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Antagonistic Allies: Bridging the Abyss
Between Nietzsche and Democracy
Melinda Rosenberg
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the often tumultuous
relationship between Friedrich Nietzsche and democracy. Nietzsche has always had
an antipathy towards democracy. Nietzsche has claimed that democracy espouses a
will to equality which levels the greatest men along with the most average men. For
Nietzsche, his Ubermenschen must emerge from the muddle of mediocrity and
similitude in order to set themselves apart from the herd. The herd is more than happy
to live in a democratic society since no one will be rendered better or greater than
anyone else.
I argue that Nietzsche does not realize democracy’s many assets. Liberal
democracy could very well be the best political springboard for his Ubermenschen.
For Nietzsche, higher culture emerges in spite of modernity’s leveling snare. These
great men engage in contests. They create their own rules and values. They say what
they like. In a fascist society, these men would never be allowed to do as they please.
One benefit of liberal democracy is that we are given the right to dissent. We are
given the right to express ourselves. Democracy could facilitate the emergence of the
elusive Ubermenschen. These are men who transcend the average and the ordinary.
In this dissertation I begin by exploring Nietzsche’s cultural criticisms. He
devotes a great deal of energy condemning modernity and its leveling tendencies. Out
ii

of the cultural morass that is modernity comes this higher culture of which Nietzsche
speaks highly. In chapter two, I argue that higher culture must begin with the
individual. I will examine what it takes for a man to be able to transcend his mediocre
culture. In chapter three, I examine the contemporary political climate and try to
determine whether these great individuals could emerge in such a climate. Finally, in
chapter four I examine which political system could best help this culture emerge. I
argue that liberal democracy is the best environment for these higher men.
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Introduction
In this dissertation I would like to bridge the gulf between Friedrich
Nietzsche and democracy. Throughout his texts Nietzsche rarely misses an
opportunity to excoriate the presence of democracy in modern Europe. It is my
claim that Nietzsche has perhaps overlooked democracy’s agonistic aspects. The
agon, or “contest”, is a mockery if the competition is unfair or rigged. If the
competitor is to have a chance at all at surpassing her rivals, the contest must be
free from domination, coercion, and manipulation. Liberal democracy can help to
ensure that these many contests proceed optimally. Liberalism is a type of
democracy which allows for freedom of thought, expression, and the pursuit of
individual goals. Liberal democracy sets rules in place to ensure that citizens are
allowed to express themselves and pursue their individual goals without any
unnecessary interference from others.
Liberalism is not the only form of democracy with which we are familiar.
There is also communitarianism whereby the community upholds certain values
agreed to upon by all members of the community. Values which differ from those
of the community are strongly discouraged. Democracy could also be viewed
from a majoritarian perspective. In such a system, individuals would be free to
pursue their goals provided that these goals coincide with the values of the
majority. Public opinion sways according to the majority. In a majoritarian
democracy, legislators may uphold certain freedoms and protect certain classes of
citizens because the majority of the people (voters) feel this should be the case.
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Individuals may not be free to pursue their goals if they are not granted a
particular freedom or protected in some other way.
I argue that liberal democracy is the best political climate out of which a
higher culture can arise because of its focus on individualism. Liberal democracy
does not require the unanimously shared values of communitarianism. In a
communitarian society, no one can sustain values which depart from the
community standards, lest he be ostracized, shamed, or even exiled. In a liberal
democracy, there are procedures or rules in place that guarantee that individuals
have the capacity to pursue their individual values. Values need not be agreed
upon by the majority either. Rules are in place to ensure that no one encroaches
upon others in his pursuits. There must be an element of fairness and equal
opportunity preceding and accompanying the staging of any contest. Absolute
autonomy cannot be permitted. We will have to sacrifice a few liberties so that we
can engage in a fair contest. When rules or procedures are enforced, then we are
free to do as we will.
Nietzsche’s criticisms of democracy and its institutions fall within the
scope of his critique of modern European culture. In chapter one I examine the
culture of modernity that Nietzsche condemns. This dissertation will begin with
Nietzsche’s assessment of modern culture and how the latter has collapsed into a
state of decadence. As an alternative to such decadence I focus on Nietzsche’s
concept of “free spirits”. While these free spirits have been born into the same
culture as their fellow men, the former have done something to set themselves
apart from the latter. The others belong to a category that Nietzsche terms the
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“herd”. The herd is a group of people who follow the lead of others. They are less
creative types who do not wish to be singled out as different or subversive. I will
examine what Nietzsche’s free spirits might do in order to elude what Nietzsche
terms decadence. Free spirits will have to transcend the realm of modern “good”
and “evil” and make their foray into Nietzsche’s seemingly unknowable “higher
culture”. Lower culture still must exist for the spirits to emerge. Lower culture
will be a kind of negative guide for the free spirits. They may not know what to
do to transcend the mundane culture in which they find themselves, but they will
know what not to do. A lower culture will always be a reminder of what a lack of
creativity and self-creation will do to someone.
I will argue in chapter two that this higher culture cannot begin until each
person who wishes to be a part of it overcomes the many personal inhibitions and
reservations that can hinder his or her creativity, resourcefulness, and
imagination. It is in this chapter that I focus primarily on Nietzsche’s concept of
eternal recurrence. A great labor must be completed before we can even consider
Nietzsche’s cultural politics. We must encounter the personal before the political.
There is little use of heralding a higher culture if there are no participants in this
higher culture. There are personal crucibles that must be addressed first.
Eternal recurrence is the main crucible which comes to mind. The question
that Nietzsche will ask us is whether we are disposed to living our lives as if they
recurred eternally. If we answer affirmatively, this implies that we are willing to
live the same life over and over. The same life means that we cannot add or
subtract any moments from our lives. If we subtract even one moment, it will not
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be the same life. If we affirm every moment, we affirm not only the joy, but also
the misery. Both joy and misery are necessary constituents of who I am
individually. If I erase the misery, I will not be the same person. If I am willing to
live my life over and over, that means I have accepted every moment that comes
my way. The misery is not enough for me to negate my life. This is no easy task.
I will show that even though eternal recurrence may not appeal to those
who have suffered numerous tragedies, it is still possible to will it without
needing to be self-deceived. It is also my claim that eternal recurrence is a very
personal experiment. I will claim that when I will eternal recurrence, I do not will
all of history. I claim that I only will the events that I have experienced. Other
events spatially or temporally removed from me may have impacted me in ways I
will never know. However, unless I have experienced something firsthand, I do
not find that I must will that event along with all others in history. Many will find
this interpretation to be a misreading of eternal recurrence, but this reading fits
with my account in chapter two. Once I have addressed the many issues that
surround eternal recurrence, I will return to the subject of higher culture. If one is
capable of willing eternal recurrence, one can then ascend to higher humanity. Or,
one is at least better prepared to make this ascension.
In chapter three, I leave the personal and begin to examine how this higher
culture might impact the world in which we live. Much time is given to
Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals in this chapter. It is in this book that Nietzsche
makes an especially arresting juxtaposition between higher types and lower types.
These higher types will be free of a bitter and ugly emotion Nietzsche calls
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ressentiment. This angry and often spiritual envy stifles the lower types. They are
angry at someone or something for their condition. Lower types are not jealous;
they are not in danger of losing someone or something. They are envious because
they lack something and are angry at those who have it. After this discussion, I
will no longer primarily look at the world through Nietzsche’s nineteenth-century
Europe as I will do in the first two chapters of this dissertation. I take his concepts
and begin to apply them in today’s culture. Is there any need to discuss eternal
recurrence or ressentiment today? I will look at the contemporary world and
ascertain whether Nietzsche still has a place in it. I will argue that Nietzsche
definitely belongs with us in today’s political climate.
Finally, in chapter four, I will argue how Nietzsche’s culture can best be
realized today. Nietzsche might not be prepared for my answer, but with the help
of a few scholars, I will argue that liberal democracy is the best political milieu
for the emergence of the higher culture Nietzsche so greatly prizes. Some might
think that coupling Nietzsche with liberal democracy is a fruitless endeavor. I do
not think that Nietzsche has more use as an apolitical thinker. It is my claim that
Nietzsche is quite potent as a political thinker. I take a very charitable and
generous approach to Nietzsche. However, I do not think that I am taking too
many liberties. Applying Nietzsche’s politics of culture does not require me to be
disingenuous regarding his many controversial writings. Like Walter Kaufmann
and Richard Schacht, I not only attempt to spare Nietzsche from proto-Fascist and
proto-Nazi accusations. I also try to soften Nietzsche’s sometimes belligerent
stance for the purpose of applying his philosophy of culture to democracy today.
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This is not always an easy task to complete. Yet with the emphasis on
multiculturalism, plurality, difference (to name a few relevant political keywords
we use today), Nietzsche is quite helpful along with democracy in negotiating this
turbulent cultural-political terrain. I will use the scholarship of Richard Schacht,
Bernd Magnus, Iris Marion Young, and even Habermas to bolster my arguments.
Schacht is a central figure for my claims due to his liberal handling of Nietzsche.
In this dissertation, I will use works of Nietzsche from his middle and late
periods. I will reference books such as Dawn, Human, All Too Human, Beyond
Good and Evil, The Genealogy of Morals, and Thus Spoke Zarathustra. I have
chosen these texts over Nietzsche’s unpublished notes since the majority of
readers are familiar with the aforementioned texts. In these texts Nietzsche takes
democracy to task. While Nietzsche is averse to anything democratic, it is my
claim that Nietzsche is somewhat mistaken about what democracy requires.
Nietzsche assumes all democracy requires the recognition of sameness among all
people. Nietzsche uses the term democracy interchangeably with terms like
“sameness” and “leveling”. Liberal democracy requires procedural equality, but it
does not require the recognition of sameness among all people. We are not all the
same. I doubt any political order could function effectively if we were required to
view every person as being substantively equal. Using Nietzsche’s many
criticisms of democracy as a backdrop enables me to argue that Nietzsche and
liberal democracy make a rather compelling duet despite their antagonistic
underpinnings.
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Chapter One
Nietzsche and the Culture of Modernity
I
We do not regard the animals as being moral
beings. But do you suppose the animals regard
us as human beings? An animal which could speak
said “Humanity is a prejudice of which we animals
at least are free. (D 333)
Nietzsche assumed a very prominent role as an arbiter of modern culture.
As a man of the nineteenth century, he surveyed the norms and values of his time
to judge the strength and vitality of modern-day Europe. As a classical
philologist, Nietzsche also had an intellectual conduit to the ancient cultures of
the past, even though he felt confined by the narrow discipline of classical
philology. Philology had trained him to simply examine classical texts and
cultures. Eventually Nietzsche would overstep the boundaries of this prim
academic discipline and defect to philosophy. He had more time to make his
foray into philosophy after he resigned from his post at the University of Basel.
One of Nietzsche’s aims in his poorly received first book, The Birth of Tragedy,
is to explore how cultures lose their creative drive and become, in Nietzsche’s
words, “decadent”. Nietzsche’s impressive breadth of knowledge concerning
Greek culture enables him to extend his analysis of antiquity to modern culture of
his time. The juxtaposition of classical and modern culture becomes Nietzsche’s
focal point. His attention is not only focused on the distant past. Nietzsche also
cares about whether modern culture is derivative of the tragic culture of Greece.
7

Modernity is not necessarily oblique to this philologist’s immediate concerns.
Nietzsche sees an intimate connection between antiquity and modernity.
Another aim of The Birth of Tragedy is to celebrate tragic culture – the
robust Dionysian culture as opposed to the cool-headed Apollonian culture.
Nietzsche seeks to resurrect the tragic culture of Greece in modern Europe since,
in his view, the latter is woefully anemic culturally and intellectually. The tragic
culture is to be revived in the opera of Richard Wagner. Nietzsche has a very selfcritical change of heart in the second preface of The Birth of Tragedy. But up
until then, what does Nietzsche admire about ancient Greece?
Some tragedians such as Aeschylus exemplified the tragic culture of
Greece. The leitmotif of his tragedies was that suffering could make one better.
No one would wish to be like Prometheus, fettered to a rock with a vulture
devouring his liver daily. Yet Prometheus seems heroic in the face of adversity.
Tragedians like Euripides nullify the value of suffering. No one would wish to
suffer like Medea. After her desertion by Jason, she lets her emotions get the best
of her and ends up killing her two sons. Here, suffering has no discernible value.
Socrates’ rationalism was another blemish on classical culture. Rationalism
prevented a person from listening to what their instincts dictated. This Apollonian
orientation, according to Nietzsche, could suffocate the creative energy of the
Dionysian culture. Instead of surrendering to aesthetic impulses, the Apollonian
would more likely savor cool rationality and restraint. The Apollonian does not
have to trump the Dionysian.
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Nietzsche had hoped to awaken the spirit of the Dionysian in his times,
even though he admitted that culture, whether then or now, was a mix of the
Apollonian and Dionysian. Nietzsche did not discuss the Apollonian and
Dionysian exclusively in the Birth of Tragedy. While the Apollonian/Dionysian
dichotomy is the primary focus of the Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche continues to
celebrate the Dionysian in later works. While Nietzsche does not focus
exclusively on this dichotomy in his later writings, there is still some hope that he
can revive the Dionysian spirit in his time. This dichotomy appears in other texts
such as Twilight of the Idols. In a section entitled “What I owe to the Ancients”,
Nietzsche recalls his first book and its intended message:
Saying Yes to life even in its strangest and hardest
problems, the will to life rejoicing over its inexhaustibility
even in the very sacrifice of its highest types – that is what
I called Dionysian, that is what I guessed to be the bridge to
the tragic poet. Not in order to be liberated from terror
and pity, not in order to purge oneself of a dangerous
affect by its vehement discharge…but in order to be
oneself the eternal joy of becoming, beyond all terror and
pity – that joy which included even a joy in
destroying. (TI: “What I Owe to the Ancients”: 5)
Regrettably for Nietzsche, the Birth of Tragedy was not well-received.
Perhaps Nietzsche besmirched his academic reputation by publishing a book
considered too outré for academic philology. Richard Wagner’s music was
celebrated as a Dionysian force in the Birth of Tragedy. Some years later,
Nietzsche broke off his friendship with Richard Wagner. With this permanent rift
in their relationship, Nietzsche decided that Wagner would not be the harbinger
of the new tragic culture. Nietzsche conceded this by the time he published the
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1886 preface to the Birth of Tragedy. Nietzsche had also determined that even he
could not fully revive the tragic age of Greece in his time.
Despite the professional embarrassment that followed the book’s
reception, Nietzsche never abandoned the celebratory import of Dionysus. The
shadow of Dionysus continued to permeate his writings. Nietzsche took to
censuring modern culture, always within the perspective of the tragic Greek
culture on his mind. Nietzsche would use the Dionysian to diagnose the rather
diseased, devolving modern culture of which he found himself a part. Nietzsche’s
attention began to focus on the prevailing values and norms of his own culture
and how these values and norms were indicative not of a sublime tragic culture,
but of a weary and declining culture. Would it be possible for a Dionysus to even
partially emerge in Nietzsche’s time?

II
Some of Nietzsche’s most strident and sophisticated criticisms of modern
norms and values are found in the works of his later period: The Gay Science,
Beyond Good and Evil, The Genealogy of Morals, Twilight of the Idols, and The
Anti-Christ. Nietzsche’s critique of modern culture does not begin with these
volumes, of course. In the books of Nietzsche’s middle period, one can begin to
see Nietzsche’s development of his critique of modern values. The “philosophers
of the future” have not yet been conceived, but books like Dawn and Human, All
Too Human allow for such Nietzschean exemplars to emerge in later volumes.
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In Human, All too Human, Nietzsche presented the genealogy of good and
evil, a genealogy that would reappear in a more refined form in the Genealogy of
Morals. In section 45, Nietzsche claims that in ancient cultures, those who had
power were called “good” while those who were deemed powerless were called
“bad”. There was nothing normative about the words “good” and “bad”. These
terms were purely descriptive. (HAH 45) Things began to change when
communities became larger and more civilized. Evaluative judgments began to
circumscribe human behavior. “Good” and “evil” begin to surface in moral
dialogues.
Moral norms emerged as a way to preserve the community. In another
passage, Nietzsche examines the differences between community and the
individual. The individual’s relationship with the community will take center
stage in later works. Even now, Nietzsche noticed that morality had its foundation
in custom. Acting in accordance with custom and tradition was the way for a
person to be considered moral. No individual created his own values since such
personal creativity would run counter to tradition and custom. This would leave
the person ostracized. To be “evil is to…practice things not sanctioned by
custom, to resist tradition, however rational or stupid that tradition may be…”
(HAH 96).
It is also in Human, All Too Human that Nietzsche’s philosophy of culture
begins to bloom. Nietzsche starts to partition the lower types from the higher
types in this book. Higher types will be unable to surface ever if they do not arise

11

from a mediocre culture. Something great, that “free spirit”, cannot come from
nothing after all:
He is called a free spirit who thinks differently
from what, on the basis of his origin, environment,
his class and profession, or on the basis of the dominant
views of the age, would have been expected of him. He is the
exception, the fettered spirits are the rule; the latter reproach him
that his free principles either originate in a desire to shock and
offend or eventuate in free actions, that is to say in actions
incompatible with sound morals. (HAH 225)
It is important for a free spirit, that higher type, to have a template of cultural
mediocrity against which to judge herself. The free spirit is a stark contrast to the
mediocre. Mediocrity is a backdrop in which a free spirit does not wish to blend
herself. She needs that backdrop to keep the contrast between herself and all the
rest. Higher types must never forget the past that has appreciably influenced their
lives:
He who has come to a clear understanding of the
problem of culture suffers from a feeling similar to
that suffered by one who has inherited a fortune dishonestly
acquired or by a prince who reigns by virtue of an act of
violence on the part of his forbears. (HAH 249)
Suffering from this “cultural past” might stir uneasy emotions, but a higher type
presumably cannot disregard her humble beginnings. These higher types do not
have a large number of compatriots. Nobility is a laborious goal. “Nobility of
mind consists in good-naturedness and absence of distrust, and thus contains
precisely that which successful and money-hungry people are so fond of looking
down on and laughing at” (HAH 493). So, few wish to shock and mark
themselves as nonconforming. Nietzsche valorizes these types also for their
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genius. For Nietzsche, a genius is one who “strives with uncommon energy to
…discover a new path which no one knows“ (HAH 231).
The genius is also someone who would “manipulate falsehood, force, the
most ruthless self-instruments as his instruments so skillfully he could only be
called an evil, demonic being…” (HAH 241). Of course “evil” for Nietzsche is
that which has run counter to “good” after the slave revolt in morals. Nietzsche is
not inviting nefarious bigots to introduce themselves as those demonic beings.
Refusing to pity someone might be seen as an evil gesture. In the same passage,
this genius is depicted as a “centaur, half beast, half man, and with angel’s wings
attached to his head in addition” (HAH 241). Despite the lurid mythology implied
by these words, the genius might actually choose a mild-mannered existence
instead of imitating the life of a maenad or satyr. Nevertheless, many can view
Nietzsche’s words as signaling battle, blood, and domination. “The frightful
energies – those which are called evil – are the cyclopean architects and roadmakers of humanity” (HAH 246). Nietzsche does not make anything easy for his
readers.
Nietzsche sketches the genius and what sets her apart from others. He
claims that “[e]veryone possesses inborn talent, but few possess the degree of
inborn and acquired toughness, endurance and energy actually to become a talent
[and] to become what he is…”(HAH 263). His insistence that we all become who
we are resounds in later books. Becoming who one is suggests that one has
certain talents that can be cultivated while others do not possess the same talents.
It is not necessarily decided upon birth or by genes who can transcend the
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mediocrity of one’s culture. No one’s pedigree has to permanently damn them to
a life less than extraordinary.
However, this higher type might face a difficult beginning when
considering those who live among the swarm of mediocre values. There will
always be culture icons and other pin-ups even in the midst of what is middling
and stultifying. A person whom the lower types deems great is really someone
“whose views are in advance of their time, but only to the extent that he
anticipates the commonplace views of the next decade” (HAH 269). This
person’s “fame usually tends to be much noisier than the fame of the truly great
and superior” (HAH 269). One can quickly envision a self-help guru who soars to
the top of the New York Times bestseller list with a dreary handbook for
happiness and self-actualization while the veritable scholar’s manuscript, still in
need of a publisher, accumulates cobwebs. What Nietzsche might consider
“higher culture” is often misunderstood, disdainfully labeled as cerebral,
subversive, or just plain irrational. Higher culture may breed suspicion and
antagonism since the lower types “cannot understand those men who are able to
play on more strings than two” (HAH 281). Higher culture is a “many-stringed
culture,” always “falsely interpreted by the lower” (HAH 281). Higher types
would never wilt facing such contempt. They know the foundation from which
they sprang:
Is it not on precisely this soil, which you sometimes
find so displeasing, the soil of unclear thinking, that
many of the most splendid fruits of more ancient cultures
grew up? One must have loved religion and art like mother
and nurse – otherwise one cannot grow wise. But
one must be able to see beyond them, outgrow them;
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if one remains under their spell, one does not understand
them. (HAH 292)
Higher types have to be familiar with their humble beginnings before they can
transcend the mundane and the mediocre. Furthermore, whoever might qualify as
a higher type might not know he has the artistic makeup if it is not clear just what
intellectual and artistic tools are necessary for raising oneself above the ordinary
to become an Ubermensch. Just what is the Ubermensch of which Nietzsche
speaks? How would we ever know we have one in our presence? The
Ubermensch, or “overman”, is some kind of extraordinary and supra-human
being. Is this a human being who emerges from a lower culture?
There are precedents for regarding Nietzsche’s statements regarding the
Ubermensch and vilification of traditional morality and modern culture. The “free
spirit” could be seen as an earlier incarnation of the Ubermensch. Prior to Thus
Spoke Zarathustra, the “free spirit” who creates his own values can be seen in
Daybreak. Nietzsche claims that there is no “morality with an exclusive
monopoly of the moral, and that every morality which affirms itself alone
destroys too much valuable strength and is bought too dear” (D 164). Nietzsche
declines to accept any morality as the one true morality. If morality is to exist,
there would presumably be more than just one type of morality. Nietzsche is
neither a communitarian nor an absolutist regarding morality. Morals will be
contingent upon the plethora of perspectives that are entailed by any culture,
higher or lower. These perspectives, at least for Nietzsche, are not reducible to
one overarching view regarding the moral and immoral. Nietzsche’s beliefs about
morality could isolate him from his community and condemn him to solitude. He
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theorized this situation as taking a distance from the human-all-too-human and
maddening crowd. If objections are not raised to the value of morality, the
presuppositions of morality remain intact, as does its practice. Submission to a
prefabricated morality itself hinders the creation of new values. Morality “makes
stupid” (D 19). Nietzsche repeatedly wonders how many people really have
questioned the origin of their moral beliefs and prejudices. Why are so many
people hesitant to do so? Why are so many beguiled by moral norms and values?
III
Nietzsche could answer such questions in The Genealogy of Morals. In
this work, Nietzsche applies a genealogical method to trace the development of
morals. In the preface, he asks under what conditions did man derive these
judgments (GM P:5)? If morals are binding, which they appear to be for most,
then one must arrive at a knowledge of the very nature of morality to offer a
critique of the values that morality produces. Nietzsche’s aim is to demonstrate
that moral values are contingent. If certain people are to counteract the values of
their culture, or in other words, to revaluate values, then a genealogy is needed to
show that the accepted moral values are not eternal truths predetermined by a god
or by a deified nature.
Nietzsche is recalling his previous assessment that he made of ancient
culture in Human, All Too Human, yet goes further here. According to Nietzsche,
long ago there were two groups of people – the masters and the slaves, or the
“good” and the “bad” respectively. “Good” and “bad” were descriptive and not
prescriptive terms in ancient times. If one were good, that meant one was noble,
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beautiful, and highborn. The designation of “bad” meant that one was “ignoble”,
base, and ugly (GM I:4). The bad were rather unhappy with their lot, so they
sought to revolt and invert the values of good and bad. According to Nietzsche,
this “slave revolt in morals” occurred when ressentiment became creative and
produced new values, or least inverted the old values (GM I:10). Ressentiment is
repressed envy, an envy which can be both destructive and hostile when projected
onto other people who happen to be different. Ressentiment produces in its
sufferers a spirit of revenge. “While every noble morality develops from a
triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is
‘outside’, what is ‘different’, what is ‘not itself’; and this No is its creative deed”
(GM I:10).
The weak and ignoble were fortunate enough to have a hostile external
world; such a world was all the more conducive to their creativity since others
were to be blamed for their condition. The ignoble were envious of the noble
living conditions of the noble and well-born. The ignoble sought to avenge their
miserable lot by inverting the values of good and bad. What was bad became
“good”, and what was good became not bad, but “evil”. A show of superiority, of
strength, or of nobility became “evil”. These new values were no longer
descriptive, but prescriptive. Slave morality bred men to be a certain way all the
time. Expectations developed. Men became more responsible, reliable, and
calculable. Men had to develop a memory so that they could remember to be
more responsible, reliable, and calculable. If morality were to become more
uniform, men had to remember what was expected of them (GM II:2). Men had
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responsibilities and commitments, and they had to promise that they would honor
these responsibilities and commitments. One had to remember to keep his
promises.
Another way to analyze what makes morality binding, according to
Nietzsche, was to trace the history of the creditor/debtor relationship back to its
amoral beginnings. Nietzsche argues that “the major moral concept Schuld [guilt]
has its origin in the very material concept Schulden [debts]” (GM II:4).
Originally, if a debtor could not pay back his creditor, he was guilty of defaulting
and deserved to be punished for his failings. This creditor/debtor relationship can
be enlarged and then applied to criminal and moral wrongdoing. A person is
angry over such wrongdoing and wants the “debtor” to repay his debt in some
way. According to Nietzsche “this anger [at some harm or injury] is held in check
and modified by the idea that every injury has its equivalent and can actually be
paid back, even if only through the pain of the culprit” (GM II:4).
Such a relationship is further enlarged when the community adopts the
role of creditor. Each man owes his community in some way and he is found
guilty if he falls short of his duties as a citizen:
The community, the disappointed creditor, will
repayment it can, one may depend on that. The direct harm
caused by the culprit is here a minor matter; quite apart from
this, the lawbreaker is above all a ‘breaker’, a breaker of
his contract and his word with the whole in respect
to all the benefits and comforts of communal life
of which he has hitherto had a share. The lawbreaker is a
debtor who has not merely failed to make good the advantages
and advance payments bestowed upon him but has actually
attacked his creditor: therefore he is not only deprived
henceforth of all these advantages and benefits, as is
fair – he is also reminded what these benefits are really
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worth (GM II:9).
Moral lapses are strongly discouraged. If a transgressor feels guilty, it must be
because he has a “bad conscience”, another byproduct of slave morality (GM
II:14). The transgressor has let down his community and is beholden to the
community. He feels guilty for his sins. His conscience makes him feel guilty. A
man has to feel guilty concerning his wrongdoing so he will feel too bad to ever
commit the same offense again. The guilt is instilled into his memory.
The creditor/debtor relationship then expands even further. Slave morality
eventually gives birth to the Judeo-Christian tradition, a tradition that emphasizes
the meek, the humble, and the slavish, at least for Nietzsche. This tradition has
been institutionalized in culture. Its values are pervasive. It is a tradition that is
still the basis of modern-day values, even if the values are secularized. The
Judeo-Christian tradition was for Nietzsche the unfortunate foundation of values
in his time. With this tradition, the creditor/debtor relationship becomes
spiritualized where God is the creditor and man the debtor (GM II:20). Such a
feeling of indebtedness to God can never be assuaged. Man is forever incapable
of fully appeasing God. We are indebted to God and this debt can never be
repaid. God is disappointed in man for many reasons, and the concomitant guilt is
immense. Perhaps this is why we are suffering. Men are guilty of something,
guilty before the eyes of God. We suffer for our sins. As Nietzsche says in The
Gay Science, “the resolve to make the world ugly and bad has made the world
ugly and bad” (GS 130).
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The power of traditional morality is reinforced by the ascetic ideal. In the
third essay of the Genealogy, Nietzsche claims that many people will turn to the
ascetic ideal, a form of psychological self-flagellation, to protect themselves from
further suffering (GM III:13). The ascetic ideal is another derivation of the JudeoChristian tradition. The instincts of a person have never been lost, yet this person
continues to struggle against these supposedly “evil” instincts. The ascetic ideal
requires a person to suppress their instincts since it is believed by most that the
instincts cause great suffering. An ascetic priest would certainly claim this is so.
Instincts are too primordial, too uncivilized to be good.
Ascetic priests, in Nietzsche’s words, are “slanderers of nature” (GS 294).
These ascetic priests will implore their congregation to deny their most basic
instincts. According to ascetic priests, these instincts are vile. Nietzsche declares
instincts to be natural inclinations, not moral abominations. If the instincts are
natural, why should we feel behooved to suppress them? The ascetic ideal
prevents us from affirming these instincts. The ascetic ideal turns away from
affirmation and joy; it turns toward sickliness and degeneration. The denial of
instincts presumably erases the joy and affirmation from our lives since, in the
process of this erasure, we struggle too hard to destroy what comes naturally to
us. For Nietzsche, one must be sick if he is ashamed of his natural inclinations.
Natural inclinations are not taught. Very often someone is taught to repress
certain visceral desires because these desires supposedly distract someone from
pursuing the goods of her culture. Perhaps her natural inclinations do make a
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sharp detour from what others say is “good”. A herd animal is taught to feel
shame for succumbing to instincts instead of religious dogma.
Affirming our instincts would not mean that we were living in a brutish,
Hobbesian state of nature. Instincts are not the cause of our suffering. But we do
suffer. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, there must be a metaphysical cause for
suffering. In this view, suffering could not be meaningless in a moral world.
Nietzsche points out that
…something was lacking, that man was surrounded by a fearful void – he
did not know how to justify, to account for, to affirm himself; he suffered
from the problem of his meaning…but his problem was not suffering
itself, but that there was no answer to his crying question, ‘Why do I
suffer?’ (GM III:28).
According to Nietzsche, the answer religious morality provided rested on the
association of suffering with guilt and on the subsequent internalization of guilt,
from which individuals must seek redemption. Nietzsche says in Twilight of the
Idols that “the value of life cannot be estimated” (TI, “The Problem of
Socrates:2). Judgments concerning the value of life do not empower the
individual. They are just symptoms of an a declining life. Nature is not immoral
or moral. Nature is just there. No God is punishing us for original sin or for acting
according to our instincts. Nietzsche would like others to agree with this
assessment. But few can bear the idea that suffering is meaningless. Slave
morality seeks meaning in suffering whether it is great or small. After all, there
must be a reason for everything. Relief may reside in the principle of sufficient
reason. Furthermore, it relieves many to think that there must be a metaphysical
answer as to why they suffer. These believers are unable to accept their suffering
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as a natural and possibly meaningless process. They are also unable to accept
their current social status. No one wants to be in the class of the weak and the
envious, but those in the class of the strong and the proud may have their troubles
too. The latter have found a way to overcome the limitations that life can present.
The love of fate, amor fati, something Nietzsche so joyously celebrates, appears
to be absent from a person who “wages war against what is ugly” (GS 276).
If Nietzsche is right in his genealogy, then morals certainly have an
unhealthy origin. In modern culture, these morals persist. Modern Europeans are
inextricably fettered by these moral values. At least most modern Europeans are
snared. People still fight their instincts. Nietzsche says in The Antichrist that “I
call an animal, a species, or an individual corrupt when it loses its instincts, when
it chooses, when it prefers, what is disadvantageous for it” (A 6). Instincts are of
little value in a civilized and modern culture, or so its citizens think. Nietzsche
believes that these “corrupt” values have not promoted excellence. They have
promoted mediocrity, weakness, and degeneration. It appears that few people
have the strength and audacity to overcome morality and overcome themselves.
Nietzsche traced the origin of morality with a genealogy, yet his task is not
complete. Can these morals be overcome? Can new values be created? How is
one to transcend mediocrity? The “herd” is a group of average people who follow
other people’s values instead of creating their own. The “herd” follows other
conceptions of good and evil instead of transcending good and evil. How is one to
transcend the “herd” which Nietzsche criticizes? Nietzsche calls the mediocre
ones the “herd” since unlike the free spirits who follow their own instincts, the
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herd follow each other without ever questioning the direction in which they are
headed.

IV
The herd is always an burden for Nietzsche. The stability and permanence
of the herd can never be underestimated. The herd simply will not disappear, nor
will its membership decline significantly. More or less, people are born into the
herd and distancing oneself from its values is onerous if not impossible. Why is
this the case, according to Nietzsche? No current member of the herd has the
imagination to think of life without its comfortable norms. Morality is deeply and
indelibly acculturated into the individual. Few in the herd have the selfpossession that is ostensibly needed to annul these supervening moral norms and
create their own values. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche indicts morality for
training “the individual to be a function of the herd and to ascribe value to
himself only as a function” (GS 116). A man of the herd is programmed to think
himself only of value with reference to the herd, not apart from it. If value is
ascribed only by invoking moral precepts, and if respect is bestowed because one
is an exemplar according to his cultural tradition, then who would want to stand
alone?
In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche writes his “prelude to a philosophy
of the future.” as he indicates in the book’s subtitle. Nietzsche offers a thumbnail
sketch of what these philosophers of the future (or the present) might be like:
“Every superior human being will instinctively aspire after a secret citadel where
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he is set free from the crowd, the many, the majority, where, as its exception, he
may forget the rule of ‘man’” (BGE 26). Superior human beings in the
Nietzschean sense would resist the leveling impulse of morality (BGE 44). These
are human beings who want no part of the herd. They do not need to be trained in
how to impart meaning to their lives by someone else. The superior human being
has to affirm her life; no else will do it for her. She can always follow another
person’s pedestrian formula for success, but her life and its values could never be
exclusively hers. Many of us will learn from our parents and teachers without
ever once questioning their doctrines. This may work well for some, but
Nietzsche does not see this path as conducive to the creation of a superior human
being.
Nietzsche claims that there are some people who do not need others to
supervise them. According to Nietzsche, some people simply have it in them to
be greater than others. This does not mean that superior human beings are entitled
to completely transcend the parameters of their culture in the sense that superior
human beings are not above the law. A superior human being can cast off the
yolk of her mediocre culture, but if she wishes to live among the herd, some
compromises will have to be made. Valuing lawlessness or violence would leave
such a human being more sequestered than Zarathustra ever was. I argue that the
creation of new values need not entail the planning of a master race and the
enslavement of weaker, slavish types. In chapter three, I will argue, along with
Richard Schacht that the creation of values is an intermittent process that is
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coupled with moments of mediocrity, even for the superior human being.
Creative types must pay their income taxes too.
Nietzsche underscores the importance of creativity because, in a culture
that tends towards equality, higher and lower types mingle together. This
mingling might be awkward. Not everyone can paint a masterpiece or be a
virtuoso at the piano. Not everyone has the literary imagination to write a novel
or a play. Some will be the artists, and some will be the artisans. For Nietzsche, a
superior human being’s creative proclivities should not be sacrificed so that lower
men are accounted for equally. In today’s world, not every journalist or columnist
will be talented enough to write for the New York Times. Yet this is just what herd
morality does. Nietzsche claims that sovereign religions are the reason why
“higher” men are subsumed into the lower (BGE 62). Those in the herd safeguard
their belief in God since it is only an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent
God who can ensure that all human beings, despite their differences, can be
rendered equal from his supernatural standpoint (BGE 219).
With this steadfast Judeo-Christian interpretation, only the herd-like man
is “permissible” (BGE 199). Yet this is not an interpretation that Nietzschean
“free spirits” would likely accept. Free spirits, pariahs from the herd, are a
frightening prospect because of their willful disregard for cultural norms. Any
human being who extricates herself from the herd is a danger to the very
foundation of her culture. Her self-created values are inimical to the sustaining of
the culture since she may write off typically shared norms like moderation, pity,
and equality. She keeps a “pathos of distance” between herself and the herd since
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her law-giving posture predictably disconnects her from the rest (BGE 257).
Nietzsche states that all moralities, however many there are, must “bow before an
order of rank” (BGE 221). This does not mean that no system of morality is
useful for the individual who transcends the herd. Some moralities may be better
than others. Herd values are on a far lower rung. For those who rise above the
rest, whatever their morality enjoins is for them a higher morality than anything
that springs from the herd.
The number of superior human beings will surely be small in proportion
to the majority. All others remain part of the always maddening crowd, part of the
dreadful herd dependent on values which were created for them. These ready-towear values include “free will”. According to Nietzsche, human beings are under
the impression that they possess a will which allows them to choose their actions
autonomously, whether in the style of Kant or that of a God-fearing Christian.
Autonomy entails responsibility and punishment. This is a fiction for Nietzsche.
He claims that there are only strong wills and weak will (BGE 21). Nietzsche
adds that “independence is for the few; it is a privilege of the strong” (BGE 29).
Instead of being free to choose one’s actions, the weak ones are actually
conscripted into morality for fear of censure or other punitive measures. The
weak simply live according to their mythological values, believing themselves to
be exercising moral self-determination when they are dutifully genuflecting in
front of some type of unchallenged moral authority.
It seems rather surprising that any “free spirit” could emerge from the
herd culture unscathed and healthy. As Daniel Conway has observed, Nietzsche
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and his disciples would have been “enframed by modernity”.1 Even the free
spirits cannot completely escape from the values of modernity. We would be
enframed to such a stifling point that modernity would be the blight from which
we could never fully escape.
The more sickliness becomes among men –
and we cannot deny its normality – the higher
should be the honor accorded to the rare cases
of great power of soul and body, man’s
lucky hits; the more we should protect the wellconstituted from the worst kind of air, the air of
the sickroom (GM III:14).
Nietzsche adds elsewhere that that “the power of moral prejudices has penetrated
deep into the most spiritual world, which is apparently the coldest and most free
of suppositions – and, as goes without saying, has there acted in a harmful,
inhibiting, blinding, distorting fashion (BGE 23). Worse yet, these enduring
moral prejudices are just interpretations, or rather “misinterpretations of
phenomena” (TI “Improvers of Mankind”:I).
These stodgy interpretations are viewed by the herd as the truth, which of
course would proscribe other articulated interpretations. Such misinterpretations
narrow other perspectives of morality (BGE 188). Nietzsche is suspicious of
epistemic and moral cartels because he claims they refuse to recognize other
perspectives as being valid. Nietzsche’s “perspectivism” involves:
only a perspective seeing, only a perspective knowing; and
the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes,
different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete
will our ‘concept’ of this thing, our ‘objectivity’ be…[and] to eliminate
the will altogether, to suspend each and every affect, supposing we were
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capable of this – what would that mean but to castrate the intellect? (GM
III:12).
The free spirits recognize that moral norms are simply interpretations that they do
not accept. Moral norms of the herd, as free spirits might interpret it, are not
conducive to greatness, artistry, and creativity. Herd morality is something which
must be overcome, overcome by each individual person. Nietzsche echoes the
sentiment of his beloved Zarathustra who so compelling said that “in order to
create, one must also destroy” (Z I:15). Nietzsche is not abolishing morality; he is
lambasting herd-morality. Other moralities, the aforementioned “higher
moralities” are possible (BGE 202). Nietzsche’s perspectival approach to
morality allows him to be reticent on the possibility of these other higher
moralities.
This is not to say that any particular morality or kind of morality can be
unquestionably judged as higher. For Nietzsche, some are better than others but
even the higher moralities’ presuppositions must be questioned. As a result, there
is always the threat that perspectivism could collapse into relativism. In this view,
without any objective criteria against which we could judge perspectives, there
would be no conceivable way of ascertaining which perspective is right or even
better. Nietzsche however does not see relativism as a doppelganger of
perspectivism. I will delve into this discussion later on in the chapter. We will see
how Nietzsche enlightens us as to how some perspectives can be judged better
than others. In this way, relativism will merely seem like an immature and crude
process of valuation.
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V
Nietzsche is calling for a “revaluation of all values under whose novel
pressure and hammer a conscience would be steeled…” (BGE 203). Free spirits
do not necessarily have to retreat into the friendless solitude of the mountains like
Zarathustra in order to engage in such a project. Free spirits could still live on the
same street as their herd-like counterparts; they may simply decline to adhere to
all of the latter’s values. The traits the free spirits might exhibit would be
remarkably different from those of the faint-hearted herd. Free spirits, alone or
among fellow creators, make the rewarding attempt to craft a higher culture.
Many scholars, such as Richard Schacht and Walter Kaufmann, have attempted to
spare Nietzsche from the misappropriation by Nazis and other miscellaneous
fascists. I feel my task is the same. I do not believe that Nietzsche is advocating a
violent overthrow of moral norms so these “higher men” can overpower and
subjugate the weak. I would not even expect a bloodless coup by the free spirits
since their numbers are ostensibly small. Further, Nietzsche points out in The Gay
Science that harming others is a sign that one lacks power and is fraught with
ressentiment – the spirit of revenge (GS 13). The “master race” of Aryans would
not be any stronger or healthier than the wretched slaves from the Genealogy. Nor
do I think that Nietzsche is recommending a return to the barbaric master race as
seen in the Genealogy. The “master race” may charm white supremacists and
neo-Nazis who conflate the ancient masters with Aryan purity. I maintain that this
is not all what Nietzsche envisioned. Instead he speaks of an “ascent” and not a
regression to barbarism (TI Skirmishes of an Untimely Man:48). Those who turn
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their attention away from the herd can be seen as menacing primarily because
they are defying their given culture, not because they seek to erect a thousandyear Reich.
With this, I would like to briefly examine Nietzsche’s alleged ties to
Nazism and Anti-Semitism. In these two passages, the first comes from a Nazi
propaganda magazine. The second quotation comes from Beyond Good and Evil.
While I see no similarity between these two quotations, a cursory reading of
Nietzsche’s passage can lead to the misuse and misappropriation of what he has
said:
With his poison, the Jew destroys
The sluggish blood of weaker peoples
So that a diagnosis arises
Of swift Degeneration
With us, however, the cases is different
The blood is pure; we are healthy!2
A species arises, a type becomes fixed
and strong, through protracted struggle against
essentially unfavorable conditions (BGE 260).
While these epigraphs were written years apart and by different people,
has one sentiment influenced the other? In Beyond Good and Evil, was Nietzsche
advocating a racial hygiene which would later become institutional in the Third
Reich? Nietzsche clearly thought certain people by nature were greater and
stronger than others. Were the people, the fabled Ubermenschen, fitter than
others? Were they purer than others? Is Nietzsche’s philosophy a prototype of the
“racial science” which would emerge violently with Nazi Germany? Is Nietzsche
an intellectual forefather of racial prejudice? Racial hygiene, beginning in the late
2
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19th century, was championed by countless physicians and scientists in Germany
to advance the racial purity of the Aryan race. How racial purity was to be
preserved by the Nazis can be unmistakably ascertained by looking at laws
forbidding abortion or birth control for Aryan women, forcing sterilization of
certain undesirable, impure women, requiring mass euthanasia of feeble-minded
and mentally ill patients.
I argue that Nietzsche in no way was advocating a racial hygiene in any of
his texts. However, Nietzsche’s writings can inadvertently cast him as a deceased
mouthpiece for Nazis and other assorted Fascists and supremacists who do not
realize that “around every profound spirit a mask is continually growing, thanks
to the constantly false, that is to say shallow interpretation of every word he
speaks, every step he takes, every sign of life he gives” (BGE 40). I will examine
in depth the last two chapters of Beyond Good and Evil and Human, All Too
Human to see where this stronger species can arise out of a weaker species. Such
racial, biological, and medical language has been misappropriated historically.
While Nietzsche, like many philosophers, has been abused and misappropriated, a
Nazi’s lack of literary sense or Elizabeth Forster-Nietzsche’s fanatical and
laughably small Aryan colony in Paraguay are not reasons to accuse Nietzsche of
latent racism and anti-Semitism. However, I will argue that Nietzsche does
indeed have racial aspirations, but that these aspirations do not lead a few million
to the gas chambers or to Madagascar.3 If there is a charge for which we can
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indict Nietzsche, it would be Eurocentrism, not racial hygiene. Racial hygiene
was the product of German nationalism. Lampert notes that Nietzsche attempts to
promulgate a “pan-Europeanism” that has nothing to do with racial hygiene.4
The pernicious thought of racial hygiene surfaced in 1895. Alfred Ploetz
had coined the term Rassenhygiene for the purpose of studying how one’s race
allegedly influenced physical and mental health.5 The emergence of racial
hygiene as a legitimate science was due to the Teutonic fear that the white Aryan
race was quickly becoming degenerate because of the mixing with other races
who were less pure. Misfits and miscreants were multiplying. This trend was
alarming because the Aryans considered themselves to be the superior race, but
their superiority was being challenged by increased breeding with other races.
Miscegenation could swiftly destroy the “human germ plasm”.6 Oddly enough,
Aryans were not peerless. Ploetz did class Jews as also racially superior.7 His
intentions were not first-class. Ploetz considered European Jewry to be a virtual
facsimile of the Aryan race. European Jews practically were Aryans, so there was
no need to omit them from the elite list of races. Ploetz was most likely speaking
of Ashkenazi Jews who tend to have lighter skin than their Sephardic
counterparts. Early on, Ploetz felt that Anti-Semitism was a futile prejudice.
There were no pure races anymore because of mixing.8 Ploetz did not believe that
mixing was necessarily detrimental, provided the top-tier races mixed together
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and not with second or third tier races. The mixing of superior races could
actually enhance fitness. For Nietzsche, fitness was cultural. For Ploetz, fitness
was biological, racial, and evolutionary. In this case, Ploetz and Nietzsche do not
belong on the same pedestal. The best qualities and variations would be inherited
by the offspring. These beliefs still are troubling, and the zealous bigotry of the
Nazi party further radicalized the scientific community’s quest for racial
sweetness and light.
The concerns that racial hygiene fostered, at least until the 1920s, had
more to do with the declining birthrate of the Aryans thought to constitute racially
superior families. Aryans had to protect posterity from the dirty gene pools of
inferior types. These worries are hardly innocuous, but they were not nearly as
noxious as the ones which began to percolate in the Weimar Republic in the
1920s, culminating in state-sponsored extermination of people the Nazis declared
to be racially impure. Racial scientists were always apprehensive, but now the
disquiet was from the apparent de-nordification of Europe.9 Jews were not
permitted to breathe easily for long. They soon lost their near-equal status with
the Aryan population and were subsumed into the category of the polluted races.
In the 1930s, the confluence of racism, prejudice, paranoia, misbegotten cultural
attitudes and angry young men that would become the National Socialism party
appropriated racial hygiene for their political agenda. The Nazi party sought to
implement measures which promoted “applied biology”.10 We know what
happened after that.

9

ibid., p.27.
ibid., p.69.

10

33

So where does Nietzsche fit into all of this? In his writings there is a
bifurcation between lower and higher cultures. He scoffs at the decadence of
those who are part of the herd, precluding their ascension to that higher plane
where only a few destroyers and creators of values tread. For Nietzsche, nothing
appears completely forbidden. Could his musings have been the benchmark of
Nazi values? It is difficult for anyone to familiarize herself with the “overman”
since Nietzsche does not adequately illustrate what kind of person this would be.
Could the Nazis seamlessly include Nietzsche in their political platform by
propounding the thesis that Aryan culture was the higher culture? Could we ever
hold such Nazi beliefs to be erroneous if there are no overriding truths to be
found in Nietzsche? Alexander Nehamas fears that Nietzsche could be valorizing
an evil hero or a “Hitler”, provided such a person followed the Nietzschean
program of self-overcoming and revaluating all values.11 There would appear to
be no firm epistemological and ethical points of view for Nietzsche. Could we
even condemn such a person? How could we be sure that Nazi postures were not
noble? Furthermore, Nietzsche’s diction entails racial and biological terms that
were not foreign to the very scientists and physicians whose perverse ideologies
underpinned the Nazi and proto-Nazi consortium.
While Nietzsche cannot be spared from misinterpretation, I maintain that
there is no need to prosecute Nietzsche in absentia. Nietzsche is unequivocally an
elitist. This does not mean that he is a racist. He had great plans for Europe.
These plans included the separation, or “pathos of distance”, between the higher
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types and lower types (BGE 257). I do believe that Nietzsche was an equal
opportunity elitist. Anyone, not just blond-hair blue-eyed Aryans, could transcend
the herd and its life-denying values. Perhaps even women could transcend the
herd. It is imperative to look at several of Nietzsche’s passages in an attempt to
soften the blow his words might have on those who need a rough and ready
spokesman for their political campaign.
Nietzsche’s iconoclastic beliefs regarding race, culture, nobility, and the
future of Europe can be seen even in his middle period in Human All Too Human.
In section 439, he claims that “a higher culture can come into existence only
where there are two castes in society: that of the workers and that of the idle”
(HAH 439). One section later, he points out that “that in which men and women
of the nobility excel others and which gives them an undoubted right to be rated
higher consists in two arts ever more enhanced through inheritance: the art of
commanding and the art of proud obedience” (HAH 440). While nothing here is
excruciatingly worrisome, there are obviously elitist watermarks in Nietzsche’s
work. Nietzsche is not a classist even though he uses a word like “caste”.
“Differences in good fortune and happiness are not the essential element when it
comes to the production of a higher culture” (HAH 439). Even the proletariat has
a chance. The lower culture espouses values which are hostile to life, at least
through a Nietzschean lens. Hence we have those “unfavorable conditions” for
the strong species. However, the species is not a specific one. In no passage can
one detect proto-Nazi sympathies. Nietzsche does not procure any specs of a
“higher culture”, nor does he state just what kind of person gains membership to
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this culture. Aryans and Jews alike just might be the higher culture’s denizens.
With no apparent fixed or well-defined entities in Nietzsche, higher culture could
entail many people; there would be no singularity in superiority.
Nietzsche also discusses the mixing of the races and the deep-seated AntiSemitism of many Germans In Human, All Too Human. Nietzsche was no
nationalist. We shall find out soon who the “Good European” is, but he or she is
certainly the result of cross-pollination. It is doubtful we ever would have heard
or seen him belting out “Deutschland, Deutschland, uber alles!” in any Nazi
propaganda film. In a section entitled “European man the abolition of nations”,
Nietzsche claims that:
Trade and industry, the post and the book-trade,
the possession in common of all higher culture, rapid
changing of home and scene, the nomadic life now lived
by all who do not own land - these circumstances are
necessarily bringing with them a weakening and finally an
abolition of nations, at least the European: so that as a
consequence of continual crossing a mixed race, that of the
European man, must come into being out of them. (HAH 475).
Nietzsche supports this mixing of European races. Together, and not apart, a
mixed European race that contains the best elements of those races which were
mixed, would produce the “Good European”. This does not mean that Nietzsche
would have assented to Alfred Ploetz’s racial science. Nietzsche was not
advocating the triumph of the Aryan race over all others. Nietzsche would have
been better served if he had not used words like “race” so loosely. Instead, I feel
he should have said that the admixture of the highest cultures of Europe,
including Jewish culture, would shape the hearty cultural makeup of the “Good
European”. To further the claim that Nietzsche was averse to nationalism, he
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points out that the goal of the Good European is “at present being worked against,
by the separation of nations through the production of national hostilities” (HAH
475). He called such nationalism “artificial” and felt it was a “temporary
countercurrent”. Furthermore, “one should not be afraid to proclaim oneself
simply a good European and actively work for the amalgamation of nations…”
(HAH 475). The European Union is definitely not Nietzsche’s work in practice.
After all, France and Germany often appear to have the final word on European
affairs. Europe cannot elude this Franco-Germanic sway. The mixture races,
cultures, and peoples has not been a success yet. And England wants to separate
too.
Also in this passage, anti-Semites must pardon Nietzsche for not feeling
the same way about Jews as they do. Another problem with national states is that
they cannot escape their anti-Semitic proclivities:
The entire problem with the Jews exists only within
national states, inasmuch as it is here that their energy
and higher intelligence, their capital in will and spirit
accumulated from generation to generation in a long school
of suffering, must come to preponderate to a degree calculated
to arouse envy and hatred, so that in almost every nation - and the
more so the more nationalist a posture the nation is again adopting
- there is gaining ground the literary indecency of
leading Jews to the slaughter as scapegoats for every possible
public or private misfortune. (HAH 475).
This passage is tragically prescient. While in later works Nietzsche vilified all
that was derivative of the Judeo-Christian tradition, the perseverance and grit of
the Jewish people, not their religion by itself was something Nietzsche truly
admired. Nietzsche adds that “[for] the production of the strongest possible
European mixed race, the Jew will be just as usable and desirable as an ingredient
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of it as any other national residue” (HAH 475).
Nietzsche continues this conversation in “Peoples and Fatherlands” from
Beyond Good and Evil. In this book from his later period, Nietzsche is even more
explicit regarding his hopes for the future of Europe. The “Good European” is not
an amorphous persona that plays a small part in Nietzsche’s identity politics. The
“Good European” has arrived. Now, the contingent just needs to be enlarged.
Nietzsche says that the good Europeans still “have our hours when we permit
ourselves a warm-hearted patriotism, a lapse and regression into old loves and
narrowness” (BGE 241). There are still those “hours of national ebullition, of
patriotic palpitations and floods of various outmoded feelings” (BGE 241).
Without the lower culture, the higher culture could not have existed and because
of this, we good Europeans still have tinctures of the lower culture in us. These
feelings last for just a few hours during the Olympics when a fellow countryman
wins a gold medal. We might wave the flag of our country and sing its anthem,
but the feeling fades as quickly as it came. These few hours do not translate into a
thousand years.
Nietzsche also continues his praise of Jews in section 250. It is in
Nietzsche’s opinion that Europe actually owes the Jews:
the grand style in morality, the dreadfulness and
majesty of infinite demands, infinite significances,
the whole romanticism and sublimity or moral
questionabilities…and the most attractive, insidious
and choicest part of those iridescences and seductions
to life with whose afterglow the sky of our European
culture, its evening sky, is now aflame… (BGE 250).
Nietzsche did not consider Jews to be a European people, but he still venerated
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them for their contributions to Europe.12 Jews are the “strongest, toughest and
purest race at present living in Europe; they know how to prevail even under the
worse conditions (BGE 251). Nietzsche further states that Jews have the acumen
to take over Europe and could easily do so, but they are not planning on doing so
(BGE 251). Not everything about Jewish culture appealed to Nietzsche. Keith
Ansell-Pearson claims that Nietzsche was no anti-Semite, but instead shared a
common Gentile belief that Jews were better off if they assimilated into Europe
instead of remaining on the periphery.13
Some might think that wanting Jews to assimilate instead of asserting their
unique identity among Christians reeks of anti-Semitism. Assimilation does entail
the partial if not complete erasure of one's identity in order to blend in with the
rest. This could be viewed as racism since one type of people are being
encouraged to merge within the culture so their identifying characteristics have
been forgotten and destroyed. However, the desire for the assimilation of Jews as
opposed to the desire for expulsion, deportation, or extermination of Jews seems
far more harmless. Nietzsche wanted the best of the Jewish population to mix
with the best of the European population. Nietzsche believes that Jews actually
want to assimilate so they could be “finally settled, permitted, respected
somewhere and to put an end to the nomadic life, to the ‘Wandering Jew’" (BGE
251). There were many Jews who desperately wanted to assimilate, even though
persecution may have influenced a large number of these people. Even with
assimilation, some Jewish elements, whatever they are, would remain part of the
12
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vibrant culture of the "Good European". Furthermore, instead of expelling Jews,
it would “perhaps be a good idea to eject the Anti-Semitic ranters from the
country” (BGE 251). Due to numerous expulsions, pogroms, perpetual distrust
and discrimination by Gentiles, and mass ghettoes, it was hard for Jews not to
stand out in the crowd. For Nietzsche, Jews should be allowed to assimilate since
their contribution to the race of good Europeans would be invaluable. There was
no shortage of Assimilationist Jews all across Europe. Their counterparts, the
Zionists, did not wish to be “good Europeans”. They wanted a Jewish state of
their own.
Combining the Jews with the best and brightest of Europe is Nietzsche’s
brainchild which, I might add, fails to mention anything about racial hygiene.
Nietzsche discusses nobility in the last chapter of Beyond Good and Evil. Again,
his choice of words could have been better, but his point, at least to me seems
clear:
[S]ociety should not exist for the sake of society
but only as the foundation and scaffolding upon
which a select species of being is able to raise itself
to its higher task and in general to a higher
existence: like those sun-seeking climbing plants
of Java - they are named sipo matador - which clasp
an oak tree with their tendrils so long and often
that at last, high above it but supported by
it, they can unfold their crowns in the open
light and display their happiness (BGE 258).
Some people do indeed belong to the lower culture, a culture from they can never
be extricated because of their weaknesses. Whether these weaknesses are due to
mental illness, indolence, jingoism, decadence, religious fervor, or even
ressentiment does not imply that these people need to be exterminated.
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Nietzsche’s perennially fragile health could have eventually made him the
“useless eater” that the Nazi doctors would have euthanized to ease their minds.
Before his death, before his eleven years of incurable madness, Nietzsche
seemed to know where Europe was headed:
Thanks to the morbid estrangement which
the lunacy of nationality has produced and continues
to produce between the peoples of Europe, thanks
likewise to the shortsighted and hasty-handed politicians
who are with its aid on top today and have not the slightest
notion to what extent the politics of disintegration they pursue
must necessarily be only an interlude - thanks to all this, and
to much else that is altogether unmentionable today, the most
unambiguous signs are now being overlooked, or arbitrarily
and lyingly misinterpreted, which declare that Europe wants
to become one. (BGE 256).
This “interlude” would be bloody, grisly, and brutal, encompassing two world
wars. The Third Reich was not Europe becoming one. It was Germany trying to
conquer all of Europe. Nietzsche’s words seemingly presage the arrival of Adolph
Hitler, Rudolph Hess, Heinrich Himmler, and Joseph Goebbels to name a few.
Nietzsche’s language has often made readers suspicious of his intellectual
motives. Is the lower culture unhygienic or racially impure? Is the lower culture
genetically ill? Is the lower culture a pollutant? Should there be a euthanasia and
sterilization law for those who belong to the lower culture? My answer is a
resounding “no” and I do think Nietzsche would agree. Higher culture will have a
hard time emerging without a lower culture. Higher men still had traces of the
herd in them anyway. Proponents of racial hygiene would never believe that a
lower culture was necessary for the higher culture. Those who were racially pure
or close enough to it (since all people were mixed) would have been better off not
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ever having mingled with the lower, contaminated types. This is not what
Nietzsche argued for. Nietzsche asserts that “[m]an himself has to take in hand
the rule of man over the earth, it is his ‘omniscience’ that has to watch over the
destiny of culture with a sharp eye to the future” (HAH 245). “Man” need not
enslave, torture, and liquefy a people to accomplish this task. I think his “Good
Europeans” do indeed have a slightly German taste. Nietzsche could never
forsake Goethe. But, the “Good European” also had a slightly Jewish, English,
and French taste too. Nietzsche’s aversion to philosophical transparency in many
cases casts him as a spokesman for what he found to be noxious and pernicious.
Nietzsche does not offer a precise algorithm for transcending the good and
evil of one’s culture. He neglects this task because creativity and artistry are
personal matters not circumscribed by societal constructs. His perspectivism
seemingly would not permit him to make such prescriptions either. When we
create values, these values most likely are self-regarding. Nietzsche argues that
“my judgment is my judgment; another cannot easily acquire a right to it…[for]
one has to get rid of the bad taste of wanting to be in agreement with many”
(BGE 43). Perhaps we may be agreement with a few. Yet even if two free spirits
dare to counteract the will of the herd, they may not do so in the same fashion.
Zarathustra adamantly declares that “’[t]his is my way: where is yours?’ Thus I
answered those who asked me ‘the way’…for the way does not exist!” (Z III:11).
A noble man may be a determiner of value judgments, but he determines only his
values and no one else’s (BGE 260). The free spirit also captures the Dionysian
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spirit when nature celebrates once more her reconciliation with her prodigal son,
man” (BT 1).
The order of rank, the pathos of distance, and other elitist ideas that
Nietzsche has on his philosophical plate can easily arouse apprehension, if not
intense loathing, in the reader. In Nietzsche, inequities between people seem
natural and innate. I may be sentenced to a long life languishing in the herd
because I am not creative and bold enough to transcend cultural normativity and
create values of my own. I may not even be aware that I am languishing if I
overlook Nietzsche’s writings. But since I have read Nietzsche voraciously, I
would like to think that I could ascend to the tier of the free spirits.
Is the herd that inferior? How many people could easily relinquish their
abiding values? Perhaps Nietzsche misdiagnosed modernity. Are modern norms
life-denying? Are present-day values life-denying? Do they contribute to the
degeneration of man? Is it trite to think that all men and women are created
equal? Is it trite to think that everyone should have equal opportunities to certain
things like a college education? Nietzsche’s dismay at modern moral norms is
worrisome because of his repeated insistence that this glut of norms retards the
progress of the law-giving free spirit. On my interpretation, Nietzsche is not
advocating a fierce moral upheaval and lawlessness that could culminate in
tyranny and genocide. Yet, it is not always clear what means a person is to secure
to ascend to a possible, higher morality. It is not always clear just what he is
suggesting we simply do. Nietzsche would only perpetuate our moral tradition if
he clearly enjoined us to do certain things to break away from the herd. His
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perspectival approach would not conceivably produce general evaluative claims.
He leaves the creation of values as an open-ended project. All that seems evident
is that Nietzsche is championing an elitist culture which would display its small
but steely members. Are these objections insurmountable?
Problems reading or interpreting Nietzsche are quite prevalent. But the
ideas of other German philosophers have not been immune from serious
misreadings. Kant and Hegel were misappropriated by the Nazis too. Like many
philosophers, he leaves many questions in his wake. He is not the only misogynist
and/or elitist to wreak intellectual havoc with his pen. Yet Nietzsche deserves our
attention, in spite of his elitist proclivities. Maybe the Ubermenschen are never to
be fully reunited with the spirit of Dionysus. Not every Nietzschean idea has
prospered even among the philosophical intelligentsia. Some Nietzschean ideas
should not even be considered. Viewing women solely as breeders of the “good
Europeans” might be one of them. Yet Nietzsche had the audacity to challenge
prevailing moral norms which is something many philosophers failed to do. Kant
and Mill do not jettison moral norms; they make cosmetic adjustments to already
existing ones. Nietzsche brazenly dares us to confront and revaluate our own
values. He opens the door for enlarged creativity and self-invention, even if his
directions are muddled. He widens the perspective of morality. He is not right all
of the time. Some of his judgments are misguided. Yet his role as philosopher of
culture and modernity is priceless, from my perspective of course. We may not
always like what he says, but he has the audacity to say it. Nietzsche’s “higher
culture” may still be an enigmatic idea. Modernity must largely be overcome by
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the superior human being if she is to transcend the herd. Nietzsche has
determined what has gone wrong with culture. He has given us a few intimations
as to how we can avoid falling into the snare of mediocrity as our herd-like
brethren have. Avoiding these many pitfalls that the herd offer must begin with
each individual person. No culture of great men and women can exist without
these men and women first helping themselves individually. The personal must
come before the political. This is an issue I will discuss in the next chapter.
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Chapter Two
The Personal: Nietzsche on Eternal Recurrence and the Ubermensch
How deeply human beings suffer determines
their order of rank…profound suffering ennobles; it
separates… (BGE 270).
Yes, at the bottom of my soul I feel grateful
to all my misery and bouts of sickness and
everything about me that is imperfect, because
this sort of thing leaves me with a hundred
backdoors through which I can escape from
enduring habits (GS 295).
I
Those were the reflective words of Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche hardly
had perfect health. His vision was defective. During one year, he recorded over
140 days of migraine headaches. Rifts formed between Nietzsche and many of his
friends such as Richard Wagner, Lou Salome, and Paul Ree. Nietzsche remained
unmarried for his entire life. An outsider could assume that Nietzsche’s life was
not brimming with sweetness and light. One might think that Nietzsche would be
a gloriously miserable creature. He is presumed to have had syphilis. He was in
love with a woman named Cosima, who also happened to be the wife of his
erstwhile friend Richard Wagner. Nietzsche had a sister who, with her antiSemitic husband, tried to erect an Aryan colony (racially hygienic of course) in
South America called “New Germania”. Nietzsche showed a wealth of promise as
a young philologist only to retire at a young age since he also had a multitude of
infirmities. None of his books ever sold that well during his lifetime. Such
misfortunes might compel the average person to teem with maudlin sentiments.
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Nietzsche was often in a good, convivial mood. How could he be so spirited when
his life seemed tragic-comedic at best? Why would he never consider his life to
be a Sisyphean existence? Did Nietzsche actually follow his own advice?
Nietzsche says in The Gay Science “Amor Fati [love of fate]: let that be my love
henceforth! I do not want to wage war against what is ugly. I do not want to
accuse; I do not want to accuse those who accuse. Looking away shall be my only
negation. And all in all, and on the whole; some day I wish to only be a Yessayer” (GS 276). To what does Nietzsche say “Yes”? How could one love his or
her fate when life seems interminable and wretched?
Nietzsche is not the only person on this earth to suffer. People of all faiths
have suffered and still suffer. Men and women suffer. Adults and children suffer.
There is neither a quorum nor a quota on suffering. Every year Jews around the
world observe Yom Hashoah which commemorates the roughly six million Jews
who were killed during the Holocaust. Millions suffered under Stalin. Nietzsche’s
lot is still better than most. Yet I would not have wanted his life. He is not averse
to suffering. One might think that he is being disingenuous. Perhaps he is lying to
himself. After facing much calamity in his life, how could he have possibly been
so accepting and cheerful? He has chronic pain which he calls “dog” because this
pain shows such fidelity to its host (GS 312). Why so joyous in the midst of
suffering? It is in this chapter that I’d like to explore Nietzsche’s philosophy of
culture at a very personal level, a level which entails his teaching of eternal
recurrence. Nietzsche’s philosophy of culture ends with the public and the
political, but must first begin with the private and the personal. A person with a
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surplus of herd-like qualities will be ill-equipped to take part in a higher culture. I
must first seek out these “higher types”. I will also call upon scholars such as
Bernd Magnus, Alexander Nehamas, Richard Schacht, and others to aid me in my
efforts.
Nietzsche is often accused of trying to fashion a master race out of the
weaker, slavish types. Such attitudes appealed to the Nazi party, the would-be
progenitors of a master race. In the post-World War II society, Nietzsche had
become a “Chandala” he eloquently described in Twilight of the Idols, a person
untouchable to demure academics. Walter Kaufmann in the middle twentieth
century had reintroduced Nietzsche to academia. Kaufmann’s Nietzsche was a
much kinder one than previously thought.14 Yet even after Kaufmann, many
academics were not amenable to Nietzsche. Alasdair MacIntyre claimed that the
“Ubermenschen…belong in the philosophical bestiary rather than in serious
discussion.”15 The Ubermensch is an oblique concern in this chapter, so I will not
address MacIntyre’s trenchant yet mistaken dismissal of Nietzsche. I will
however, attempt to dissect Nietzsche’s response to suffering in light of what he
calls “the teaching of the eternal recurrence “(die Wiederkunftslehre). It is in The
Gay Science and in Thus Spoke Zarathustra that Nietzsche valorizes this
“doctrine” of eternal recurrence. Whether in the form of a riddle or in clear prose,
the crucible which Nietzsche lays before his readers is that life is something
which one must want to live again and again, and that includes all of the joy and
all of the misery that might come with life. In other words, if you had to live this
14
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life over and over without any changes made to it, would you? A person who says
“No!” ostensibly would have to restructure and revise his life so that it would be
bearable to live once more and innumerable times more. For Nietzsche, this
cannot be done. No additions or subtractions from a person’s life are acceptable.
If suffering does not waylay Nietzsche, it might be because despite his infirmities
and imperfections, he could live the same life again and again without any
deletions. Are his claims full of hot air? It is my task in this chapter to clarify
what eternal recurrence is and what its ramifications are, if there are any. I will
argue that eternal recurrence is a hypothetical thought-experiment, and not a
cosmological thesis. If eternal recurrence were a cosmological thesis, there would
be no way for us to want to live our lives once more and innumerable times more.
We would have no choice in the matter. The world really would recur eternally
with or without our consent. As a thought experiment, the world does not actually
recur eternally. But if the world did recur eternally, would you be disposed to
living your life over and over? Would you want nothing more than to live your
life over and over without subtracting or adding any moment to your life?
One might at first blush wonder how a prisoner in a gulag could affirm his
life over and over. Why should a prisoner in a gulag affirm his life over and over?
It could have been a life filled with loving parents, siblings, and children. Yet the
interstices between his life and death were fraught with grief and misery in the
desolate terrain of Siberia. Every moment (Augenblick) of one’s life would have
to be affirmed. Even if eternal recurrence is just a metaphor and not a
cosmological principle, how could a person even hypothetically wish to live this
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life of ephemeral love and abiding loss over and over without change? Why
would a person wish to live this life over and over? If life contains too many
horrors, would we not be better off enduring it just once instead of innumerable
times more?

II
To begin, I must first underscore that it is not the case that Nietzsche
thought his personal tribulations and endless calamities were part of God’s divine
plan, so Leibniz’s Theodicy and its pre-established harmony do not explain
suffering. Saint Augustine hardly offers a sufficient explanation for why there is
suffering in this world. His claim that we are being tested to prove whether we are
good Christians would make any Nietzschean nauseous rather quickly. For
Nietzsche, there is no supernatural explanation or meaning for suffering.
Nietzsche discovered this long before Albert Camus. Camus of course presented
us all with the narrative of the mythical Sisyphus and his rock which he had to
roll up a hill and watch it fall down for an eternity. Sisyphus suffered a great deal,
but if he could redeem his suffering (which he did), could Nietzsche do the same?
Nietzsche discovered that there was no supernatural meaning for suffering long
before Sartre did.
While existence was endlessly “absurd” for existentialists, Nietzsche did
not even trouble himself to describe his existence; he was more interested in
coping, not describing. Nietzsche’s own sufferings emit an afterglow because
suffering does not allow him to get too comfortable and ensconced in life. The
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afterglow comes from Nietzsche’s admission that there is no architectonic of
suffering. There is no overarching reason why we as human beings suffer. We
cannot look for a supernatural and/or divine wellspring of suffering. There is no
such thing to be found. Suffering happens to us all. There are always variations of
suffering, but no one has immunity to the presence of suffering.
Nietzsche does offer some advice on how to deal with life when it
wallows in the troughs instead of the crest. Nietzsche argues in the Genealogy of
Morals that the human being, the sickest yet most interesting animal, has always
sought a meaning for why he suffers, as if such a soul-searching odyssey will
obtain an explanation. In the third essay of the book, Nietzsche attacks “ascetic
ideals”, ideals which include:
…freedom from compulsion, disturbance, noise,
from tasks, duties, worries; clear heads; the dance,
the leap, and flight of ideas; good air, thin, clean, open,
dry, like the air of the heights through which all animal being
becomes more spiritual and acquires wings; repose in the cellar
region; all dogs nicely chained up; no barking of hostility and
shaggy-haired rancor; no gnawing worm of injured ambition;
undemanding and obedient intestines, busy as windmills but
distant; the heart remote, beyond, heavy with future, posthumous –
all in all, they think of the ascetic ideal as the cheerful asceticism
of an animal become fledged and divine, floating in life rather
than in repose (GM III:8).
Nietzsche claims in the “Second Essay” that morality had sprung out of
the tradition of creditor and debtor. The debtor was “guilty” if unable to repay a
loan from his creditor. These initial transactions were mundane and worldly. This
monetary relationship becomes spiritualized after the “slave revolt” in morals
(GM II:4) and the creditor/debtor relationship has a whole new meaning.
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Nietzsche adds that “it was in this sphere of legal obligations that the moral
conceptual word of ‘guilt’, ‘conscience’, ‘duty’, ‘sacredness of duty’ had its
origin; its beginnings were like the beginnings of everything great on earth,
soaked in blood thoroughly and for a long time.” (GM II:6) Human beings
become ascetic in the religious sense because they believe they are permanently
indebted to God. This is an insidious debt that that can never be repaid, at least
not in this life. This overwhelming debt to God gives birth to concepts like the
“bad conscience” and “promise-keeping”. Such things can make us suffer.
Human beings have had a bad conscience because they can never fully please and
placate God. Human beings have a bad conscience because they have certain
drives and instincts that must be repressed in order to be civilized.
Man has had all too long an ‘evil eye’ for his
natural inclinations, so that they have finally
become inseparable from his ‘bad conscience’.
An attempt at the reverse would in itself be
possible – but who is strong enough for it? – that
is to wed the bad conscience to all the unnatural
inclinations, all those aspirations to the beyond,
to that which runs counter to sense, instinct, nature,
animal, in short all ideals hitherto, which are one
and hostile to life and ideals that slander
the world. (GM II:24).
Daniel Conway observes that “[i]n order to resist or reverse the advance of
decadence, that is, a people or a culture would need to rid itself of its besetting
bad conscience.”16 This is not a simple labor since the bad conscience has been
deeply acculturated into the individual. Bad consciences impel people to feel
guilty for having such impulses. We have become animals who do not forget. Not
16
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being able to forget allows us to make promises that we must keep. We will not
forget the promises that we make to God to discharge every task that is given to
us. Ascetic priests have us believe that there is a reason for our suffering. This is a
cause a man “must seek in himself, in some guilt, in some piece of the past, he
must understand his suffering as a punishment” (GM III:20).
Nietzsche admits that we all suffer. Some of us live under repressive
regimes, some of us live in perpetual war zones, some of us suffer from morbid
obesity, and some of us suffer from high anxiety. The litany of suffering is
endless. According to Nietzsche, we do not suffer because we owe God. This
“bad conscience” appears to have precluded our ability to deal with suffering
from a secular standpoint. We do not suffer because Adam and Eve had partaken
of the forbidden fruit and thereby tainted all of humanity. We do not suffer
because we are the scions of the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah. There is no
divine punisher who sees to it that we suffer continuously to teach us some kind
of lesson. The purpose of the genealogy is to discover why we gravitate towards
the same set of values and to trace the origin of these values. Simply put, there
were some very unhappy “slaves” who at one time finally projected their enmity
onto the noble caste. Nietzsche is not adopting a pessimistic attitude towards
suffering. Accepting that life cannot always be sweetness and light does not entail
also feeling that the other line always moves faster or that when it rains, it simply
pours. Nietzsche is adopting more of a pragmatic attitude towards suffering.
However, I will argue, as others have before me, that at times Nietzsche is a bit
naïve and unsympathetic to suffering that is so extensive, demoralizing, and
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daunting that one would not will every single moment of one’s life without any
revisions.17 If I suffered a fate similar to that of Job or that poor girl Niobe,
perhaps I would not wish to live every moment over and over if given the chance.
How could I and why should I live every moment over and over? Yet many of us
are surprisingly resilient even in the midst of tragedy and we can cope quite well
when fortunes turns to misfortune.
I must emphasize though that for Nietzsche, pity for those who suffer is
not the answer. Self-pity certainly is not a fine tool for coping either. Pity is
something that the people of the Judeo-Christian tradition do exceptionally well.
Nietzsche calls Christianity the “religion of pity”, and out of a religion of pity
emerges the “religion of comfortableness”, since happiness and unhappiness are
“sisters and even twins” (GS 338). For Nietzsche, all that pity does is perpetuate
if not encourage the weakness of others. The religion of pity sanctions the agonies
and torments that we all face because we are convinced that life cannot be any
better. We cannot overcome these agonies and torments. For Nietzsche, we
cannot permit ourselves to glower over our adverse situations or give others the
license to glower because we have been dealt an unfavorable hand. Nietzsche
points out that:
…[T]hey wish to help and have no thought of the personal
necessity of distress, although terrors, deprivations,
impoverishments, midnights, adventures, risks, and blunders
are necessary for me and you as their opposites. It never occurs
to them that, to put it mystically, the path to one’s own heaven
always leads through the voluptuousness of one’s own hell (GS
338).
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We would all prefer to go straight to heaven without ever having to perambulate
just once through hell. Yet a life free of “terror” and “deprivation” is impossible.
It is Nietzsche’s claim that we need the personal horror to ever be able to
comprehend joy and affirmation. We will not learn a thing from complacency.
Furthermore, we all have enemies, many of whom wish to see us suffer. Suffering
might make someone stronger, especially if her life seems more misbegotten than
others. According to Nietzsche, suffering “ennobles”. Nietzsche is of course selfreferential here. The more profound your suffering, the more noble you are. As
noted many times before, few would have wanted to be Friedrich Nietzsche. He
did not suffer as much as others. But the average person who suffers nothing
more than a few bounced checks and a couple of botched romances would still
choose her life over Nietzsche’s.
There will still be a few episodes in every person’s life that she would
want to delete completely. Maybe someone will not experience “profound”
suffering, but her life could still come asunder quite easily. All it takes is one
unfavorable event to change the complexion of a person’s life. Others around me
might desire to mar my near-perfect existence. Nietzsche says in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra that “…whenever you have an enemy, do not requite him good for
evil: for that would make him ashamed, [b]ut prove that he has done something
good for you” (Z I:19). It is my claim that the quality of the response to suffering
is an important factor in determining whether a person could will eternal
recurrence. The focus of eternal recurrence is on how human beings respond to
suffering, despite its magnitude. Nietzsche states in the Gay Science that he wants

55

to “teach them what is understood by so few today, least of all by these preachers
of pity: to share not suffering but to share joy” (GS 338). A minority of us will be
more privileged than others whereby our suffering might be alleviated through
counseling, trips to the spa, and the use of pharmaceuticals. Famine, cholera,
political oppression, illiteracy, and homelessness may not be familiar afflictions
to many of us, but we all have our problems. Wealthy people can develop cancer
too. We cannot escape suffering, but can we make suffering positive. How can we
affirm life in the presence of sorrow? How can we derive happiness from despair?
What if I am like the dour man in Shakespeare’s sonnet who:
When, in disgrace with fortune and men’s eyes,
I all alone beweep my outcast state,
And trouble deaf heaven with my bootless cries,
And look upon myself and curse my fate…18
Suffering may be unavoidable, but must I wallow in self-pity? Shakespeare’s
dour man realizes at the end of fourteen lines that he would “scorn to change my
state with kings”. Can we do the same? Could we be part of a higher culture if we
were to mope and languish in bed all day? If life were so insufferable, does this
mean that living it once is too much to bear? If it were, we could not will eternal
recurrence. But could we come to the realization that our lives could be affirmed
in spite of the miseries and disasters? How can we spawn a higher culture if we
cannot even celebrate our personal and private triumphs? Before we begin to
worry about culture and higher humanity, we must find a way to affirm our lives
and “share not suffering but share joy” I will argue that one must will eternal
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recurrence before one to attain higher humanity. I will not argue that one must be
an Ubermensch to be part of higher humanity.

III
Nietzsche’s principal discussion of eternal recurrence appears in the
narrative of the mysterious and at times, histrionic prophet Zarathustra in Thus
Spoke Zarathustra. Nietzsche considered Zarathustra to be his finest work. He
says in Ecce Homo that:
There is no wisdom, no investigation of the
soul, no art of speech before Zarathustra; what
is nearest and most everyday, here speaks of unheard-of
things. Epigrams trembling with passion, eloquence
music, lightning bolts knurled forward into hitherto
unfathomed futures. The most powerful capacity for
metaphors that has existed so far is poor and mere child’s
play compared with this return of language to the nature
of imagery (EH 305).
Upon reading Nietzsche’s rather smug, acerbic, and self-congratulatory
autobiography, one might at first conclude that Nietzsche’s impending madness
was manifesting itself while he was writing the aforementioned passage.
Nietzsche appears to have grown embarrassingly fond of himself by telling us
why he is so clever, why he writes such good books, and why he is a destiny.
Perhaps Nietzsche is being ironic. Should Nietzsche have the honor of being a
harbinger of great things to come? He was always self-reverential and selfreferential, mostly droll, never insipid, never apologetic. In Ecce Homo, he cannot
but bring up Zarathustra every time he has the chance. Nietzsche is quite satisfied
with his other works, but Zarathustra seems to take precedence. It is not the only
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book that alludes to eternal recurrence. It is a book however that entails one
cryptic passage after another. In The Gay Science, eternal recurrence will not
seem as enigmatic. At times it is difficult to determine whether Zarathustra
should be taken literally or figuratively. Unlike other texts, Zarathustra is a
narrative, not a collection of aphorisms. Why has Nietzsche chosen Zarathustra
to teach eternal recurrence? We must not forget the “profound”. We are ennobled
by “profound” suffering, and the “profound” Zarathustra loves his masks.
Zarathustra’s maddening adventures and misadventures shed much light on
Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal recurrence.
The subtitle for Thus Spoke Zarathustra is “A Book For Everyone and No
One”. Zarathustra’s oracular and demagogic style might compel readers to infer
that Zarathustra is just a book for “Someone”, most likely Nietzsche. Nietzsche
is aware that many passages in this book are far more confounding than
illuminating. Zarathustra indeed has a message, yet if this message is nearly
impossible to decipher with all of the dramatic interludes and breathless
affirmations, why would “Everyone” or even anyone care to read past the
prelude? A person who wishes to affirm the same life would need a little more
than a sometimes puzzling text to do such a thing. Zarathustra is a character that
appeals to those who love the mask. Meaning in poetry tends to be deeper and
more hidden than meaning in prose. This is a person who loves what is deep and
hidden, far from the mind-numbing surface. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra is a profound
character who tells parables that few could and should understand. In the age
where talk-show hosts have book clubs that greatly influence the reading habits of
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millions of viewers, the enigmatic Zarathustra would not have been on the bookof-the-month selection. Nietzsche did not write a book for everybody; such books
are “malodorous” books that pander to the superficial interests of those herd-like
television watchers. Zarathustra, the mouthpiece of Friedrich Nietzsche, has a
style that is rarely seen in philosophy. Philosophers have no trouble being dense
and turgid, and they are rarely poetic.
Thus Spoke Zarathustra is a difficult book to negotiate, as is almost
everything written by Nietzsche. Nietzsche typically writes in an aphoristic style,
so his thoughts come at the reader in a blitzkrieg fashion. Nietzsche’s aphorisms
are not always known for their clarity. His aphorisms are not all hard to penetrate
or crack. Aphorisms are dramatics, but they are not long-winded narratives. There
is no circuitous story that the reader must follow. The strange narrative of
Zarathustra should not be ignored because of its not so user-friendly style.
Zarathustra was Nietzsche’s most personal work. The very personal nature of the
work could not have been captured in his aphorisms, and it certainly could not
have been captured in the traditionally stuffy philosophical manner. Nietzsche
could have stated an argument, then refuted or defended it. He was a trained
academic. He could have accomplished that task admirably. Instead, only
committed readers would tag along with Zarathustra for his entire narrative. One
must remember that this higher culture only admits the most creative, willful, and
uncomplaining free spirits. Any reader who finds this warped sojourn tiresome
can put the book down. There is little aesthetic distance between Nietzsche and
Zarathustra. It is a book that is confessional because it is the culmination of
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Nietzsche’s personal and professional life which preceded the writing of this
book. None of Nietzsche’s previous works had captured the visceral emotions,
the paradoxes, and fancies of Nietzsche in the same way. There was no better way
to depict his life than in a poetic, grandiose style. Zarathustra is Nietzsche’s
loftiest self-expression. And Zarathustra comes to us with a message that needs to
be heard. Zarathustra is at times a pathetic, lonely man. Nietzsche himself had
friends, but was betrothed to no one. If Zarathustra is Nietzsche in a poetic
disguise, why hasn’t the misunderstood Zarathustra chosen to jump off one of
those cliffs? Zarathustra had descended the mountain in hopes of disseminating
his irreverent and irreligious gospel. No one was ready to hear him. Nietzsche
himself had felt that despite the bottomless suffering that incessantly bedeviled
him, life was worthwhile and could still be affirmed.
Instead of attaching a metaphysical meaning to his suffering, Nietzsche
chose to affirm his life with all of its pleasures and all of its pain. In spite of
everything, Nietzsche could genuinely redeem his life now, and not in the
afterworld. For Nietzsche, this life was all one had. Redemption for Nietzsche is
not the Christian redemption of accepting God and being forgiven for one’s sins.
Sins, like good deeds, must be affirmed too if one is to sincerely affirm life in all
of its joyfulness and misery. Nietzsche says in “Of Redemption”, “to redeem the
past and to transform every ‘It was’ into ‘I wanted it thus!’ – that alone do I call
redemption!” (Z II:20). To redeem one’s life is to accept affirm every moment.
The past cannot be changed yet it is constitutive of every given person’s identity.
Removing one moment from your life would not make it the same life. This is the
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crucible of eternal recurrence. You must wish to live your life as if the same life
recurred eternally. Nothing about your life could be altered. A person can only
redeem her life if she affirms every second, every event. Nothing about one’s past
can be changed. This can cause much distress. Ofelia Schutte observes that:
…[t]he past is represented as the ‘it was’, that
is, the moments, conditions, and events that, due
to their past nature, are perceived as lying outside
the compass of the present exercise of willing. The main
contrast or tension shown is that between a will that becomes
disempowered and vindictive as it perceives itself limited
in its functioning by the irreversibility of the past
and a will that can take a course other than this
vindictive reaction, keeping its energy and focus
fully directed on projects of self-overcoming and
creativity.19
One might despair over the fact that the past can never change, but this “willing
backwards”, the desire to affirm every moment in one’s life, is possible. The
realization and the acceptance that even the dreary moments define the person is
what Nietzsche calls “redemption”. Turning “it was” into “I willed it thus!”
means that every prior moment is indispensable. I would not be living the same
life if even a second were subtracted the second time around. My life can be
redeemed only if I would live the selfsame life with all of its bright and dim
moments. The past is reclaimed.
Christianity is a contemptible source of values for Zarathustra. Suffering is
a leitmotif in Christianity, yet how Christians typically cope with suffering leaves
Zarathustra rather aggrieved. There is a plethora of suffering; whatever are we to
do to alleviate it? Zarathustra berates the “afterworldsmen” for having created the
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fiction of the afterlife. “It was suffering and impotence that created all
afterworlds” (Z I:3). Unless a person is complacent and totally unaware of what
goes on around him, every person will experience suffering in some way.
Nietzsche believes that suffering is unavoidable and inevitable, but it is also
bearable. Zarathustra says “yes” to suffering while Christians say “no”. Suffering
alone should not impel us to repudiate this existence in hopes of a sweeter
existence in the afterlife, if there even is one. Our embodied existence appears to
be all we have, so we make do with what we have been given. Zarathustra urges
us not to bear suffering only because we think there will be a place reserved for
us after our respective bodily lives end. This explanation may have worked for
Saint Augustine, but it will not work for Zarathustra because he thinks it is
unhealthy to look for solutions in the aftrelife. “Weariness, which wants to reach
the ultimate with a single death-leap, a poor ignorant weariness which no longer
even wants to want; that created all gods and afterworlds” (Z I:3). We will not be
rewarded with a seat in the afterlife because we remained faithful to God during
our pitiful days on earth. For Zarathustra, the afterworld is a “heavenly nothing”
(Z I:3). The past cannot be undone; sufferings are not forgotten. They can be
redeemed – now.
One can overcome a great deal by accepting Zarathustra’s doctrine of
eternal recurrence. The emotionally charged language of Zarathustra can
complicate a swift understanding of eternal recurrence. The doctrine of eternal
recurrence also wears a mask. With some care, Zarathustra’s points can be made
clear. In “Of the Vision and the Riddle”, Zarathustra finds himself with a dwarf
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who annoys him considerably. Zarathustra decides to tell the dwarf about his
“abysmal thought” of eternal recurrence. He tells the dwarf:
This long lane behind us: it goes one for eternity.
And that long lane ahead of us – that is for
another eternity. They are in opposition to
one another: and it is here at this gateway that
they come together. The name of the gateway
is written above it: ‘Moment’ (Z III:2).
Instead of being awestruck by such an abysmal thought, the dwarf gives a
sardonic reply, “Everything straight lies…all truth is crooked, time itself is a
circle.” Zarathustra is upset that the dwarf is mocking such an abysmal thought.
How could the dwarf take such things so lightly and sarcastically? Zarathustra
continues with his abysmal thought:
Must not all things that can run have already run
along this lane? Must not all things that can happen
have already happened, been done, run past? And are
not all things bound fast together in such a way that this
moment draws itself after all future things. Therefore,
draws itself too (Z III:2)?
In other words, must we not recur eternally? We are here now, we were here
before, we will be here again – eternally. What is one to make of this?
After Zarathustra says this, he hears a dog howling nearby and the dwarf
had disappeared. Zarathustra then questions whether the dwarf actually existed or
came to him in a dream. If Zarathustra had been dreaming, did he really teach the
doctrine of eternal recurrence? Is it Zarathustra’s mission to teach eternal
recurrence? Zarathustra then sees a shepherd nearby who is choking on a snake.
The black snake is hanging out of the shepherd’s mouth. Zarathustra yells at the
shepherd to bite the snake’s head off. What does the snake represent? Who does
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the shepherd represent? Zarathustra asks, “Who is the shepherd into whose mouth
the snake thus crawled? Who is the man into whose throat all that is heaviest,
blackest will thus crawl” (Z II:2)?The question is never clearly answered. The
shepherd does bite the snake’s head off and then is transformed unto something
that is not human:
No longer a shepherd, no longer a man – a
transformed being, surrounded with light, laughing!
Never yet on earth had any man laughed as he laughed? O
my brothers, I heard a laughter that was no human
laughter, and now a thirst consumes me, a longing
that is never stilled (Z III:2).
This passage perhaps implies that the shepherd is the Ubermensch. Such a being
has yet to emerge since this is a laughter that Zarathustra has never heard before.
The shepherd is no longer human, but we still are. Does this mean that we are not
ready to be Ubermenschen? Will we ever be? The shepherd bit off the snake’s
head. Will we ever be able to bite off all that is heavy and black? I do not think
that one must be an Ubermensch to will eternal recurrence. Eternal recurrence is
an abysmal thought. That will never change. Ubermenschen appear to be
superhuman beings though. We are human beings who shudder and struggle at
the thought of eternal recurrence. Human beings may have a harder time biting
the snake’s head off. We can still laugh, but our laughter will be human. We can
still be part of higher humanity, but it is still humanity.
In “The Convalescent”, Zarathustra decides to call upon this abysmal
thought of eternal recurrence again. When he decides to do this, he slips into
unconsciousness for seven days. He finally awakes and his animals come to him
and remind him about eternal recurrence:
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…O Zarathustra, who you are and must become: behold,
you are the teacher of the eternal recurrence, that is now your
destiny!...Behold, we know what you teach: that all things
recur eternally and we ourselves with them, and that
we have already existed an infinite number of times before
and all things with us…so that all these years resemble one
another,
in the greatest things and in the smallest. So that we ourselves
resemble ourselves in each great year, in the greatest things and in
the smallest (Z III:13).
Furthermore, “everything goes, everything returns; the wheel of existence rolls
forever. Everything dies, everything blossoms anew; the year of existence runs on
forever” (Z III: 13). The stunning irony is that Zarathustra never appears to be the
teacher of eternal recurrence. With the dwarf, Zarathustra “teaches” eternal
recurrence in what appears to be a dream, and while he convalesces from his
coma, it is his animals that speak of that “abysmal thought” of eternal recurrence.
The dwarf scoffs at this abysmal thought. The animals seem to celebrate this
abysmal thought. As dreadful as eternal recurrence is to Zarathustra, the animals
want to rejoice because of it. It is a thought so abysmal that Zarathustra falls
unconscious, but the animals want to sing and dance. How abysmal is this
thought? Do the animals not understand how excruciating eternal recurrence is?
Why the irony?
The dwarf and the animals see nothing abysmal about it. I do not think
they do not understand eternal recurrence. If all things recur eternally, then the
great man and little man must recur too. All that is great and all that is appalling
must recur eternally. All that enlivens and all that terrorizes Zarathustra must
recur eternally. “The greatest all too small! – that was my disgust at man! And
eternal recurrence even for the smallest! That was my disgust at all existence!” (Z
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III:13). The smallest man will recur too. The thought of that does not imbue
Zarathustra with the desire to sing and dance. This is probably the worst part of
eternal recurrence. The smallest man will recur too. Is Zarathustra even ready for
eternal recurrence? He is supposed to be the teacher of eternal recurrence, yet the
thought of it causes him to grimace, to bristle. If eternal recurrence were a
cosmological thesis, Zarathustra would not need to shrivel at the mere mention of
eternal recurrence. Shriveling, grimacing, and bristling - these all would have
happened before.
But as a thought experiment, eternal recurrence could even cause its
purported teacher to panic. Life does not recur, but if it did, the smallest man
would be there too. If life recurs eternally without change, that little man will be
back every time. That mortifying moment, that terrifying moment, that saddening
moment, and that excruciating moment would all recur eternally. It is no surprise
that even Zarathustra must pause and rethink his doctrine, the doctrine he never
actually teaches.
Perhaps there are few people who could accept life in its unedited entirety
over and over. How many of us would want the little man? I do maintain that
despite his high anxiety, Zarathustra could accept eternal recurrence. None of his
companions are ever able to accept it though. The thought is so horrifying that
most people would do more than tremble at the thought. Our lives contain events
we simply cannot bear to live again. How could we wish to live again and again if
those events could not be erased? With eternal recurrence, our lives must be
written in ink, not in pencil. It is no wonder that in the end, Zarathustra ends up
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alone. Perhaps the people he met on his way home were not ready, but others
might be. This is a demanding test to pass, but some could. The doctrine of
eternal recurrence allows to assess our lives and ascertain whether we are living
our lives as we want to live them. Am I living the life that I would wish to live
eternally? Zarathustra muses in “The Intoxicated Song”:
O Man! Attend!
What does deep midnight’s voice contend?
I slept my sleep,
And now awake at dreaming’s end:
The world is deep,
Deeper than the day can comprehend.
Deep is its woe,
Joy – deeper than heart’s agony:
Woe says: Fade! Go!
But all joy wants eternity,
Wants deep, deep, deep eternity (Z IV:19)!
There is no greater affirmation than to accept one’s life “eternally”. You accept
the joy and the pain cheerfully. We affirm even the smallest man too. If we affirm
our lives in their entirety, we have been redeemed. No task could be harder. It is
not that these teachings are too premature even for Zarathustra. He is human after
all. It is an abysmal thought that gives everyone pause.
As a character, Zarathustra frightens, excites, and irritates. In short, he is
the literary Friedrich Nietzsche. While Kierkegaard used pseudonyms to
communicate indirectly, Nietzsche uses poetry to communicate dramatically, with
the aid of masks of course. Through Zarathustra, one has emotion, power, and
drama. Prose can rarely deliver such passion. Thus Spoke Zarathustra was the
result of Nietzsche’s accrued personal problems. After all Nietzsche endured, he
had to devise a way of sublimating his energy into something creative and artistic.
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He affirmed his life in Ecce Homo. This autobiography was one of the last books
he wrote. It was also through the baffling character of Zarathustra that a
downtrodden Nietzsche could affirm his life since the joy still far outweighed the
agony.

IV
Nietzsche is less dramatic in the Gay Science when he brings up this
celebrated topic of eternal recurrence. The Gay Science preceded Thus Spoke
Zarathustra. Zarathustra, in contrast the latter’s text was more of a poetic text
while the Gay Science was an aphoristic text. In Book Four, Nietzsche entitles
section 341 “The Greatest Weight.” In this section, Nietzsche proposes what I
claim to be a monological thought-experiment, and not a cosmological principle
or normative imperative. Nietzsche asks:
What if some day or night a demon were to steal
after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to
you: ‘This life as you now live it and have lived it,
you will have to live once more and innumerable times
more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain
and joy and every thought and sigh and everything
unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to
you, all in the same succession and sequence – even this
spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this
moment and I myself’ (GS 341).
If this demon were so kind as to let us edit our lives and omit the tragedies,
cataclysms, wars and all the depression that many of us feel each morning when
we awake or each night when we lay ourselves down to sleep, then perhaps
everyone would take the demon up on his offer. Imagine re-living your life
gliding only the crest and not in the dank trough! Yet Nietzsche’s demon is not

68

giving us this option. The reader is not even given the option of declining the
demon’s offer and living this life only once instead of once more and
innumerable times more. The demon’s “offer” is an offer we cannot refuse. The
demon asks, “[w]ould you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and
curse the demon who spoke thus” (GS 341)? Or, “how well disposed would you
have to become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this
ultimate eternal confirmation and seal” (GS 341)?
Nietzsche mentions eternal recurrence elsewhere, but he is at his most
devastating – and succinct – in this section. This idea of having to live one’s life
again and again, an unedited life with mirth but also with melancholia, would
leave any person cowering the corner somewhere, praying this is a nightmare.
Tracy B. Strong claims that “Nietzsche understands eternal [recurrence] to
produce in human beings a transformation sufficiently deep and general as to
completely change the nature of all interactions men have with themselves, with
others, and with the world around them.”20 One would have to be transformed
into order to accept eternal recurrence. This means that one would have to
seriously consider whether this life is joyful and cheerful to live again and again.
This does not only include the turning of “It was” into “I willed it thus!”. Our
future choices would also be affected. Those of us brave enough or perhaps brash
enough to address this issue would have to take a sober look at our lives and how
we are living them. This is an issue that would jolt any reader into seriously
reconsidering the choices that were and are made.
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Along with the anti-cosmological stance, I argue that eternal recurrence is
not normative for Nietzsche, especially if it is paired with the cosmological
interpretation. Many could easily adopt a normative interpretation. Yet, it is
unclear as to how a person ought to live her life if her life has already been lived
many times before. If the selfsame life really has been lived over and over, no
choices could be made. That would make eternal recurrence in a sense
deterministic. The person would have no choice in determining whether her life
ought to be lived over and over. It is being lived over and over. No decisions –
moral or otherwise - could be made. If there is an “ought” in eternal recurrence, I
do not see any normativity attached to it. Maybe I ought not regret imbibing
liquor at that ill-fated Passover gathering years back or I ought not fear leaving
my hometown for another city. These “oughts” are personal and not evaluative.
There is no universal ought either. Whatever I need to do to crave nothing more
fervently than eternal recurrence may not correspond to what another person
needs to do to crave that eternal confirmation and seal. Nietzsche is largely
allergic to modern morality because of its seemingly unavoidable absolutism. He
would, on my interpretation, be averse to prescribing a rigid moral system for his
free spirits to follow. If Nietzsche lambastes modern moralists for codifying
morality into a homogeneous and universal system, then Nietzsche would
sacrifice his intellectual integrity by simply replacing Kantians or Utilitarians. To
crave that confirmation and seal is a personal craving. Richard Schacht has
argued that an Ubermensch can still be an Ubermensch and be moral since all
people are anchored within certain traditions and cultural contexts from which
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they cannot fully escape. Schacht claims that “Nietzsche does not even try to say
with any precision or clarity what he would have people in general do, or how he
would have them do it.”21 Schacht believes that there can be “Nietzschean
normativity”. But normativity for Nietzsche at best would be localized,
particularistic, and personal. It might even be normativity within a larger
normative edifice. Nietzsche had taxes to pay after all.

V
In this part of the chapter, I would like to examine what other scholars
have said about eternal recurrence and how it relates to my arguments, focusing
on contributions by Bernd Magnus, Alexander Nehamas, and Richard Schacht.
Much has been said and misunderstood regarding Nietzsche’s puzzling doctrine
of eternal recurrence. Many scholars who preceded Magnus took Nietzsche quite
literally when he claimed that we live our lives once more and innumerable times
more. Many scholars believed that Nietzsche was propounding a cosmological
view of the universe, and because of this, scholars labored over the apparent
truth-value of eternal recurrence. Eternal recurrence would seem self-defeating if
it were cosmological. We would not have any choice in affirming our lives that
we currently live. We would have already done that before and will do it again.
Bernd Magnus takes a different course when he examines eternal
recurrence. Perhaps if one peels away the layers that are Nietzsche’s lyrical
words, there might be a pearl of wisdom beneath it after all. I will examine

21

Richard Schacht, “Nietzschean Normativity”, from Nietzsche’s Postmoralism: Essays on
Nietzsche’s Prelude to Philosophy’s Future, ed. Richard Schacht (Cambridge: NY) p. 154.

71

Magnus’ claims from Nietzsche’s Existential Imperative. This was published in
1978. I will also use “Perfectibility and Attitude” which was published in 1983,
and a paper he gave at the Spindel Conference” at Memphis State University.
Magnus’ claims have been modified over the years.
In Nietzsche’s Existential Imperative, Magnus quotes section 341 in the
Gay Science in an attempt to ascertain what Nietzsche might have meant saying
that the world recurs an infinite number of times. In this section, the truth value of
eternal recurrence, whether the world really does recur eternally, is not at issue
according to Magnus. The purpose of the agonizing question posed by the demon
is to determine whether anyone would crave nothing more fervently than to live
her life again and again without subtraction or addition. She would live the
selfsame life over and over, a life possibly fraught with disappointment and
adversity. All that is bad would have to recur with all that is good. It is no wonder
that many, if asked that question would gnash their teeth and crave nothing more
fervently than complete annihilation the first time around. According to Magnus,
it does not matter whether all of us truly are condemned to live life an infinite
number of times. What section 341 spotlights is the question as to whether a
person is well-disposed enough towards her life so that if life did recur an infinite
number of times without any editing, she would want to live once more and
innumerable times more. How many of us would clamor for this opportunity?
According to Magnus, it is a mistake to interpret eternal recurrence as a
normative and/or cosmological interpretation. Magnus is quite swift with his
dismissal of these two interpretations. According to the cosmological
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interpretation, the world really does recur eternally. According to this
interpretation, as I sit here typing this paper, I have previously sat here nervously
typing this paper an infinite number of times before. I will sit here nervously
typing this paper over and over in the future. Presumably, I will always be
“nervously” typing the paper instead of “confidently” and “lovingly” typing this
paper. How could I answer the demon affirmatively or negatively? If I have
already lived my life an infinite number of times before this present life, nothing
about my experiences or my actions will change. In life #112, I will do the exact
same thing as I did in my previous 111 lives. I would be unable to change the
outcome of any event in my life since the outcome is always the same. There is
nothing new that I can do in this life. Why gnash my teeth? If I haven’t done that
already in my previous lives, I will not do it now. Eternal recurrence seems rather
useless on this interpretation. Magnus claims that the cosmological interpretation
“has the least to recommend” regarding the coherence and tenability of eternal
recurrence.22 This means that if eternal recurrence were a cosmological principle,
then life really would recur. How could we have any control over our actions if
they have already happened and will happen over and over? We could not control
whether we wish to will eternal recurrence.
The normative interpretation suffers a similar fate. If, according to
Magnus, eternal recurrences were normative, then we are being asked to behave
as if eternal recurrence were true.23 If your life recurred eternally, what ought you
to do? You would tailor your actions so that your life would be tolerable if not
22
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swell – just in case you had to live it over and over. Magnus points out that for
the most part, the normative interpretation collapses into the cosmological
interpretation. Magnus is unsure as to what we are being “asked to imagine”. We
are enjoined to behave as though eternal recurrence were true, yet how can we be
accountable for our actions if “we are being asked to behave in ways that we have
behaved in an infinite number of previous recurrences.”?24 Our behavior is not
going to change in this life because we have already behaved in the same way
before. Making the normative interpretation hypothetical does not make the
interpretation any more convincing. Another problem that Magnus raises is
whether anyone can “behave as if X were true” if they do not believe X to be
true.25 If one is truly skeptical about the truth value of eternal recurrence, then one
would have to “abandon rationality” in order to believe X to be true when one
knows X to be false. If I believe that eternal recurrence is not true, how could I
convince myself that it is true? Both interpretations are too deeply rooted in the
truth value of eternal recurrence, according to Magnus. If we were to jettison
considerations of truth value regarding eternal recurrence, there is still plenty for
us to salvage from section 341.
Magnus is happy to assume the task. Magnus asserts that his interpretation
is completely indifferent to the supposed truth value of eternal recurrence.
Magnus claims that “recurrence…is a visual and conceptual representation of a
particular attitude toward life…[and] the attitude Nietzsche wishes to portray is
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the opposite of decadence, decline of life, world-weariness.”26 The antitheses of
the life-negating qualities are overfulness, celebratory affirmation, and joy – to
just name a few. The second part of Magnus’s thesis is that “the attitude toward
life captured in the doctrine of eternal recurrence is the expression of nihilism
overcome.”27 According to this attitudinal interpretation, it is the Ubermensch
who would be so well-disposed toward life that she would cheerfully express
such affirmation and crave nothing more fervently than to live once more and
innumerable times more.
According to Magnus, Nietzsche’s “existential imperative” claims that the
task is to live in such a way that we must wish to live again.28 We do not have to
accept eternal recurrence as true in order to live in such a way that we would wish
to live again. Nietzsche is not telling us explicitly what we must do in order to
wish to live our lives over and over. The existential imperative is a personal
imperative. No single formula exists for everyone to follow. Kant’s categorical
imperative is universal. Any maxim that can be willed into a universal law is
binding on all autonomous agents. Not only is Nietzsche’s existential imperative
amoral, it is an imperative that must be customized per person. At best, this
existential imperative narrowly resembles Kant’s “hypothetical imperatives”
which are conditional and personally binding in nature.29 Magnus adds that “the
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important thing is to become aware of what is worthy of infinity in our
lives…[and] about these things we will surely differ. We are different after all.”30
Discussing the chapter “On Redemption” in Thus Spoke Zarathustra,
Magnus asserts that the point of “redemption” is for the will to “affirm and accept
its own creative power, its accomplished past, its chosen present, and to-becreated future.”31 A person should sidestep the old adage that “all life is
[negative] suffering”. A person must be able to bring joy to this life instead of
waiting for joy to come in the afterlife. A person should embrace fully her past,
present, and future without a tincture of revenge because of the way life turned
out. All this constitutes a person who would crave that eternal confirmation and
seal. Magnus concludes that “Nietzsche’s imperative heightens, intensifies – and
eternalizes – the content of experience.”32
Magnus has slightly backed away from his earlier interpretation of eternal
recurrence. In Nietzsche’s Existential Imperative, Magnus claimed that most
people, if they were truly joyous in Nietzsche’s iconoclastic way, would crave
nothing more fervently than eternal recurrence.33 Magnus appears to have
mellowed somewhat. In more recent work he is less upbeat regarding eternal
recurrence. He seems quite suspicious of the doctrine. In an essay entitled
“Perfectibility and Attitude in Nietzsche’s Ubermensch”, Magnus is no longer
sure whether anyone could really live her life over and over without revision.
Perhaps that existential imperative has become too frightening to bear. If
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someone lives her life in such a way that she would wish to live eternally, no
editing is permissible, whether it is the second or eightieth time around. Would a
person require self-deception in order to want to live again?34 Magnus now thinks
that a person would have to appreciably deceive herself in order to believe that
life is worth living over and over without any revision. According to Nietzsche,
no one gets to affirm her life selectively; she must affirm their life entirely. Yet
the desire to live life selectively trumps affirmation. There are a couple of
moments I would love to omit next time around. Yet this desire then undermines
my wish to live again and again the same life. Magnus claims that the only person
who could will eternal recurrence without a touch of self-deception is that
mystifying Ubermensch. Perhaps if Magus is able to figure out who this person
is, we might be able to determine who really could will to live life once more and
innumerable times more. If the Ubermensch is human, then perhaps we could
mimic him. If the Ubermensch is inhuman as he does appear in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, we may not be able to will eternal recurrence.
Magnus offers two possible interpretations of the Ubermensch. On one
reading, the Ubermensch “exhibits certain traits of character, traits in which the
typical are associated with notions of self-overcoming, sublimation, creativity,
and self-perfection…[and] construed in this way, [the Ubermensch] expresses
Nietzsche’s vision of the human ideal, of what humans beings should or might be
like.” 35 This is what Magnus calls the “ideal-type” reading. Magnus calls the
other interpretation the “diagnostic” or “attitudinal” reading. On this
34
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interpretation, the attitude “portrayed is supposed to be that of affirmation,
overfulness; the attitude which expresses ascending life, life in and as
celebration…[and] one consistent with a wide range of directly conflicting firstorder traits and attributes.”36 On this reading, there are no specific traits which are
universally constitutive of the Ubermensch. The traits will differ from person to
person. Under the first interpretation, there will be only one class of traits that
comprise the Ubermenschen.
According to the ideal-type reading, the Ubermensch resembles a heroic
ideal. This is a person who is anchored in the human-all-too-human herd, yet
managed to go beyond that mundane herd and transform himself into a selfperfecting, superior individual. It is the “immoralist”, this “creator of values” who
is a cause for concern. Magnus cites many passages from scholars who insisted
that the Ubermensch was some kind of proto-fascist and proto-Nazi entity. Some,
like the critic J. P. Stern, believe the Ubermensch to be the quintessential
expression of the Hitlerian ideal.37 Many fear that the drive for self-perfection, a
drive which would require one to transcend good and evil, leaves a person
susceptible to committing violence against others in order to achieve this state of
higher morality. Since the ideals are the same for each person wishing to
transcend good and evil, perhaps these values are of an Aryan nature? Could one
advocate a master race under the guise of an ideal-type Ubermensch? Magnus is
not sympathetic to this ideal-type reading. This reading may not only allow for
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intellectual misappropriation such as the “Hitlerian ideal” This is an ideal which
seems unattainable.
Perhaps the other reading might protect the Ubermensch from any gross
misinterpretation. The other reading might let the Ubermensch look more
attainable. The “diagnostic” reading of the Ubermensch, according to Magnus,
does not “emphasize the Ubermensch as a human ideal of
perfectibility…[instead] I take the Ubermensch to be a nonspecific
representation…of a certain attitude toward life and world – the attitude which
finds them worthy of infinite repetition.” On this reading, whatever constitutes
the Ubermensch purposely remains opaque. If my life is worthy of infinite
repetition, I am the only one who can make such a declaration about my life.
Only I can affirm my life. I have no other references against which to judge my
life. I cannot affirm anyone else’s life, and nor can they do the same for me. Our
criteria are different. Magnus urges us to read Nietzsche “bifocally”, which
entails that one cannot be intent on ascribing to Nietzsche any particular worldview or vision of what constitutes the Ubermensch.38 Whatever path a person
needs to tread in order to believe that life is worthy of infinite repetition, Magnus
states that only the Ubermenschen could tread such paths. Magnus does believe
that both readings could be correct though the diagnostic reading, on my
interpretation better fits Nietzsche’s perspectival approach. However, what needs
to be made clear is whether we can be Ubermenschen.
In this essay, it appears that we can be. The description of such a person is
unclear. What if it turns out the Ubermensch is unattainable? Only the
38
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Ubermensch can tread that lofty path, perhaps the rest of us must be self-deceived
if we think we are able to will eternal recurrence. Even with the diagnostic
reading, the Ubermensch has an otherworldy quality that human beings do not
possess. It is still an ideal. Only this enigmatic Ubermensch can think life is
worthy of infinite repetition. We cannot even come close to this mark. We would
have to be fooling ourselves to believe that every moment, even the tragic ones,
can be willed over and over. I can only will eternal recurrence for myself, and
you can only will eternal recurrence for yourself. We have to adopt a subjective
attitude regarding our ability to will eternal recurrence. No one else can will it for
me. Yet if I am not an Ubermensch, the only way I could even think that I could
will eternal recurrence is to deceive myself into thinking that my life is worthy of
infinite repetition. I may think I am an Ubermensch, but I must have deceived
myself into thinking that I am such a thing.
In a later paper entitled, “Asceticism and Eternal Recurrence: A Bridge
Too Far”, Magnus seems to have turned his back on his earlier works, or he is
least strongly reconsidering them. Magnus is now claiming that eternal recurrence
is an impossible doctrine to adopt. In the earlier essay, Magnus needs to assure
himself and the readers that self-deception would not be mandatory in order to
will eternal recurrence. It appears now that the self-deception needed to will
eternal recurrence would be of epic proportions. Life just contains too many
tragedies to be redeemed. Some moments cannot be redeemed. Apparently no
affirmation can be had if life is to be lived over and over in its unexpurgated
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version. Magnus boldly asks in the paper: “How can eternal recurrence be willed
after Dachau and Auschwitz?”39
Now it appears that eternal recurrence is apparently too light-hearted and
blithe to be taken seriously in the weaponized age of the 21st century. Perhaps
Nietzsche spent a little too much time sequestered in the placid Swiss mountains
to have a firm grasp on reality and tragedy. Magnus removes the leavening that
Nietzsche gave to eternal recurrence by viewing it with much more trepidation
and solemnity than he had before. Magnus is now asserting that most of us would
find the idea of eternal recurrence to be:
…shattering because they should always find
it possible to prefer the eternal repetition of their
lives in an edited version rather than to crave nothing
more fervently than the recurrence of each of its
horrors. Only a superhuman could (Ubermensch) accept
recurrence without emendation, evasion, of self-deception,
a being whose distance from conventional humanity is
greater than the distance between human being and
beast…..40
Magnus and I differ regarding eternal recurrence insofar as I argue that eternal
recurrence can be willed and Msgnus believes that it would be a nearly
impossible exercise. Yet we are not too far apart regarding the Ubermensch. Like
Magnus I maintain that the Ubermensch is so far removed from humanity that his
emergence into society is highly unlikely. In “The Vision and The Riddle”, the
man who bit the head off of the snake is described as a remarkable if not
preternatural specimen that Zarathustra has never seen before. This may seem as
if the Ubermensch is too superhuman for humans. I do agree with Magnus that
39
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the Ubermensch is not an attainable ideal for humankind. However, I disagree
with Magnus when he claims that one would have to be superhuman, an
Ubermensch in order to will eternal recurrence. According to Magnus, the world
has too much misery and not enough joy to bear once more and innumerable
times more. Magnus believes that only a person riddled with self-deception would
want to live her life over and over without any editing. I am not discounting the
magnitude of evil that befalls nearly every person. I argue that in spite of every
calamity, a person can still wish to live the exact life again and again. A person
need not be an Ubermensch to will eternal recurrence. This does not mean that
willing eternal recurrence is not a crucible itself. Tragic events can devastate even
the most emotionally impermeable person. The majority of people probably
would prefer to live their lives over and over only if they could instead have an
edited version to relive. If one is to will eternal recurrence, the editing cannot take
place. This is why “higher humanity” is unattainable for most. I do not think the
Ubermensch and “higher humanity” are the same. I maintain that if a person
manages to ascend to “higher humanity”, they would and could will eternal
recurrence.
Magnus is now reluctant to embrace the Ubermensch and the ramifications
that he thinks follow from such an endorsement. Eternal recurrence may be a hard
concept to accept, but it is not an impossible concept to accept. It is useful for
Magnus to allude to the Holocaust now that he wishes to disrupt a person’s
attempt to will eternal recurrence. After the ghettoes, after the yellow stars, after
the gas chambers, and after Anne Frank – how could any Holocaust survivor will
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eternal recurrence? Why would any of them want to? Fortunately, most of us will
never have to suffer those horrors personally. I do not think that when one wills
eternal recurrence, one wills all of history along with it. As the scene with the
demon in section 341 of The Gay Science suggests, I will eternal recurrence
because I want to live my life once more and innumerable times more. On my
interpretation of eternal recurrence, I am willing the life that I have experienced
through my eyes only. I cannot will eternal recurrence for others. Others may
have experienced events that had more of an impact on them than it had upon me.
I can only affirm the events as I experienced them. Some events impact me
directly, others indirectly. A death in the family would have a direct impact on
my life as opposed to the Holocaust which is not only temporally distant from
me, but also has fewer personal ramifications than the former. A moment that
occurred four hundred years ago may have impacted me in ways that I will never
know. I might have been different if this event did not occur. I did not experience
it though. In a way I would have to will that distant event for me to be the person
I am, but this event still is not one of my “moments”. I affirm every moment that
I have experienced. My moments are all that I have.
Who is to say that Holocaust survivor would not crave nothing more
fervently than eternal recurrence? Magnus claims that “no matter how content I
may be with my life I can always imagine a better one, for example, my life plus
a reduction in the total sum of the world’s pain and suffering, a world without
disease, without hunger, without hatred, without genocides.”41 Has Magnus
forgotten Nietzsche’s claim that “the path of one’s heaven leads through the
41
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voluptuousness of one’s hell”? We could never affirm our lives if we had no
appreciation for the suffering that has strengthened and emboldened us. Of course
we could imagine a better world. Yet sounding like a modern-day Voltaire does
not mean that we cannot affirm the lives we have, even if they could be better.
This perfect, Edenic world is the product of a fecund and idealistic imagination. I
see no point in imagining a world without disease, hunger, or genocide. Such a
world is never going to exist. A sick Nietzsche swaddled in blankets up in the
mountains pointed this out long before the twentieth century. This is not
pessimism. Magnus argues that all of history is willed when we will eternal
recurrence. This would mean that all moments in this universe are liked together
inextricably. Every moment would need the previous moment to remain
intelligible. I take a less extensive view of eternal recurrence. I will only the
moments that I have experienced. As a personal thought experiment, I do not will
every moment that has occurred and will occur. This is why I maintain that
eternal recurrence does not involve the amount of self-deception and elusion that
Magnus that thinks it would need. Without a somber reading, eternal recurrence
ostensibly risks becoming a casualty of pop psychology. Magnus does not want to
take the Ubermensch and “convert him into the philosopher’s version of a
sublime Ann Landers.”42 Magnus would not have to do such a thing. Like
Magnus, I believe that the Ubermensch remains this unattainable ideal. But
willing eternal recurrence is not impossible, just very difficult. I doubt that such a
person who can will eternal recurrence has been reading too many advice
columnists or watching too many daytime talk shows. What is important is not
42
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our wanting to erase all of the pain, but to respond to all the pain affirmatively.
Magnus believes that scholars like Richard Schacht take a far too generous
approach to Nietzsche by neglecting to acutely examine life’s vicissitudes. I will
discuss Schacht later, but his approach I find to be far more user-friendly and of
course, more cheerful. Next, I would like to examine Alexander Nehamas’s
contributions to Nietzsche scholarship.

VI
Another reader who has made the Ubermensch and eternal recurrence a
primary concern for his scholarship is Alexander Nehamas. In his book,
Nietzsche: Life as Literature, Nehamas also sifts through Nietzsche’s work in an
attempt to understand what eternal recurrence really means. Like Magnus,
Nehamas also dismisses the cosmological and normative interpretations.
Nehamas claims that eternal recurrence is a view of the self.43 Upon quoting
section 341 of The Gay Science, Nehamas claims that Nietzsche is interested in
the “attitude one must have towards oneself in order to react with joy and not
despair to the possibility that the demon raises, to the thought that one’s life will
occur, the very same in every detail, again and again for all eternity.”44 We are
not given the luxury of adding or subtracting moments. Why doesn’t the demon
offer us such a possibility? According to Nehamas, Nietzsche maintains that a
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person is the sum of her actions and experiences and nothing besides. To remove
one experience or action is to have a completely different person.45
We cannot subtract even one occurrence of misery from our lives because
if we are the sum of our actions and experiences, there is no substantive self
beneath each of us which would preserve our identity. Who we are is the product
of our respective personal narratives. Our personal identities are dependent on our
narratives. A coherent narrative reads just like a text, or at least ideally it should.
According to Nehamas, Nietzsche uses the metaphor that the world, and even the
individual is a text that is to be interpreted.46 We interpret our lives as if they
were literature. Who I am today is the result of my past actions and experiences.
What I have it in me to become is contingent upon my present actions and
experiences. This tightly woven narrative does not allow me to erase a couple of
pages so that my next life does not include any pitfalls. So, if I am to live my life
over and over, I have to relive every moment of my life and nothing less.
Nehamas adds that “wanting to be different in any way is for Nietzsche to want to
be different in every way; it is to want, impossible as that is, to be somebody
else.”47 Also, if one feels that her life can be lived again and again, she will have
to redeem her life as she is living it. She cannot redeem her life in the afterlife.
We cannot expect to be given the option of living after dying. All we can redeem
are the lives we are currently living. It is redeeming this life which is possible,
and there is no single answer for how one is to redeem her life with the eternal
confirmation and seal of eternal recurrence.
45
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Nehamas will use the metaphor of life as literature to clarify what he
thinks Nietzsche is claiming about eternal recurrence. He points out that “perhaps
the proper approach to Nietzsche’s view is to think of his ideal life, the life of the
Ubermensch, as a framework within which many particular lives, each one of
which exhibits the natural unity and coherence he finds so important, can fit.”48
Nehamas does not argue that life should be lived and interpreted as a literary text.
A text once it is written is a done deal. No changes can be made to prevent the
suicide of Ophelia or the jealous rage of Othello. There may be a multiplicity of
ways to interpret a text, but the text never changes. A person’s narrative is always
a work in progress. For Nehamas, in order to form a unity out of a seemingly
fragmented narrative and to redeem the entire past even if it contains much more
grief than bliss, one might make use of self-deception. Nietzsche does tell us that
“giving style to one’s character” is necessary in order for the “ugly…to be
reinterpreted and made sublime” (GS 290). This is a concern for Nehamas and for
me. Must we lie and confabulate to achieve style? Must we be disingenuous so
that our life is like a thrilling, coherent text? Having an enduring character for
Nietzsche may never be outmoded, but is honesty passé? These questions always
loom in the background.
Another idea of Nietzsche’s is to “become who you are” (GS 270).
Nehamas believes Nietzsche is claiming that in order to become “who you are”,
you must “actualize the capacities for which [you] are inherently suited.”49 From
a narrative standpoint, we are the sum of our actions and experiences. We must
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create a self out of these chaotic actions and experiences which befit our
capacities. To “become who you are” does not imply that all people will become
Ubermenschen. Becoming who you are may mean that a person only has it in her
to remain with the herd. Knowing what you can become is dependent upon what
you have already done, which has influenced who you are today. It appears in
Nietzsche that many talents and capacities are inborn. There are some people who
never had it in them to transcend the herd. Self-deception still haunts some people
since many permanently deceive themselves into thinking that they can become
something they can never be. The quest for “style”, Nehamas warns, is always
endangered by the future as one tries to unify the past with the present.50 The
“future” may have nothing to do with the past or present. What comes next may
cast the person into a narrative wreckage. Life still must be “redeemed”. Seeking
that redemption might be a thorny problem. Nietzsche never sees the self as fixed
or static. The future can always chip away at the self unless one is inclined to fib
somewhat so that she can become who she is. Redemption is contingent upon the
vagaries of each person’s existence. As Nehamas observes, sometimes those
vagaries have to undergo a little cosmetic change to look more significant and
purposeful.
Nehamas concludes the book with a discussion of transcending good and
evil. An Ubermensch presumably craves life once more and innumerable times
more and is always engaged in that process of becoming who she is. What aids
the Ubermensch become who she is would be her stark refusal to adhere to the
vulgar, life-denying values of good and evil. Nehamas points out that Nietzsche
50
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was not trying to preclude the possibility of morality. Nietzsche stood in
opposition to any morality that was in Nehamas’s view, “absolutist”.51 “Style” is
not universal. Different people find different ways to affirm their lives. Prevailing
moral values subsume everyone into the same category of agents who adhere to
the values uncritically. Nietzsche swiftly destroys values, but his creation of new
values is a bit trifling, trivial, and banal, as Nehamas sees it. Nietzsche is averse
to systematizing his philosophy. He says so forcefully in Twilight of the Idols that
the “will to a system lacks integrity” (TI 1:26). Nehamas does not expect a
system out of Nietzsche, but a little order out of chaos might have been useful.
After all that Nietzsche has said, do we really think about transcending
good and evil? Nietzsche does not permit us to generalize and universalize – he
would only perpetuate that damned moral tradition if he did. According to
Nehamas, becoming an Ubermensch is a singular odyssey which might not even
be so rewarding after all. Nehamas is not disgruntled by this. He claims that in the
end, Nietzsche “urges others to make a way of life out of views of their own –
views which…he cannot and will not supply for them.”52 That sentiment is never
démodé to those who dare to be a little different, dangerous, and less ordinary.

VII
Like Bernd Magnus and Alexander Nehamas, Richard Schacht also offers
intriguing interpretations of Nietzsche. Eternal recurrence is briefly discussed in
Schacht’s Nietzsche (1983). In this work, Schacht has spent more time trying to
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unveil the odd Ubermensch, and he has a fascinating interpretation. Many
scholars like Magnus would disagree with the way Schacht has viewed Nietzsche.
Schacht’s views are very liberal and at times he soft-pedals controversial points in
Nietzsche’s texts. Schacht believes that higher humanity and the Ubermensch are
the same thing. In “Nietzschean Normativity” (2001) Schacht has a very liberal
approach to Nietzsche which allows the Ubermensch to seem less superhuman.
As I will show in the forthcoming discussion, Schacht argues that an
Ubermensch is a part-time vocation. I have stated earlier that I do not believe the
Ubermensch and “higher humanity” to be the same. While I think a person must
will eternal recurrence to be part of higher humanity, I do not think that one must
be an Ubermensch to be part of higher humanity. I do agree with Schacht’s
assessment of higher humanity. I am not convinced that an Ubermensch is even
human. Still, I argue that many of Schacht’s views are important to the discussion
of Nietzsche and how his philosophy of culture can impact us personally and
politically.
In the article, “Nietzschean Normativity”, Schacht sets out to elucidate the
perennially puzzling Ubermensch. Schacht has never failed to point out that
Nietzsche did not seek to quash all of morality.53 Nietzsche was perturbed by the
stultifying and stifling herd morality of his Europe. Other higher moralities were
possible. Herd morality was but one interpretation although it was certainly the
predominant interpretation of his time. Indeed, Schacht claims that Nietzsche did
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seek the elimination of morals. Nietzsche sought a “moral renewal”.54 Always
keeping in mind Nietzsche’s aversion to systematizing, this “renewal” is never
developed in Nietzsche’s texts. It is up to Schacht to pick up where Nietzsche left
off.
What would shock many readers is that, according to Schacht, the
Ubermensch does not have to lead a solitary existence. Ubermenschen could live
among us and we probably would not be able to tell them apart from the rest.
Schacht always reminds us that Nietzsche would never tell us explicitly what he
would have us all do in order to ascend to higher humanity. Here is where I turn
away from Schacht. Higher humanity and the Ubermensch are one and the same
for him.55 What Schacht claims about higher humanity can be claimed about the
Ubermensch. As Schacht points out, “[f]ighting for what one cherishes and
esteems, and against what one abhors and despises, is the last thing a Nietzschean
would eschew – but there are, in Nietzschean eyes, no moral monopolies or
trumps.”56 If one were to find the source of Nietzschean normativity, the source
would reside in the individual person and not in an impersonal, universally
binding system. Normativity arises from “historically engendered, culturally
configured and socially encoded macro- and micro-forms of human life or
broader and narrower Lebenspharen (“spheres of life”)…”57 In other words, we
are socioculturally encumbered selves whose normative affiliation arises from
historical contexts. Herd morality has had over two thousand years to anchor
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itself in many societies and cultures. Herd morality is too deeply anchored in
society for any of us to fully and cleanly escape. The Ubermenschen, according to
Schacht, have some herd-like proclivities.
Nietzsche does allow the possibility of a higher morality. That claim might
meet little objection. There are some individuals who can attain the status or at
least approximate status of “higher humanity”. “Higher humanity” sounds like a
permanent stage in which one always remains. Yet for Schacht, it is not.
“Nietzschean higher humanity is best conceived, on my view, in such a way that
it never really is – or is likely ever to be – more than a sometime piecemeal thing
even among those who have it in them to be exceptions to the human rule…”58 If
one were to carelessly read Nietzsche’s texts, it could appear that once a person
has attained higher humanity, the person never returns to earth. No one comes
down form the pedestal of higher humanity. According to Schacht, even the most
exceptional person never fully transcends the mundane.
When they leave the mundane, it is temporary and intermittent. Schacht
has done well to de-claw Nietzsche. When a person transcends good and evil, she
does not necessarily shirk her mundane responsibilities. She most likely is not
living alone in the mountains, hunting for food and a few companions. The
exceptional human being is more creative than the unexceptional and ordinary
human being for sure. Yet one might not immediately be able to tell the
extraordinary from the ordinary according to Schacht. Unlike Schacht, I think a
member of higher humanity can be both ordinary and extraordinary. What
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separates this person from an Ubermensch is that the latter is always
extraordinary. We are human after all.
Schacht’s intention is to vindicate Nietzsche from charges of fascism,
immorality, and barbarism. Nietzsche has always left himself vulnerable to such
charges. When Nietzsche declares that “life itself is essentially appropriation,
injury, overpowering of the strange and weaker, suppression, severity, imposition
of one’s own forms, incorporation and, at the least and mildest, exploitation…”
(BGE 259), it is not surprising that one might get apprehensive if one were to
read this quotation literally. This “higher humanity” seems like a sphere reserved
for pugilists. Nietzsche’s claims leave us to wonder what he really meant here and
meant there. Schacht has to remove the sting from Nietzsche if the latter is to be
spared from further misappropriation. Mass appeal was never Nietzsche’s
desideratum. Schacht views Nietzsche as a thinker who is not trying to galvanize
the few into ousting the ancien regime and impose a brutal new world order upon
the weaker. Schacht thinks that Nietzsche was trying to protect himself and others
against moral absolutism and imperialism. Such features strangle those who are
more creative and artistic by delimiting difference of perspectives and attitudes.
All morals in the Nietzschean sense, for Schacht, are local – “a first-person
singular affair”.59 No one thing will promote flourishing.
Along with this, Schacht claims that “much of our lives, for much of the
time, even in the cases of the most ubermenschlich among us, are herdlike affairs
…”60 Schacht maintains that commonplace situations call for commonplace
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morality. Even the greatest human beings still have to stop at red lights. No needs
to be ubermenschlich regarding the paying of income taxes, tipping the bartender,
or stopping at red lights. At times, life can be mundane, and there is no need to
transcend good and evil in such a situation. I doubt that any of us can be
ubermenschlich at all. If we were, there would not be any “flashes” of creativity.
Creativity would be a perpetual light. It is a little different with higher humanity.
With higher humanity, a person does experience flashes of creativity and
brilliance coupled with flashes of ennui and torpor.61 Those who belong to higher
humanity have more of the flashes of creativity and brilliance of course. This
mild-mannered if not diluted “higher humanity” is Schacht’s way of welcoming
Nietzsche and disciples into the public sphere so they can live far and near to the
crowd at the same time. It will be my task for the rest of the dissertation to
determine what effect these creative and brilliant flashes in the public sphere, and
what kind of cultural politics can best nurture these flashes.

VIII
Even with Schacht’s generous optimism and his liberal interpretation of
“higher humanity” and of the Ubermensch, much of what Nietzsche says can still
be viewed as beastly and eternal recurrence still difficult to accept. There is
always Magnus’s concern that eternal recurrence cannot be willed after
monumental tragedy. There is always Nehamas’s concern that willing eternal
recurrence and giving style to one’s character might mandate so much selfdeception that the person’s character becomes fictional. Eternal recurrence is an
61
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idea most people would rather not think about. Turning suffering into something
positive seems like an impossible task. Magnus (early on), Schacht, and Nehamas
have shown us ways to affirm suffering. We have to affirm suffering before we
begin to fashion any higher culture. We need personal confidence and poise
before we can even approach the challenges of the public sphere. We must see
ourselves as worthy opponents before we begin the contest. Ignoring the idea of
eternal recurrence will not wipe away tragedy.
Eternal recurrence might instead sharpen our response to tragedy. What
else is there to do? Magnus might claim that “only self-deception of theological
proportions could affirm the unconditional worth of every moment of one’s
life…”62 We do not get the option of purging and cleansing our lives so that the
blood and tears are never shed. This coping is the manifestation of Nietzsche’s
amor fati. For the last eleven years of his life, Nietzsche did not have the
opportunity to affirm his life due to his catatonic state. Before that of course, the
sickly and nearly blind philologist-turned-philosopher from Leipzig would have
and probably did will his life again and again, even though Lou Salome still
would have turned down his marriage proposals once more and innumerable
times more. It is my claim that tidying up and celebrating one’s private life
enables one to function and perform optimally in the public sphere. One’s
personal life has to be receptive to life-creating values before she emerges in
public. It was necessary to determine what sorts of people constitute a higher
culture. I have discussed the personal. It is my next challenge to ascertain how the
personal will affect the political. This is the next step in seeing how Nietzsche’s
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cultural politics can have in the public domain. The personal has been serviced.
How is “higher humanity” viewed in the public sphere? What kind of higher
culture can be produced when Nietzsche’s personal and political are finally
bridged? What kind of political system could allow the emergence of this higher
culture?
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Chapter Three
Revenge, Ressentiment, and Resistance: Nietzsche’s New Homeric Contest
You Higher Men, learn this from me: In
the marketplace no one believes in Higher
Men. And if you want to speak there, very well,
do so! But the mob blink and say: ‘We are all
equal,’ ‘You Higher Men’ - thus the blink ‘there are no Higher Men, we are all equal, man
is but man, before God - we are all equal!’ Before
God! But now this God has died. And let us not
be equal before the mob. You Higher Men, depart
from the marketplace (Z IV:12)!
The study of the average human being, protracted,
serious, and with much dissembling, self-overcoming,
intimacy, bad company - all company is bad company
except the company of one’s equals (BGE 26).
I
Departing from the marketplace and "bad company" is Zarathustra, the
would-be harbinger of higher men who will have overcome themselves and will
have overcome morality. The Sturm und Drang tempo of Zarathustra’s narrative
boldly heralds the arrival of men (and women perhaps?) who have overthrown the
traditional values of good and evil in order to transcend cultural mediocrity which
has become institutional in our time. These are the proud men who have risen
above the herd. As riveting and amusing as Zarathustra’s histrionics are, is such a
culture of men possible? At times Zarathustra seems a bit feckless, especially
when the abysmal thought of eternal recurrence is brought up. Will these men
ever come? Will there ever be a contest among these higher men? If they are not
here now, will they ever be? For Nietzsche, there appears to be a modicum of
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human beings who are simply better and stronger than the rest of their species.
When we become who we are, we are becoming the kinds of people that it was in
our nature to be. Will any of these stronger and better types realize their true
natures? Or, will their capabilities and talents lay fallow if these men fear
detaching themselves from the comfortable herd? As Kathleen Marie Higgins has
observed, perhaps anyone who is eligible to become a higher man is still
encumbered by their pre-fab values.
Higgins claims that “[p]oison abounds, as apparently do its victims…[b]ut
Nietzsche startles us with his admission that he is among those poisoned.”63
Higgins is referring to the third essay in the Genealogy where Nietzsche asserts
that “we, too, are still victims of and prey to this moralized contemporary taste
and ill with it, however much we think we despise it - probably it infects even us”
(GM III:20). Is Nietzsche’s inherent elitism a cause for concern if these higher
men never emerge in order to engage in the contest? Is our culture even
conducive to the emergence of higher men and their agonistic proclivities? Not
everyone belongs to this class of higher men. Not everyone gets to play. Most of
us are going to languish in the marketplace with our human-all-too-human
beliefs, convictions, and sentiments. Fortunately the herd makes us complacent to
the point where we might not know that we are languishing. Those of us on the
lower rung of mankind can attend church every Sunday to appease God and busy
ourselves with other holy icons while the higher men are preoccupied with their
much more creative labors.
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Being an avid reader of Nietzsche, I can quickly be flattered by being
placed in the category of higher (wo)men. I would probably be responsible for
that placement since I would be averse to loitering around the herd’s popular
hangouts. I am not a constituent of the vulgar and the ugly. I am ready to live
dangerously. I concur with Nietzsche’s sunny feeling that “whatever one casts
into us, we take down into our depth - for we are deep, we do not forget - and
become bright again” (GS 379). I believe that the public sphere should be an
open space for competition. We either think Nietzsche is mostly or completely
wrong with his characterizations of human beings, or we wholeheartedly agree
with him. If it is the former, we might be the kind of scholars who ascribe fascist
traits to his corpus or bristle at his inexorable elitism. If it is the latter, we accept
Nietzsche assuming that we have membership in the denomination of higher men.
Why would we support Nietzsche’s agonistic politics if we did not receive
preferential treatment of sorts? What are the requirements for membership? What
sort of dues must we pay? As Zarathustra states, we must overcome ourselves and
morality. Would this overcoming result in more of a Pyrrhic victory for those
who dared to transcend the life-denying values of the herd? Would we alienate
ourselves from friends and family to engage in this lofty contest? It would be a
toilsome task to strip ourselves of the very moral convictions by which we have
lived for so long. As I mentioned earlier, even Nietzsche says that we too are
poisoned. Are we poisoned irreparably? If one carefully reads the Genealogy, and
if one agrees with what Nietzsche says in that book, perhaps our adherence to
those moral convictions is indeed flawed and is detrimental to human flourishing.
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Nietzsche’s claims can appear counterintuitive and dangerous. But is he right? By
tracing the genealogy of morality, is he correctly identifying where human beings
went wrong? Will we ever get to compete with one another again?
There will be a cavalry of Nietzsche disciples who do attest to the
allegation that the omnipresence of morality has been a pox to the creativity of a
few talented and strong men. Once one accepts Nietzsche’s diagnosis of modernday Europe, we begin to identify the source and origin of the common and the
ordinary. We also identify ways of precluding a possible collapse and/or relapse
into the common and ordinary. Jacob Golomb points out that “[t]he division of
the personality and the repression of many essential elements characterizes the
prevailing ethical norms, preventing human beings from achieving personal
harmony and full expression.”64 Morality may be a salve for the weak, but it is a
pestilence to the strong - us higher men and women of course. It may turn out that
the near-messianic coming of higher men will never be. But just in case it does,
Nietzsche recognizes ways to differentiate stronger men from the mass of moral
yet weak men. If upon due examination, no one can be that quixotic Ubermensch,
perhaps one can come close. Taking part in this contest is never a waste.
Nietzsche plays not only the part of culture physician, he plays the role of
cheerleader too at times. Nietzsche will not tell you how to join higher humanity,
but he could certainly convince you that any attempt is worthwhile. What could
help revive the ancient Greek agon? While Nietzsche may not give any clear-cut
steps, he will gladly share with us what behaviors and beliefs will not be catalytic
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for the new Homeric contest

II
Nietzsche declares in Twilight of the Idols that “to have to combat one’s
instincts…is the formula for decadence: as long as life is ascending, instincts and
happiness are one” (TI The Problem of Socrates: 11). Nietzsche is not arguing for
the re-emergence of savages who have nothing but their instincts. Nietzsche still
prefers civility over savagery. However, too many instincts are being repressed
which in turn leads to decadence. One has to combat and even suppress one’s
instincts if one is to be considered “moral” in the conventional sense. As
Nietzsche sees it, we would seemingly have to fetter ourselves to any given moral
system since it would run counter to our most basic instincts. Nietzsche claims
that “[m]orality has always been a bed of Procrustes” (TI Skirmishes of an
Untimely Man: 44). Morality, metaphorically and at times literally speaking,
tames the man who would be the carefree beast of prey without it. Morality
ensures docility. As Procrustes would chop off the legs of men who were too tall
or stretch the legs of men who were too short so that everyone could fit on his
bed, morality manipulates the array of human personalities so that they all
conform to one prevailing code of conduct. Perhaps we would all be happier if we
did not need any moral superintendence. Perhaps we could rely on ourselves for
personal moral guidance instead of relying upon a generic, law-like code which
behooves us to forgo certain desires and needs for the sake of everyone. Many of
us would prefer to act as our instincts dictate. However, to live in a community,
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we need to thoroughly oversee our behavior so as not to violate any moral norms
that are operative within the community. Under any supervening moral system,
disrupting moral norms is seen as undermining the community upon which these
norms are based. This is why those members of higher humanity can cause many
critics to grimace since Nietzsche’s brigade of higher men disobey the norms
which they would view as inimical to thriving beyond good and evil.
Judeo-Christian morality also involves slighting the passions. One of
Nietzsche’s many admonitions is that “[t]o exterminate the passions merely in
order to do away with their folly and its unpleasant consequences - this seems to
us today a merely acute form of folly” (TI Morality as Anti-Nature: 1). We have a
plethora of passions, desires, and emotions that often manifest themselves in an
intense and visceral fashion. Gratification does not always have to be visceral.
These passions, desires, and emotions can also be sublimated. Nietzsche’s point is
that we often feel the need to repudiate these feelings as swiftly as we can. If we
indiscriminately satiate ourselves, we might spurn and neglect others. We might
be so egoistic as to withdraw care and concern for everyone else unless they aid
us in maximizing our personal interests. A moral regimentation entails
disregarding our instincts. We would also have to disregard our self-interests
since universal ethical egoism is not a solvent moral theory. One of Nietzsche’s
innumerable complaints about modern Europe is that most Europeans are
engaged in some kind of moral practice, and those that rule them recycle those
hackneyed, herd-like values:
The strange narrowness of human evolution,
its hesitations, its delays, its frequent retrogressions
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and rotations, are due to the fact that the herd instinct
of obedience has been inherited best and at the expense
of the art of commanding…This state of things actually
exists in Europe today: I call it the moral hypocrisy of
the commanders. They know no way of defending themselves against their bad conscience other than to pose as
executors of more ancient or higher commands, or even
to borrow herd maxims from the herd’s way of thinking
and appear as ‘the first servant of the people’ for
example, or as ‘instruments of the common
good’ (BGE 199).
Transcending good and evil entails an entirely different outlook towards life, a
life devoid of misgivings and fears. As Nietzsche says in the Twilight, “[w]e
others, we immoralists, have on the contrary opened wide our hearts to every kind
of understanding, comprehension, approval…[and] we do not readily deny, we
seek our honor in affirming” (TI Morality as Anti-Nature: 6). However, this
particular attitude may estrange and isolate the immoralists from all others. To
avoid being an “immoralist”, one has to relinquish certain things for the good of
others and for the community. We have to be compassionate. We cannot steal.
We cannot harm others. We cannot only care about ourselves individually. Why
not? We all have the same moral standing; we are equal in the home and in the
marketplace.
Substantive equality implies that everyone, no matter how impoverished,
stupid, and unproductive, deserves the same moral consideration as those who are
urbane, bright, and ambitious. Presumably, people deserve equal moral
consideration because they all belong to the same class - human beings. Equal
moral consideration is also given because those who are not bright, urbane, and
ambitious are at a moral and social disadvantage. Morality could certainly appear
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undesirable at first. Personal satisfaction and self-interests would most likely have
to be shelved permanently if we are to co-exist peacefully. The benefits of a
moral system would override any costs, or would they? As we have already seen,
Nietzsche has viewed current morality as hostile to life-affirming values. Selfexpression and self-creation might have to be limited or completely eliminated
since such plans may seem unfair to those who do not have the capabilities and
capacities to express and create themselves as others do. Substantive equality tries
to eradicate the seemingly unfair and arbitrary nature of the world so we can all
win in the end. We are leveled to the point where no difference among us can be
recognizedMany would agree with Nietzsche that morality is a social construct
that requires us to make a few sacrifices to live in a harmonious society. Any side
effects of morality should be rendered mild.
According to Nietzsche, morality has deleterious effects. As I stated
earlier, Nietzsche believes that some people are by nature better than others. They
are stronger; they have more promise. For Nietzsche, these higher men should not
be considered equal with the lowly, mild-mannered herd. Traditional morality
requires us to recognize equality among all men, or at least most of them. For
Nietzsche, inequality is natural, which is a stance many ethicists would not share
with him. Higher men have to be emancipated from traditional morality, if they
can be. The higher men might still be poisoned. The fetters of every moral system
are secured onto everyone. Morality, as Nietzsche says in Beyond Good and Evil,
“levels” the base with the free spirits so that the goal of the “green pasture
happiness of the herd, with security, safety, comfort, and an easier life for all” is
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attained and sustained (BGE 44). The “levelers” clamoring for a democracy
protect the weak but wound the strong. How could this happen? How is it that a
stifling morality has endured for so long?

III
Nietzsche points out in the preface of the Genealogy that he is searching
for the origin of our moral prejudices, and that “I learned to separate theological
prejudice from moral prejudices and ceased to look for the origin of evil behind
the world” (GM P:3). Nietzsche is seeking the answer to the question: “under
what conditions did man devise these value judgments of good and evil and what
value do they themselves possess?” (GM P:3). If the values of good and evil for
Nietzsche are no longer sought “behind” the world, then these values appear to be
man-made. These values are not supernatural. Morality does not appear to be
constitutive of divine commands, nor is it a natural occurrence in the world.
These are values which cannot be divorced from their social construction.
Morality seems more like a folkway, an arbitrary construct. Nietzsche has to offer
evidence that this is the case. Was there a time when we did not need these moral
values? At some point in time, morality was created and enforced to protect a
certain people from some kind of iniquity? Why?
Nietzsche traces good and evil to the ancient nemeses of the ‘noble” and
“ignoble. According to Nietzsche, there was a time long ago when there was a
noble caste and a separate caste of the ignoble ones who were considered ugly
and base. This dichotomy is not unique to the Genealogy. Nietzsche had already
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made such a distinction in Human, All Too Human:
As a good man, one belongs to the ‘good’,
a community which has a sense of belonging
together because all of the individuals in it are
combined with one another through the capacity
for requital. As a bad man one belongs to the ‘bad’,
to a swarm of subject, powerless people who have
no sense of belonging together. The good are a caste,
the bad a mass like grains of sand. Good and bad
is for long a long time the same thing as noble and
base, master and slave (HAH 45).
Nietzsche’s analyses of good and evil are not ostensibly normative. He is not
claiming that this dichotomy is the way things ought to be. He is describing a
historical stratification of types. Despite his admiration for much of the ancient
Greek and Roman cultures, Nietzsche is not advocating a return to the ancient.
Rarely in the Genealogy does Nietzsche even use the words “master” and “slave”.
Fascist sympathizers may have seized the opportunity to intellectually hijack
Nietzsche’s genealogy believing he was advocating a “master race” to rule over
the “slaves”. As we delve deeper into the Genealogy, we will see that master and
slave are metaphorical terms. Nietzsche typically uses words like “high-born”,
“noble” to refer to the former and use words like “low” and “common” to refer to
the latter
Nietzsche’s intention is to trace to origin of “good” and “evil” This is a
bifurcation between peoples that existed long ago. Nietzsche begins with the
word “good” At this point in the Genealogy, Nietzsche claims that to designate a
person “good” meant that he had an “aristocratic soul” or a “privileged soul”
(GM I:4). Nietzsche claims that “the judgments ‘good’ did not originate with
those to whom ‘goodness’ was shown…rather it was ‘the good’ themselves, that
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is to say, the noble, powerful, high-stationed and high-minded who felt and
established themselves and their actions as good, that is, of the first rank, in
contradistinction to all the low, low-minded, common, and plebeian” (GM I:2).
The Greek word for good was agathos. This word had a family resemblance with
words whose English translations are “beautiful”, “noble”, and “powerful”. The
Greek word for “bad” was kakos. English words which resembled bad are “ugly”,
“ill-born”, “mean”, and “craven” (GM I:5). People who were bad were low-born,
common, and “plebeian” (GM I:4). The “noble” class was certainly aware of
their blessed fortune. For Nietzsche, the ancient and contemporary use of “noble”
does not entail that one be born an aristocrat. A fabulously wealthy person can
still have an all-too-human, slavish mentality that is hinders her immensely. The
“noble” ones could emerge from the darkest recesses of a ghetto. From a
contemporary perspective, Nietzsche will usually substitute “noble” with “strong”
and “ignoble” with “weak” (GM I:13). Nietzsche views nobility as a “mode of
valuation: it acts and grows spontaneously, it seeks its opposite only so as to
affirm itself more gratefully and triumphantly…” (GM I:10). As Nietzsche is
tracing the origin of good and evil, he discovers how intimately connected words
like “good”, “noble”, and “aristocratic” are. The same goes for “bad”, “common”,
and “low”. How did these values become inverted? Did the common ones grow
resentful of the noble and stage a revolt?
The “noble” ones keep that “pathos of distance” between themselves and
the base class (GM I:2). “Noble” men and women were not going to pity those
beneath them. The low-born types were presumably low-born for good reason.
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Did these plebeian types never have a chance to better themselves? Did they ever
have a chance? They were born “ugly” and “base”, and they can never extricate
themselves from their lowly existence. Any chance of social mobility was
eradicated since it was not in the nature of the common types to be any better than
they already were. Nietzsche’s task is to determine how we have come to value
the things we do. The point of Nietzsche’s account of these early noble and
ignoble types is that these types are merely descriptive, not prescriptive.65 Value
terms were not originally moral; they described the way things were. The ethos
then does not resemble the ethos now.
I have stated earlier in Chapter One that while Nietzsche is an elitist par
excellence, one does not have to be a modern-day “aristocrat” or a plutocrat to
belong to “higher humanity”, though the accoutrements of an affluent lifestyle
would not hurt. In modern times, an “aristocrat” does not mean what it used to
mean. This kind of aristocrat is more of a plutocrat, meaning someone who has
money, power, and influence. The kind of aristocrat that I believe Nietzsche to be
lauding is the kind from Greek or Roman antiquity. This aristocrat was part of the
elite because he was the best educated and most fit to rule.66 He would not be the
kind of aristocrat who had to buy votes or bribe campaign contributors.
In Nietzche's account, the case of “good” and “bad” were descriptive
terms. “Good” and “bad” have not acquired a normative connotation just yet. If
someone were “bad”, he was not acting immorally. The values of good and bad
did not prescribe any course of action. “Bad” described a person. He was bad
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because the good ones viewed him as base and ugly. These values described the
way things were in the eyes of the dominant group, not they way they ought to be.
Those unlucky with their lot in life could only cope by accepting their immutable
fate. Nietzsche claims that eventually there was a “slave revolt in morals”. This
slave revolt was perpetrated by a “priestly-aristocratic” class (GM I:7). Nietzsche
argues that priestly types “are the most evil enemies” (GM I:7). Why is this the
case? According to Nietzsche:
It is because of their [priests] impotence that in
them hatred grows to monstrous and uncanny proportions,
to the most spiritual and poisonous kind of hatred. The truly
great haters in world history have always been priests; likewise the most ingenious haters: other kinds of spirit hardly
come into consideration when compared with the spirit
of priestly vengefulness (GM I:7).
In the end, these priestly-aristocratic types became moral seditionists. They
began the inversion of the previous values of “good” and “bad”. The world with
the meek at the helm would look dramatically different from the world where the
noble and high-born ones reigned while keeping the weak ones at bay. After this
slave revolt in morals, the world would no longer be viewed through what
moderns would consider an amoral lens. Suddenly, the world was "moral".

IV
The “slave revolt in morality” begins with revenge (GM I:10). The desire
for revenge is a reactive emotion. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche tells a
tale about a gathering of angry and resentful tarantulas:
For that a man may be freed from the bonds of
revenge: that is the bridge to my highest hope and
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a rainbow after protracted storms. But naturally
the tarantulas would have it differently. ‘That
the world may become full of storms of our revenge,
let precisely that be called justice by us’ - thus they
talk together. ‘We shall practice revenge and
outrage against all who are not as we are’ - thus
the tarantula-hearts promise themselves. ‘And
the will to equality - that itself shall henceforth
be the name of virtue; and we shall raise outcry
against everything that has power!’(Z II:7).
Nietzsche accuses the tarantulas of projecting their repressed envy onto the
powerful. This is what Nietzsche calls ressentiment. The word can be loosely
translated as “resentment”, but I maintain that the word is best left untranslated
since ressentiment involves more than just resenting. Ressentiment is a reactive
and potentially hazardous emotion to bear. I will say more on that later. The
tarantulas are powerless and are angry that others have power. They seek revenge
to overturn this state of affairs. It is no different with the ignoble and weak ones.
The envy of the weak ones begins to burst. This is an envy which has smoldered
for ages. This envy is intolerable. The possessors of envy react with a longing for
revenge:
The ‘well-born’ felt themselves to be happy; they
did not have to establish their happiness artificially
by examining their enemies, or to persuade themselves,
deceive themselves, that they were happy; and they likewise
knew, as rounded men replete with energy and therefore
necessarily active [my italics], that happiness should not
be sundered from action - being active was with them necessarily a part of happiness - all very much the opposite of
‘happiness’ at the level of the impotent, the oppressed, and
those in whom poisonous and inimical feelings are festering,
with whom it appears as essentially narcotic, drug, rest, peace,
‘sabbath’, slackening of tension and relaxing of limbs, in short
passively (GM I:10).
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The anger becomes spiritual and lofty. The enmity is reactive and also creative
(GM I:11. With the slave revolt in morals, “ignoble” values are venerated and
“noble” values are scorned. Those who were once “good” descriptively now lose
that appellation. Instead of a perfect inversion of values where the “good” ones
become the “bad” ones, the good ones are now “evil” and the bad ones are
“good”. Nietzsche adds that:
This ‘bad’ of noble origin and that ‘evil’ of the cauldron
of unsatisfied hatred - the former an after-production, a
side issue, a contrasting shade, the latter on the contrary the
original thing, the beginning, the distinctive deed in the
conception of a slave morality - how different these words
‘bad’ and ‘evil’ are, although they are both apparently the
same concept of ‘good’. But it is not the same concept ‘good’:
one should ask rather precisely who is ‘evil’ in the sense of
the morality of ressentiment. The answer…is: precisely
the ‘good’ man of the other morality, precisely the noble,
powerful man, the ruler, but dyed in another color, interpreted
in another fashion, seen in another way by the venomous eye
of ressentiment (GM I:11).
This “other way” became the prevailing morality which still guides us today. If
nobility is evil, one ought not exemplify nobility with all of its complacency and
indifference to those who are weak and base.
Nietzsche is not resorting to hyperbole with his genealogical account of
morality. In the Genealogy, Nietzsche claims that slave morality begins with
ressentiment.
The slave revolt in morality begins when ressentiment
itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: the
ressentiment of natures that are denied the true reaction,
that deeds, and compensate themselves with an imaginary
revenge. While every noble morality develops from a triumphant
affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to
what is ‘outside’, what is ‘different’, what is not ‘itself’; and
this No is its creative deed (GM I:10).
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While ressentiment may be a reactive emotion, it can still be creative.
Ressentiment is a bitter and spiteful emotion. A man of ressentiment despises
those who are greater than him. Nietzsche views nature as indifferent and amoral.
Demanding to know why nature seems evil or at least unfair is a non-issue for
Nietzsche. Yet men of ressentiment refuse to acquiesce to their current situation.
There is nothing wrong with trying to improve one’s life. But, ignoble ones, the
common ones, wished to lay the blame on others for their terrible lot. The outside
world to them is hostile, not indifferent. The men of ressentiment want
recompense for living in this malicious and hostile world. They want to be
disentangled from the underbelly of society. Since they had to suffer
considerably, they should be compensated. How? This was a blame-ridden and
vindictive envy that was also immensely productive. Ressentiment is the emotion
out of which concept like Heaven and Hell are constructed. Nietzsche points out
that “[I]t was suffering and impotence that “[w]eariness, which wants to reach the
ultimate with a single leap, with a death-leap, a poor ignorant weariness, which
no longer wants to even want: that created all goods and afterworlds” (Z I:3).
The noble ones, in most cases, have no ressentiment. If they do, the
feeling dissipates and has little effect, if any. Nietzsche adds:
[t]o be incapable of taking one’s enemies, one’s
accidents, even one’s misdeeds very seriously for
very long - that is the sign of strong, full natures
in whom there is an excess of the power to form,
to mold, to recuperate, and to forget (GM I:10).
The noble ones are satisfied with their lives and lament to no one. The ignoble
types lack this self-possession and blame others for their misbegotten lives. In
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Thus Spoke Zarathustra, there is a section entitled “On the Adder’s Bite”. In this
section, Zarathustra is bitten by an adder, but does not seek to harm the adder in
retaliation. A person seeking retribution would attempt to exact a penalty for
being bitten. Instead, Zarathustra tries to determine if he in any way can benefit
from the adder’s bite. Zarathustra’s disciples are puzzled by his refusal to harm
the adder. Zarathustra, in desiring the presence of a worthy enemy, tells his
disciples that they should not “requite him [the enemy] good for evil, for that
would make him ashamed, but prove that he has done something good for you”
(Z I:19).
A noble person could ascertain what he would gain from this adder’s bite,
an ignoble type would instead languish with his unremitting desire for revenge.
Nietzsche makes a similar point in the Genealogy regarding revenge, though he
couples it with a discussion of justice and punishment. Nietzsche claims that as a
community becomes stronger, it “ceases to take an individual’s transgressions so
seriously because they can no longer be considered as dangerous and destructive
to the whole as they were formerly…” (GM II:10). The community more often
declines to avenge past wrongs and to punish those who err. According to
Nietzsche, a healthy and strong community could “attain such a consciousness of
power that it could allow itself the noblest luxury possible to it - letting those who
harm it go unpunished…[because] ‘What are my parasites to me?’ it [society]
might say…’May they live and prosper: I am strong enough for that!’” (GM II:
10).
Moral judgments, at least according to Nietzsche, are derivative of the
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Judeo-Christian tradition, which in turn is derivative of the slave revolt in morals.
Are we teeming with spite and envy if we imprison those who murder, rape, and
steal? This is a legitimate concern for me. Should I abstain from making any
value judgments for fear of remaining a scion of the plebeian types who revolted
against the noble ones? No moral judgments were made in the antebellum period
preceding the slave revolt. Now, how does making a moral judgment show
weakness and hostility towards life? This is a problem in Nietzsche to which I
will return later.
Returning to the ignoble types, these people could have embraced what
they had been allotted and everything would have gone according to nature.
However, the ignoble types were persistent in identifying the causes of their
vexation, distress, and suffering as something which occurred outside of
themselves. They sought revenge and according to Nietzsche, the eventual
reprisal for their anguish was slave morality. Eventually even the noble types fell
prey to this wondrous creation. Noble types gradually sensed the alleged dishonor
of good fortune and nobility (GM III:14). This is not unexpected. Moral systems
have guided nearly everyone for centuries. Even Nietzsche has to admit that the
ignoble ones, the sick ones, were clever and very convincing, after all they
“succeeded in poisoning the consciences of the fortunate with their own misery,
with all misery, so that one day the fortunate began to be ashamed of their good
fortune and perhaps said to one another; ‘it is disgraceful to be fortunate; there is
too much misery!’” (GM III:14). The erstwhile apathy of the noble types is
transformed into guilt for their unchosen fortune. The noble types become
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cognizant of widespread suffering. Good fortune is re-conceptualized as
detestable and scandalous.
Robert Solomon does not dispute Nietzsche’s claim that Judeo-Christian
values arise out of ressentiment. However, Solomon claims that ressentiment can
be a catalyst for social change. Solomon does not view ressentiment as being a
negative emotion. According to Solomon, a man of ressentiment can be a man
who senses a social justice and seeks to have it rectified.67 Under this
interpretation, Martin Luther King, Jr. or Gandhi can be seen as men of
ressentiment since they fought against the injustices of their day. Both men were
viewed as lesser human beings according to the powerful in their day. Are people
who wish to counteract segregation in the South and British colonial rule
envious? Spiteful? Resentful? If Solomon is right, Civil rights activists are from
the same stock as the weak types. Solomon continues his argument:
What Nietzsche ignores - in part because of his own sense
of biological determinism, but also, I suspect, because of his
own sense of rootlessness and social impotence - is the
legitimacy of the sense of oppression, the proper resentment
toward an unjust world and the felt need to change it. The
sentiment of resentment is not the voice of mediocrity or
incompetence but the passion of justice denied.68
Solomon adds that “[r]esentment, indeed, is the emotion of legitimacy - the
emotion that more than any other prompts the ‘slavish’ demand of the ‘herd’ (that
is, the socially responsible insistence of the community) for justice and
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justification.”69
I think Solomon is misguided with his interpretation of ressentiment. A
person who seeks to eradicate an injustice does not imply that person is filled
with repressed envy. The desire to topple those who are more successful and
more creative may be a desire that is averse to promoting social change. Solomon
admits that ressentiment is “nasty…[i]t looks enviously at those who are on top,
who have the power…[and] it wants to pull them down.”70 However, wanting to
topple someone because he will not allow you to vote or requires that you use a
separate drinking fountain does not mean that you are filled with envy and
resentment. Nietzsche’s maligned weak ones may think that their situation is
unjust because they can never extricate themselves from their ignoble class. For
Nietzsche, some inequities as being natural. Indeed his view is slightly
problematic. It appears that a person is condemned to remain in their class for as
long as they live. This is why Solomon cautions against Nietzsche’s apparent
biological determinism. Yet, Nietzsche views these weak ones as quite
embittered, if not catty. Nietzsche would view these weak ones as unlovable
losers who sought to equalize the strong and the weak out of envy and unrequited
desire - and not out of a genuine sense of injustice and discrimination. Claiming
“Property is theft!” because you drive a Pinto while an acquaintance drives a
brand-new Porsche will not help legitimize the claim that social classes ought to
be equalized.
In contrast, the “Americans With Disabilities Act”, on my interpretation,
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would not be another instance ressentiment. Arguing for reasonable access into a
building and a few handicapped spots in the parking lot does not amount to
repressed envy and spite. This is not a case of a disabled person seeking revenge
against everyone else by being allowed to cut in line at a theme park instead of
waiting with everyone else. No one is equal in the sense that they are given equal
access into a building or all have suffrage. This in no way affects a person’s
natural talents or capabilities. Their being recognized as people who have natural
talents and capabilities is a separate issue. I maintain that Nietzsche has made
clear enough what constitutes a man of ressentiment. Justice is rarely at the end of
every endeavor which is born from ressentiment. Desiring access into the contest
does not imply that one is entitled to argue for preferential treatment once one is
allowed to play. The issue of being recognized politically as a “participant” is an
issue I will take up in the next chapter.
Another matter that I find important to discuss is whether when Nietzsche
discusses “higher humanity”, he is advocating the emergence of a “master race”.
If one makes a cursory reading of Nietzsche, one might think the master/slave
dichotomy describes a current state of affairs. Are the higher men part of a master
race? If so, who are the slaves and what happens to them? Anyone with fascist,
racist, or just plain bigoted tendencies might see Nietzsche as their poster child
for a new master race. According to Jacob Golomb and Robert Wistrich, Adolph
Hitler was not that familiar with Nietzsche, but his many subordinates were.71
This was enough to bestow the posthumous honor of patron saint of fascism onto
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Nietzsche. Even white supremacists in the Untied States (mis)appropriate
Nietzsche for their own use. Are burning crosses, dressing in white sheets, and
supporting the annihilation of Jews, Catholics, and African-Americans indicative
of a master race? It is my claim that utilizing any part of Nietzsche to promulgate
or recommend a fascist or racist program is completely erroneous.
I have stated in chapter one Nietzsche’s endorsement of a pan-European
race. However, this is a “race” that is the amalgamation of Christians and Jews.
Nietzsche did not support the extermination of those who were not part of this
proposed pan-European race. The “good European” is not the master we have
seen in the Genealogy. No one from the herd is “vermin”; nor is anyone from the
herd in danger of being “processed” at a concentration camp. Looking even
further into Nietzsche’s men of ressentiment can clarify any confusion that might
surround the topic of masters and slaves.
Of course Nazis fancied themselves to be the paterfamilias of the master
race - the Aryans. The master race had to be purified of any undesirables, hence
the Third Reich. Nietzsche is actually quite helpful in explaining where the Nazis
and people of their ilk go so terribly wrong. Nietzsche remarks in The Gay
Science that “the state in which we hurt others is rarely agreeable, in an
unadulterated way, as that in which we benefit others, or it shows a sense of
frustration in the face of this poverty; it is accompanied by new dangers and
uncertainties for what power we do possess, and clouds our horizon with the
prospect of revenge, scorn, punishment, and failure” (GS 13). What is interesting
about this remark is that Nietzsche argues that harming others is a sign that one
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may feel hindered, that one lacks power. The men of ressentiment may look like
Nazis and white supremacists. Why? Nietzsche asks, “what do you suppose he
finds necessary, absolutely necessary, to give himself in his own eyes the
appearance of superiority over more spiritual people and to attain the pleasure of
an accomplished revenge at least in his imagination?” (GS 359).
A few sections later, Nietzsche claims that “hatred places people on a par,
vis-à-vis; in hatred there is honor; finally, in hatred there is fear” (GS 379). These
two quotations come from a chapter entitled “We Fearless Ones”. It is doubtful
that fascists are fearless. Some men of ressentiment try to will equality so that
they are eligible for competition even when they do not have the talent and
creativity to compete with others. This leveling of the contest befits those who
remain with the herd but wish to soar with higher humanity without making any
effort. These people are those who are angry at their lower positioning on the
cultural hierarchy. On the flipside, fascists do not want to compete with others.
They wish to force their subordinates to do as they say. Fascists also fear
competition from others who are different. If they wish to imprison or even
liquidate a people or culture, they must fear something about those who differ
from them. Anti-Semitism did not begin and end with the Nazi party, it just
reached its most frightening peak during 1933-1945. On a Nietzschean view, one
could be claiming that the Nazis were a contingent of men and women who were
exceptionally frustrated. They were stymied by their own repressed anger and
projected it onto others. The “Final Solution” was the unfortunate culmination of
self-loathing turned outward. Nazis and others are fraught with so much hatred,
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suspicion, and fear that they feel it is imperative for them to drastically streamline
the population of those who are the wellspring of their malignant feelings.
Nietzsche was not around to comment on Nazi Germany, but I maintain that his
analysis of ressentiment fits. Men of ressentiment loathe the external world and at
times loathe themselves for their wretched condition. They project their loathing
into unsuspecting and undeserving bystanders who are not to blame.
Those guilty of ressentiment do not have to be Christians. Ressentiment is
not a singular occurrence. Its frequency can be seen all over the world. Suicide
bombers in the Middle East and in Chechnya are angry at someone. Being part of
higher humanity entails resisting ressentiment. The bonds of ressentiment are
difficult from which to be released. We envy what we do not have. We are
embittered by social slights. Even close friends and family can spurn us, which
my leave us incensed, insulted, and indignant. This is something we have to
overcome. We may not be able to prevent all misfortune that befalls, but we can
control our response to it. It is a response that must be free of ressentiment.

V
Our moral prejudices use the template “good” and “evil” by which to
judge human beings and their actions. However, Nietzsche does not adequately
indicate the source of secular morality. According to Nietzsche analysis in the
Genealogy, many moral judgments are derivative of the Judeo-Christian tradition.
Not all moral judgments are part of a Judeo-Christian construct. As narrow as
Nietzsche’s genealogy of morals is, he is tracing a genealogy where the particular
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categories of good and evil are Judeo-Christian categories. In other words,
Nietzsche forcefully attacks a system of morality, even though it is not the only
system of morality available. It is the predominant system in our moral tradition.
With Nietzsche’s help, we can understand the origin of the concepts of
good and evil now. Are these concepts empowering at all? If we are Christians,
we are empowered by calling ourselves “good” and scoffing at our counterparts
by calling them “evil”. We are good only if we act according to the dictates of
Christianity. These dictates involve many sacrifices. We become subject to guilt
and punishment if we transgress. So we can be assured a place in the heavenly
afterworld, our bodily existence in this earthly den has to be disciplined. We may
not even enjoy being disciplined, but it is something we feel we must do in order
to please the Almighty judge himself. Such religious rigor trains men to be herd
animals who abide by what their ministers or holy books say. The herd rarely
questions religious authority. Religious hierarchies have enjoyed ongoing security
and reverence from their congregates. Nietzsche takes it upon himself to mock
such reverence.
An integral part of a person’s identity comes from the religious tradition
in which he was raised. There are other constituents that make up a tradition such
as ethnicity, gender roles in any given culture, and nationality. Religion does
carry a great deal of weight in determining a person’s views towards many social
issues. A man can convert to another religion, but he usually remains within his
inherited tradition. Unless a child is reared by agnostics or atheists, the child will
spend her Saturdays or Sundays in a holy temple. At least she’ll celebrate
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Christmas or Chanukah. We are brought up in some kind of religious
environment. Or at least a religious environment is hard to ignore. It is rather
difficult to avoid seeing Christmas decorations or hearing carols. Most of us are
raised in a religious environment that is equipped with prayers and a pantheon of
at least one God. In the monotheistic tradition, God is usually seen as an
insatiable being, always wanting to be appeased lest the heathen suffer for his
lack of reverence. Appeasing God is a laborious project. Nietzsche was unwilling
to appease, but his immediate family was not disinclined to please God. He was
from a good Lutheran family. How do we convince others to believe? Christianity
could be seen as having a will to deception complete with a packet of promises
and threats for its believers. It would seem foolish to incur the wrath of a vengeful
God. He can promise to reward you with a pleasant afterlife if you obey him. He
can threaten to punish you severely if you disobey. What are we to do?
Perhaps we are tainted by Adam and Eve’s blunder in Eden. Even if we
are not, we are imperfect in the eyes of God. I have already discussed Nietzsche’s
notions of “creditor” and “debtor” in chapter one. This relationship explains why
we feel so indebted psychologically. There are debts we can never repay. We are
guilty because we believe that we have violated one of the Ten Commandments.
We have sinned. We are guilty and we owe God. If we are suffering any
hardships here on earth, we probably owe God for something. We might sin
because we followed our instincts, and these instincts are antithetical to God’s
commandments. Acts of contrition following sins should be expected. Nietzsche
derides the “morbid softening and moralization through which the animal ‘man’
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finally learns to be ashamed of his instincts” (GM II:4). One feels the sting of his
bad conscience when he has trespassed against God. Nietzsche remarks that the
conscience was the “forcible sundering from man’s animal past” (GM II:16).
In other words, as free and instinctive creatures, human beings were not
aware of “good” and “evil”. That feeling has long since expired. Those affected
by a guilt-ridden conscience now regret that they have done wrong. Dante’s
Inferno certainly does not depict hell as an inviting place. No one would want to
reside there, even if its existence may be questioned. If we follow what Nietzsche
called “slave morality”, we must presumably act as if heaven and hell do exist.
Believers have deep-seated fears of a grim afterlife where they would eternally
mingle with fallen angels and other evil spirits if they do not go with God.
“Burning in hell” is a useful mnemonic image for believers. This belief-system
teaches that if someone is condemned to suffer the torments of the damned, he
must have deserved it - justice was served. Divine justice exacts punishments for
those who did not heed the word of God. No misdeed is ever forgotten, though it
might be forgiven depending on the religious sect. This is part of the legacy of the
“slave revolt” in morals. Ressentiment became creative and gave birth to new
values. Now, we have heaven and hell.
In the last essay of the Genealogy, Nietzsche censures what he labels
“ascetic ideals”. This is the ideal of an ascetic priest who negates his own bodily
existence since he sees himself as “too good for this world.” An ascetic ideal is
the “chief weapon in the struggle against slow pain and boredom” (GM III:1).
Ascetic priests would view the sublunary world as a devilish playground of
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temptations and delights which leave men enslaved by their passions and desires.
Men easily become distracted and divert their attention away from God.
Commitment to self-abnegation seems to be the most effective way to cure man’s
faithlessness. Few would actually like deprivation. Perhaps even priests struggle
with their passions. But believers must practice constant self-constraint to
prevent themselves from surrendering to temptation, no matter how challenging
this is. Denying one’s instincts by practicing self-constraint can even lead to
exhaustion. In inordinate amount of time is devoted to suppressing these powerful
instincts. Nietzsche maintains that such self-constraint quickens degeneration and
decadence:
The ascetic ideal springs from the protective instinct
of a degenerating life which tries by all means to sustain
itself and fight for its existence; it indicates a partial
physiological obstruction and exhaustion against which
the deepest instincts of life which have remained intact,
continually struggle with new expedients and devices
(GM III:13)
After all, what does life have to offer except suffering and pain? Ascetic priests
tell us we can only escape this pain by adhering to the ascetic ideal. Furthermore:
Read from a distant star, the majuscule script of our
earthly existence would perhaps lead to the conclusion
that the earth was the distinctively ascetic planet, a nook
of disgruntled, arrogant, and offensive creatures filled with
a profound disgust at themselves, at the earth, at all life,
who inflict as much pain on themselves as they possibly can
out of pleasure in inflicting pain - which is probably their only
pleasure…[f]or ascetic life is a self-contradiction; here rules a
ressentiment without equal, that of an insatiable instinct
and power-will that wants to become master not over
something in life but over life itself, over its most profound,
powerful, and basic conditions… (GM III:11).
Renunciants may not enjoy a barren existence, but such an existence is apparently
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indispensable for the afterlife. The is “ressentiment without equal” because
priests are so embittered by the world and ravaged by nature that they repudiate
this existence altogether. Instead of accepting his life and trying to redeem it, the
priest negates all of life and urges his congregation to do the same lest they let
their souls fall into disrepair. Anyone who ignores the ascetic ideal would,
according to the priests, be carving their own path to hell. Those who ignore the
ascetic ideal are content trying to improve their lives now - not later. Is this
existence so bad? Nietzsche claims that “the Christian resolve to make the world
ugly and bad has made the world ugly and bad” (GS 130). There are a few priests
incapable of handling their helplessness, so they take it out on the world around
them. They threaten those who are not as amenable to depriving themselves of
simple pleasures. Is a dull and deadened existence all we have for the time being?
According to Nietzsche, this does not have to be the case. Men who follow the
ascetic ideal simply do not want to compete in this world. There is no contest if
we look only into the distant future for possible gains. Ascetic priests denounce
those who do not ignore their agonistic leanings. These leanings may not be that
distracting. Must we always be penitent? Must we always feel we have sinned
everyday? The ascetic priests try to convince us this is the case. Nietzsche warns
that “it is the ascetic priest who alters the direction of ressentiment” ( GM III:15).
Ressentiment was initially seen as repressed envy redirected externally
towards the world of the ignoble types. Hatred may have turned outward, but it
must been simmering internally for awhile. Manifestations of ressentiment are the
products of internalized hatred - self-loathing. Self-hatred becomes hatred. There
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must be someone to hate; that lucky person is the one victimized. Self-hatred can
be seen on a national level as we have witnessed in pre-World War II Germany.
We are all susceptible to loathing ourselves, just as we are susceptible to blaming
others for our suffering and impotence. The trajectory of ressentiment is
dangerous, whether it leads from the person onto the external world, or leads back
to the person. As we have seen in chapter two, redeeming one’s life, even with all
of its tragedies and calamities, is never an easy task. Ressentiment is a bitter
emotion, but it is an easier emotion to have than sheer joy. One has to work to be
joyous. Bitterness and envy come quite easily. Nietzsche points out that “what we
know about ourselves and remember is not so decisive for the happiness of our
life as people suppose…[since] one day that which others know about us (or think
they know) assaults us - and then we realize that this is more powerful. It is easier
to cope with a bad conscience than a bad reputation” (GS 52). It may be easier,
but not necessarily the recommended course of action. Should we worry if the
ascetic priest thinks we are damned? Should we worry about what anyone thinks?
If we do, we will be hindered. We will try too hard to impress others instead of
enhancing ourselves. There can be no contest if one is not willing to compete
with others, compete against the elements. Those against whom I compete are
willing competitors, of course. Collapsing into bitterness and weakness seem
second nature since we can now take medications to negotiate these turbulent
periods without having to address our psychological states. The solace of
redemption comes at an onerous price. Few are willing to risk it.
Nietzsche is so averse to the ascetic ideal because of its mistaken
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explanation of suffering in the world. We all suffer. Nietzsche does not believe
that we suffer because we are the debtor to God’s creditor. We are not suffering
because we are eternally beholden to him. We are not born with congenital birth
defects, left widowed or bankrupt because we owe favors to a supernatural being.
The ascetic priests would like us to believe that we are indebted to God and that
we will never fully repay him in this life. It may not be my fault that I suffer
today, but I could be faulted for it tomorrow. Nietzsche writes that “the
meaninglessness of suffering, not suffering itself, was the curse that lay over
mankind so far - the ascetic ideal offered man meaning…[since] it was the only
meaning offered so far; any meaning is better than none at all” (GM III:28).
Nietzsche adds that “man would rather will nothingness than not will…” (GM
III:28). Man would rather will something than nothing.
There must be a way to explain the presence of suffering. Suffering cannot
be meaningless. Suffering can be made meaningful as long as there is a reason for
suffering, even if that reason is erroneous. The fact suffering could be
meaningless is, pardon the pun, insufferable. For Nietzsche, there does not have
to be a metaphysical explanation for suffering. There does not have to be an
explanation at all. We can act without ressentiment towards our suffering.
Blaming others and languishing in one’s misery is not the best response. Looking
for pity, looking to be excused, or wallowing in self-pity disqualify a person from
higher humanity. He is not even trying to improve himself. The crucible of
revaluating values and transcending good and evil leaves little time for blame and
self-pity.
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We can allow ourselves to deteriorate. We can flee to the comfort of a
church or let a talk-show host tell us how we are feeling and what we can do
about it. This will not spare us any further grief. Or, we can overcome ourselves
and those moral traps which stifle our creativity and competitive edge. Nietzsche
says in The Gay Science that “the poison of which weaker natures perish
strengthen the strong - nor do they call it poison” (GS 19). Nietzsche should be
more willing to admit that some suffering is so profound, it does poison its host.
This does not mean that a few sad events will cause a person’s life to unravel.
Nietzsche should however, at least recognize that suffering can hinder a person.
Overcoming suffering is possible, but Nietzsche does himself a disservice by
making this self-overcoming sound so easy in certain passages. Some suffering
seems too deep to be converted into something positive. Eternal recurrence
requires every moment to be lived over and over. Willing eternal recurrence is
never easy. A person may more or less, need to detoxify some of that “poison”
and convince themselves it was never poison. In the end hopefully, the “higher
man” will have been strengthened as a result. Some endure suffering only by
saying “no” to life and waiting impatiently for it to end. A “higher man” wants
life to recur eternally. Nietzsche thinks we are better served by living life as if it
is the only one we are given. Life can be affirmed despite its deficiencies and
excesses. One way to live life affirmatively is to shed the morality that infuses
false hope into its enthusiasts.
VI
Most would claim Adolph Hitler, Joseph Stalin, and Slobodan Milosevic,
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to name a few, are mass murderers and judge them to be evil. Are they evil
because they breached a few slave values? No. They are evil because they are
responsible for deaths of millions. On one interpretation, these men violated
Christian ethical norms. We could also say that they violated secular ethical
norms. Are these secular norms nonreligious versions of slave values? They
appear to be so. Can we then call someone evil without being accused of
maintaining herd values? Secular accounts of evil do not have to be conditioned
by religion. Nietzsche seems to think they are. Can we ever escape the herd if we
make moral judgments? Should higher men recoil at the thought of branding
someone “evil”? How else do we describe a murderer? Or a sex offender? Or a
wife-beater? Could we call such a person fanatical, zealous, indecent? “Good”
and “evil” for Nietzsche seem like passwords into the gates of a living death - the
herd. Would invoking the categories of good and evil undermine our strength and
promise as creative human beings? Are we barred from accessing higher
humanity if we label such people as good or evil? Nietzsche’s genealogy
trivializes the categories of good and evil. What if higher men, god forbid, make
moral judgments? Are they sinking towards that “green pasture happiness”?
Without being careful, some poor sap might actually renounce ethics, thinking he
is transcending good and evil when instead he is alienating himself from others.
Nietzsche does not deny that other moralities are possible (BGE 202). Even
though there may be moralities which are far higher than what we have now,
herd-morality is the only morality with which we are adequately familiar. Telling
us there may be other moralities is tantalizing, but it gets us nowhere when
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confronted with a genuine ethical problem. Since Nietzsche also claims we are
poisoned by morality, so that search for a higher morality might even seem
fruitless to many:
We are still ‘too good’ for our job; probably,
we, too, are still victims of prey to this moralized
contemporary taste and ill with it, however much
we think to despise it - probably it infects
even us. (GM III:20)
Being slightly poisoned by contemporary morality does not prevent the task; it
just makes it harder. The poison might be fatal only to those who never exceed
the boundaries of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Again, Nietzsche never tells us
exactly how to become higher men. We only know or think we know what to
avoid in the process of chasing the dream of higher humanity.
Nietzsche contends that only a few are made for independence; the rest
just follow the herd. Nietzsche is not advocating an overthrow of morality. Some
might cure themselves of that poison and resist ressentiment. The rest are still
poisoned and weakened by it. Nietzsche might write in an aggressive and
pugnacious style, but he is not an anarchist or a fascist. Even though Nietzsche
says that “the secret for harvesting from existence the greatest fruitfulness and the
greatest enjoyment - is to live dangerously!” (GS 283), he is not sponsoring a
war against all. Nor is he daring someone to jump in front of a moving train.
We have to accept Nietzsche’s love of masks, even if they confound us.
He speaks to a minority who do not read “books for everybody [since they] are
always malodorous books: the smell of petty people clings to them” (BGE 30).
Furthermore, “where the people eats and drinks, even where it worships, there is
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usually a stink…one should not go into a church if one wants to breathe pure air”
(BGE 30). These “immoralists” do not absorb the judgments of others. They do
not adopt other judgments as their own. Our moral judgments are predominately
inculcated by family, priests, and others whose tutelage we are under. Nietzsche’s
higher men must forge their own judgments and crawl out from under the wool
that others have fashioned for us.
Higher men adjudicate matters using their own perspectives. Nietzsche
claims that “my judgment is my judgment; another cannot easily acquire it…one
has to get rid of the bad taste of wanting to be in agreement with many” (BGE
43). Those who aspire to be higher men do not return to the days of the “masters”
and “slaves”. These “masters” were still barbarians; they just weren’t ugly and
base. This was a pre-moral culture that is permanently lost. We could not mimic
Adam and Eve before they ate the forbidden fruit either. In both cases, whether
we interpret the former, the latter, or both allegorically, innocence has been lost,
and the poison has seeped in.
The task of revaluating all values is trying for any of us. These are values
which we have borne for such a long time. We may never fully extricate
ourselves from the Judeo-Christian. It may still taint us. That alone should not
deter us. Nietzsche says in “Of 1001 Goals” that “[a] change in values - that
means a change in the creators of values [for] he who has to be a creator always
has to destroy” (Z I:15). The bulk of us are happily ensconced in our instant
values, so we do have the desire nor the audacity to nullify these values since we
are too meek, dependent, and vain. Higher men do not need the approbation of
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others since “it is ‘the slave’ in the vain man’s blood, a remnant of the craftiness
of the slave…which seeks to seduce him to good opinions about himself; it is
likewise the slave who immediately afterwards falls down before these opinions
as if he himself had not called them forth” (BGE 261).
Vanity, for Nietzsche, is an “atavism”, a remnant of the slave revolt. No
one wants to be called ugly and base. It might upset us and cause us to seek
revenge. Higher men have no patience for vanity or any judgments that people
pass down. A clean break with traditional values that cleave to us may not be so
easy, but it is possible. This break might leave us at sea for some time since
Nietzsche would not want to violate his perspectival approach and tell us what
values to destroy and what values to create. But as Richard Schacht observes,
“[o]ur understanding of ourselves and our world may always be improved upon,
and the manner of our human existence as well.”72 The process of creating values
and improving ourselves is an open-ended and incomplete project. Even
attempting to overcome ourselves is better than remaining idle. Resisting
ressentiment is still better.
However, determining new values is not the only trait of higher men.
There is that softer side of Nietzsche that is often overlooked. The question,
“what does your conscience say? - You shall become the person you are” (GS
270). does not presuppose determinism. This is not a person becoming who she is
because it is already determined just who she will be. Becoming who you are is a
plea for authenticity. Traditional morality appoints values for us and we
obligingly consent to them. One must cast off these restraints so we become the
72
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person it is in us to be. We can still make choices. The restraints of traditional
morality prevent us from creating the values which are suitable for each of us
individually.
Another step in becoming who one is is accepting the fate we are dealt.
This is amor fati, or love of fate:
Amor fati: let that be my love henceforth!
I do not wage war against what is ugly. I do
not want to accuse; I do not even want to
accuse those who accuse. Looking away shall be
my only negation. And all in all and on the whole:
some day I wish to be only a Yes-sayer (GS 276).
Nietzsche had his problems. Some he could control, some were completely
beyond his control. We might be able to prevent heartache if we choose our
suitors wisely. But we cannot prevent all of our allergies; we cannot always
prevent terminal illnesses. All we can control is our response to them. Instead of
being bemused by sorrow, and instead of bemoaning his ailing state, Nietzsche
chose to embrace that which ailed him. We need not blame others or blame God
for our adversity. Some enjoy more luck than others. Being envious of the lucky
ones does not help us at all. Fate is indifferent to our needs and to our entreaties.
We can either choose to accept what we have been allotted, or our spirits can
atrophy with the dim hope that we will avenge our misfortune. Free spirits do not
reproach themselves or others for their fallibility, nor do they shrink with selfpity.
Nietzsche’s inquiries into the origin of our moral prejudices is certainly
restricted enough to complicate any seamless application to the secular
environment of our existence. Nietzsche either ignores the secular genealogy of
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good and evil, or he truly believes that all categories of good and evil are
derivative of that slave revolt in morals. I am of the persuasion that Nietzsche
does hold that many of our moral beliefs in the West are adaptations of JudeoChristian beliefs. Such a consequence is the culmination of a very limited and
myopic account of morality, then and now. However, all is not lost. That higher
morality could be around the corner. I have to create it myself and you must
create it for yourself.
Even with such a narrow account of morality, we can still aspire to higher
humanity, or at least try get near it. Higher men can still surface in a world that
has been subject to Christian hegemony for millennia. These higher men might be
condemned to silence if they witness a spectacle of evil. How they would
describe a spectacle such as ethnic cleansing cannot be predicted. However, the
creation of new values is a labor that can enliven the free spirit. Discarding the
old, stale values for new ones is a task that few would have to nerve to pursue. It
is a challenge few will accept. Those who make an attempt might even be
rewarded in this life. For after the death knell of God is sounded:
[a]t long last the horizon appears free to us
again, even if it should not be bright; at long
last our ships may venture out again, venture
out to face any danger; all the daring of the lover
of knowledge is permitted again; the sea, our sea,
lies open again; perhaps there has never yet been
such an ‘open sea’ (GS 343).
Even if that open sea is hard to find, it is worth making an intrepid excursion to
try to find it rather than timidly staying behind. No one would be rewarded if they
sat out and watched others play. There is no contest without that open sea. There
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is no contest if we all think alike. There is no contest if everyone wins or loses.
The vast “open sea” is an open space for unlimited competition. The “open sea”
is public space amenable to competition. Where did Nietzsche get the idea for a
contest - the agon? He was inspired by Homer.

VII
In the essay, “Homer’s Contest”, Nietzsche celebrates the potential that
men can have if they engage in a competition:
Man, in his highest and noblest capacities, is
wholly nature and embodies its uncanny dual
character. Those of his abilities which are
terrifying and considered inhuman may
even be the fertile soil out of which alone
all humanity can grow in impulse, deed, and
work (HC, p.32).
Human beings thrive when they are competitive with each other. They thrive
when they are engaged in a battle. When we are all rendered equal, we find no
reason to distance ourselves from everyone else. Presumably we would be equal
regarding talents and capabilities. We are all worth the same. We are equal in
merit. We are equal regarding our level of intelligence. This is not the case
though. Measures have to be taken to democratize and equalize the crowd. This is
why we become part of the herd. Most of us would not endeavor to distinguish
ourselves. That requires work. When there is no competition, nothing in earned.
Nietzsche calls this modern humanity “flabby”. We have become ensconced in a
tradition leveling until no one can stand out because doing so would be gauche.
Nietzsche marks Homer’s contests as a time when men rejoiced in every conflict.

135

No warrior was a spectator.
Nietzsche adds “combat is salvation; the cruelty of victory is the pinnacle
of life’s jubilation.” (HC, p.34) Again, one must tread carefully through these
passages. Any fascist can read this cursorily and believe that Nietzsche is
declaring nothing short of a bloody revolution where might makes right.
Nietzsche claims that the Greeks valued the concept of eris or strife. When there
is strife, there is no peace. Strife ensures an endless struggle between opposing
forces. As long as there is strife, every man will compete with one another since
there is no one telling us to get along and make peace. This is a war against all.
This does not involve one violent coup after the other or guerrilla warfare.
Homer’s warriors waged battles of mythical proportions. We cannot really
compare ourselves to Achilles or Agamemnon. However, we can relate to the
spirit of competition. These heroes did not rest on their laurels if they won a
battle, so why should we? According to Nietzsche:
…not only Aristotle but the whole of Greek
antiquity thinks differently from us about
hatred and envy, and judges with Hesiod, who
in one place calls Eris evil - namely, the one that
leads men into hostile fights of annihilation against
one another - while praising another Eris as good - the
one that, as jealousy, hatred, and envy, spurs men to
activity of fights which are contests. The Greek is
envious, and he does not consider this quality a blemish
but the gift of a beneficent godhead. What a gulf of
ethical judgment lies between us and him! (HC, p.35)
Nietzsche is not suggesting that people shred each other from limb to limb. He is
recommending a healthy contest between suitable competitors. Nietzsche believes
that “the contest is necessary to preserve the health of that state.” (HC, p.36)
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Another interesting feature in the time of these Homeric contests is that of
“ostracism”. Nowadays, ostracism has a negative connotation. If you are
ostracized, you are being shunned. According to Nietzsche, ostracism meant
something quite different back in Homer’s time. Ostracism then meant that no
one would be considered “the best” competitor or “the best” warrior. If someone
is the best, he might stop competing, or everyone else might quit the contest for
fear of a perennial losing streak. Ostracism keeps the contest alive since it is
anyone’s game. Nietzsche points out that ostracism was intended for
“stimulation: the individual who towers above the rest is eliminated so that the
contest of forces may reawaken” (p.36) Furthermore, this is “an idea that is
hostile to the ‘exclusiveness’ of genius in the modern sense and presupposes that
in the natural order of things there are always several geniuses who spur each
other to action, even as they hold each other within the limits of measure.”
(pp.36-7) Few enjoy watching the same person or the same team win the same
tournaments every year. The competition becomes stale and boring when the
same people win since it no longer is a competition. When the victors remain the
same, there are no surprises. There is no impetus to fight if you know you have no
chance to win.
How do we translate this Homeric contest to today? How do we wage
these bloodless battles but still breathe life into the agon? Alan Schrift has a view
on the ancient contest that can easily dovetail into the twenty-first century.
Without a contest, there is no multiplicity of viewpoints, interpretations,
preferences, biases, likes, and dislikes. Without competing ideas, there is often
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one prevailing idea. If multiple viewpoints are not recognized and at least heard,
there is no contest. On one side, there is fascism no one is allowed to compete, no
one is allowed to express a dissenting opinion lest they are punished. In this case,
one viewpoint is brutally imposed. On the other side, in an egalitarian society,
there may not be sufficient contrast among viewpoints since it has to be shared by
all. According to Schrift, the “Nietzschean critique of dogmatism, grounded as it
is on a perspectivist position that calls for multiplying points of view and
avoiding fixed and rigid posturings, may be an important voice to heed in
constructing a politics that can challenge the panoply of emerging
fundamentalisms.”73 With fundamentalism, opposing viewpoints vanish; one
viewpoint is stubbornly and inexorably held in place. There is no recognition of
difference. There is no recognition of many talented competitors. There can be no
agon if there is fundamentalism or any overriding viewpoint. Schrift also says “an
absolute victory within the agon would mark the death of the agon, and Nietzsche
acknowledges that to preserve freedom from dominance, one must be committed
to maintaining the institution of the agon as a shared public space for open
competition.”74 Neither nationalism nor egalitarianism allow for that “shared
space for open competition.” It is odd that such antithetical political philosophies
as nationalism and egalitarianism share the same result, but their interdiction of
healthy contests inevitably lead to dominance by one party or one viewpoint.
Another point Schrift makes is one which will be the subject of the next
chapter. Along with recognizing the agon as a contest between worthy
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competitors, Nietzsche also recognizes the need for differing viewpoints. Schrift
points out that “to be able to see the world with more and different eyes now
appears to be a political necessity for those individuals who, by virtue of their
membership in certain historically marginalized groups, find themselves in
socially subordinated positions that result from traditional and/or essentialist
judgments as to their diminished worth.”75 Schrift claims that Nietzsche is
advocating a “politics of difference”. With open competition comes many
viewpoints. Open competition, according to Nietzsche, is indispensable for the
health of the state. A state cannot thrive with one viewpoint that its leaders force
their constituents to share. With open competition, there may be viewpoints that
had not been previously heard. These may be viewpoints from marginalized
peoples whose perspectives have finally been recognized. They have finally been
entered into the competition. As to whether these viewpoints will indeed be
recognized in the public is an issue that I will address in the next chapter. It turns
out that in advocating a new Homeric contest, Nietzsche may have been
advocating a very postmodern politics of difference.

75

Ibid., p. 192.

139

Chapter Four
Democracy, Discourse, and Difference in Nietzsche
We do not need to plug up our ears against
the sirens who in the marketplace sing of the
future: their song about ‘equal rights’, a ‘free
society’, ‘no more masters and no servants’ has
no allure for us. We simply do not consider it
desirable that a realm of justice and concord should
be established on earth…[since] we are delighted
with all who love, as we do, danger, war, and
adventures, who refuse to compromise, to be captured,
reconciled, and castrated; we count ourselves among
conquerors…. (GS 377)
I
Unlike Odysseus who needed to have his ears covered, lest he be
enchanted by the sounds of the dangerous Sirens, Nietzsche believes that he and
his free spirits need not plug their ears to avoid dangerous democratic voices.
Democracy could never tempt his free spirits. Nietzsche has an arsenal of
criticism directed towards democracy. Nietzsche claims that democracy
presupposes equality, leveling, and sameness. Richard Schacht observes that
Nietzsche allows “that a kind of actual equality among human beings generally is
attainable; but he contends that its realization would mean the stultifying
confinement of these potentially exceptional human beings to the level of the
rule, fixed at a relatively low level by the inherent mediocrity and all-too-human
limitations of the latter.”76 In this view, the revaluation of values could not occur
in a democratic environment. We would never strive to transcend values if we are
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all created and considered equal. If we are equal, what makes us think we deserve
more acclaim than others?
It is my claim, along with that of other critics I discuss in this chapter, that
Nietzsche might actually be more amenable to democracy than he might think. I
will include such critics as Larry Hatab and Iris Marion Young to complement
my arguments. I will show that liberal democracy does not have to presuppose
substantive equality. Every contest has rules which must be followed to ensure
fair play, but that does not mean that every competitor must be seen as equally
talented and capable. Democratic societies can still be rife with inequities, some
of which might be good while others are bad. No presidential election is a
genuine contest. Many can run for office, but only a couple have a chance of
winning. But, the rules are there to ostensibly guarantee that candidates have the
capacity to run.
I will argue that having rules alone does not necessarily entail equality. I
will also argue that liberal democracy has agonistic tendencies which make it the
best political system for engaging in contests. We have seen earlier that
totalitarian regimes are hardly agreeable to difference of opinion and competition
from all ends. Democracy promotes discourse which can be seen as a free
exchange of ideas. Many ideas may be discarded, but the fact we get to
noncoercively air our ideas allows us to be competitive, even if we are perennial
underdogs.
Furthermore, democracy can recognize differences among citizens. If we
can all participate, there is a good chance that we will not all share the same
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views. Democracy does not have to guarantee that everyone must have a herdlike mentality in order to have stability. If anything, democracy allows selfexpression and dissent. Why didn’t Nietzsche ever view democracy as having
such agonistic potential? Was he that close-minded that he uncritically assumed
democracy did nothing but level the best and the worst? I believe that Nietzsche
did not carefully examine democracy as a whole. He claimed that democracy and
its few equalizing tendencies could hardly be the conduit to the emergence of the
free spirit. At best, free spirits would emerge in spite of democracy.

II
Democracy is not spared in any of Nietzsche’s texts. In Beyond Good and
Evil, Nietzsche proudly differentiates his “new philosophers” from the herd and
its democratic proclivities:
We, to whom the democratic movement is not
merely a form assumed by political organization in
decay but also a form assumed by man in decay, that
is to say in diminishment, a process of becoming
mediocre and losing his value: whither must we
direct our hopes? - Towards new philosophers, we
have no other choice; towards spirits strong and
original enough to make a start on antithetical
evaluations and to revalue and reverse ‘eternal values’;
towards heralds and forerunners, towards men of the
future who in the present knot together the
constraint which compels the will of the
millennia on to new paths (BGE 203).
Nietzsche declares that democracy is unable to encourage the revaluation of
values because of its apparent emphasis on equality and sameness. Democracy
would also discourage originality. What would be the point of daring creativity if
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we have no need for those “antithetical values”? As I stated earlier, the free spirits
or “new philosophers” as Nietzsche calls them in this passage may emerge in
spite of democracy, and not because of it. Nietzsche was not amenable to a
politics that stifled revaluation and homogenized the people. Nietzsche had an
aversion towards democracy because he viewed it as a perpetrator of
“degeneration and diminution of man to the perfect herd animal, this
animalization of man to the pygmy animal of equal rights and equal
pretensions…” (BGE 203). Democracy makes this degeneration and diminution
“collective”. The free spirit would realize that there is so much more to man than
democratic politics admits. The free spirit “comprehends in a single glance all
that which, given a favorable accumulation and intensification of forces and
tasks, could be cultivated out of man, he knows with all the knowledge of his
conscience how the greatest possibilities in man are still unexhausted…” (BGE
203). According to Nietzsche, there is a cache of rich possibilities and promise
come with a few men whose discovery is often obscured or obstructed by
democracy.
In most of his texts, Nietzsche’s criticism of democracy does not change a
great deal. Nietzsche’s criticism of democracy intensifies in Twilight of the Idols.
He is even more polemical here than in many of his previous texts. His aversion
towards democratic equality resounds throughout his “Expeditions of an
Untimely Man”:
Our virtues are conditioned, are demanded by
our weakness…’Equality’, a certain actual rendering
similar of which the theory of ‘equal rights’ is only
the expression, belongs essentially to decline: the
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chasm between man and man, class and class, the
multiplicity of types, the will to be oneself, to stand
out - that which I call pathos of distance - characterizes
every strong age (TI 9:37).
Democracy would not recognize this pathos of distance since democracy would
not recognize distance or difference between others. Its focus on equality would
prevent this. Nietzsche adds that:
The man who has become free - and how much
more the mind has become free - spurns the
contemptible sort of well-being dreamed of by
shopkeepers, Christians, cows, women, Englishmen
and other democrats. The free man is a warrior.
How is freedom measured, in individuals as
in nations? By the resistance which has to be
overcome, by the effort it costs to stay aloft (TI 9:38).
Democratic societies are teeming with liberal institutions. Certain
freedoms are guaranteed to all. As a foundation for the elusive “American
dream”, liberal institutions are in place so that ideally all citizens have the
freedom and capacity to pursue what they desire. According to Nietzsche, what
liberal institutions attempt to do is surmount and erase any natural inequalities
among people. Some were born stronger and smarter. Ostensibly, this is unfair to
those who were born weaker and less intelligent. Liberal institutions attempt to
overcome inequality so that, assuming material resources are available, as many
as possible have an equal chance of succeeding to at least a minimum level of
competence. No one should be disadvantaged from the start. Nietzsche laments
that these liberal institutions “undermine the will to power, they are the leveling
of the mountain and the valley….[for] liberalism is in plain words, reduction to
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the herd animal…” (TI 9:38). Even worse, liberal institutions presume that
“reality” itself can be overcome and be given some purpose for all human beings:
No one gives a human beings his qualities:
not God, not society, not his parents or ancestors,
not he himself. No one is accountable for existing at all,
or for being constituted as he is, or for living in the
circumstances and surroundings in which he lives. The
fatality of his nature cannot be disentangled from the fatality
of all that which has been and will be. He is not the result of
some special design, a will, a purpose; he is not the subject
of an attempt to attain the ‘ideal of man’ or an ‘ideal of
happiness’ or an ‘ideal of morality….in reality purpose
is lacking (TI 6,8).
Capabilities and talents are often inherited, not acquired. This arbitrary allotment
is no more unfair than one person out of twenty million winning the lottery. The
will to equality here is simply another institutional case of ressentiment.
Nietzsche does not think we will in anyway be better off erasing personal talent
and ambition so that many are not left out. Some have reason to be confident and
self-assured, and many do not. Nietzsche himself says that “[t]he value of egoism
depends on the physiological value of him who possesses it; it can be very
valuable, it can be worthless and contemptible.” (TI 9,33).
There are too many people in the valley, and they are levelled with those
freewheeling in the mountains. “‘Higher education’ is no longer a privilege…”
(TI 8:5). Even though Nietzsche pinpoints his disgust for broad higher education
towards his fellow Germans, his criticism can be extended to many more cultures.
Higher education for all is valued in many places. Could we force one sector of
the population to attend a technical school, another, a community college, and
another an ivy-league institution? If we took aptitude tests seriously, students
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could be sent to their “proper” places since higher education, according to
Nietzsche, should be privilege and not a right. Privileges rarely entail equal
opportunity. Nietzsche points out that “’equality for equals, inequality for
unequals’ - that would be the true voice of justice; and, what follows from it,
‘Never make equal what is unequal’”. (TI 9:48) Not everyone belongs in a four
year college and not everyone belongs in public office. Yet cutting off many from
higher education or other opportunities may conspire to make an even more
degenerate society. Allowing people to pursue these opportunities does not make
equal what is unequal. Many students in college are not competitive enough to
remain in that contest. They should at least be allowed to compete. There is little
substantive equality in higher education. If there were, grading would be
superfluous. There would be no admission guidelines. But it is clear that
Nietzsche is unwilling to cooperate with democratic politics. Because of his
objections, one must find a way for Nietzsche and democracy to see eye to eye.
Nietzsche’s opinions have to be partially overridden, which is not a simple task to
assume. Even more, at times we might even have to be traitors to Nietzsche’s
antidemocratic cause.

III
I have benefited greatly from Larry Hatab’s discussions of Nietzsche and
democracy. Hatab is trying to promote a strong alliance of Nietzsche, democracy,
and postmodernism. Like Hatab, I will argue that Nietzsche’s free spirits would
have their best chance of emerging from the crowd in a democratic society.
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According to Hatab, Nietzsche views “democracy as a secular, political extension
of traditional religious and philosophical frameworks that are now suspect, indeed
that have already lost their central role in culture.”77 In this view, democracy is
merely the secular wing of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Democracy would take
the religiosity out of Christianity, but the latter’s tenets would still haunt its
politics. According to Hatab’s view of Nietzsche, “the unfortunate consequence is
the hegemony and promulgation of mediocrity and a vapid conformism, which
obviates creativity and excellence and portends the aimless contentment, the
happy nihilism…”78 At first blush, democracy would seem to have that leveling
urge which could be suppressed. Can democracy escape the propensity towards
egalitarianism?
Hatab claims that democracy need not be viewed as synonymous with
equality:
[D]emocracy can be sustained without its traditional
banner of human equality. Democracy does require
that all citizens be given the same rights; that
they all have the same access to, and fair treatment
by, the legal system; that they all have
the same opportunity for political participation;
and that all voices count the same in elections. Such
constructions, however, need not reflect or
depend upon any version of substantive ‘sameness’
in human beings or in the outcomes of their lives.79
In other words, democracy does not necessarily ensure equality. According to
Hatab, democracy does not assure that every citizen will be equally talented,
creative, smart, and prosperous. Some talents may be innate while others are
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acquired. But democracy cannot guarantee that every talent will be the same in
every person. Every citizen should have the freedom to exercise a talent. Any
person can try to learn to play piano, but only a few will have the talent to play it
well. In a democratic society, we do not have to consider every pianist a virtuoso
for the sake of equality. No one should be forbidden from applying to a reputable
college of music, but no college should feel it necessary to admit everyone that
applies. Again, enforcing rules which assure fair play in no way compels one to
render all participants equal. Not everyone can make it in the majors. As Hatab
puts it, “a democratic apologist can agree that equality need not refer to
something substantive or intrinsic in human nature, but simply to equal treatment,
equal consideration, and equal opportunity for political participation.”80 Is this too
far removed from higher humanity? I doubt a free spirit would ever feel
comfortable or secure in declaring his revaluated values if he feared reprisals
from a fascist government. I also doubt a free spirit would even be given the
chance to express himself or be an undertow to the all-too-human tide if he were
not guaranteed certain freedoms on the basis of his citizenship. Free spirits need
the same freedoms that their herd-like contemporaries have.
Hatab also focuses heavily on what he sees as agonistic inclinations in
democracy. Nietzsche views aristocracy as the best form of leadership. The agon
would be best played out and realized in an aristocratic setting. We would simply
have the best competing with the best instead of everyone else competing along
with the best. While aristocracy may be Nietzsche’s preferred way of life, its
exclusivity and elitism can hardly be championed. The biases and prejudices of
80
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aristocrats form a better partnership with plutocrats and others in the upper crust.
There is no competition here. Hatab chooses democracy as a better alternative for
agon. As I stated in the previous chapter, no one ever is truly victorious in the
agon. There would be no contest if there were a final end to contestation. As
Hatab sees it, this “agonistic spirit” of the Greeks could be perpetuated as long as
contests were staged. To avoid stagnation and disengagement, harmony and
concord were discouraged.81 Liberal democracy does not impose harmony on its
citizens.
Even in a democratic society there can still be discussion and dissent. The
power could not be with the people if they were not permitted to debate and
disagree. In a democratic setting, there are far more people debating than in an
aristocracy, yet unanimity is not always the result of the former. According to
Hatab, democracy has bestowed upon the people the opportunities to contend
with each other in the public spaces. In a democratic society, candidates debate
with one another, voters go to the polls, and then the votes are counted. The
winner has won that contest. The winner can be replaced at the next election. The
results of these political contests are never permanent. The outcome is not always
pleasant, but it is still preferable to a dictator seizing power in a coup.
Hatab adds that in a democracy, even though the majority has won the
contest, in no way does the majority have the right viewpoint or the better
viewpoint.82 There are more people who agree with that viewpoint. No viewpoint
is given an “ultimate warrant” or eternal confirmation. In a democracy, it must be
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emphasized that while everyone will have the opportunity to engage in a
discourse, certain viewpoints will always seem to win out over others. In a twoparty system, it is difficult for lesser known candidates to receive federal funding
and national exposure. Democracy cannot guarantee that every viewpoint will be
accepted or even appreciated. This why Nietzsche preferred his few talented types
over the many. Aristotle was not particularly comfortable with democracy either.
Being entitled to speak, being entitled to compete is better than being silenced.
However, having only community radio or public access television as a forum to
air your views can leave many a citizen rather disgruntled and dissatisfied.
Democracy does not erase privilege or pork barrel politics.
Hatab wishes to introduce postmodernist considerations into the
discussions. Hatab feels Nietzsche can dovetail nicely into a discussion of
postmodern democracy. One facet of postmodernism that is crucial for agonistic
democracy is the specter of suspicion cast over all viewpoints and claims to
knowledge. While at times seeming self-defeating, a postmodernist would usually
cast doubt on points of view and other assorted claims. This does not imply that
postmodernists are committed skeptics. This means rather that postmodernists
would most likely not accept any claim as universal and immutable. No one
would compete if the outcome were known in advance. Universal truths would
always rig the contest. Postmodernists are also suspicious towards equal regard.
Postmodernists will respect all viewpoints, but they do not have to accept and
abide by all viewpoints. Hatab points out that:
Fair play need not make any purchase on
equal regard, and any resistance to such move
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might bear out a Nietzschean suspicion that
equal regard continues to express a problematic
resentment and discomfort with difference.83
One should always be suspicious of the epistemic value of universal claims. At
best, any claim to knowledge is a very local, contextualized.
Hatab points out that postmodernism “represents a radicalization of
traditional democratic skepticism by undermining all confidences and preventing
the possibility of traditional epistemological and ethical groundings.”84 Nietzsche
can be coupled with postmodernism because of his perspectivism. The
postmodern repository of local “claims” are like the many perspectives of which
Nietzsche speaks. Perspectivism can help relieve dogmatism. Postmodernism also
assumes the same task. Demagogues stubbornly cling to their beliefs and often try
to foist them on their constituents or anyone listening on the AM talk radio. A
postmodernist need not have a riposte to every unexamined opinion of another. A
postmodernist needs the opportunity to challenge or disregard opinions she sees
as unexamined. A democracy can ensure such freedom. Hatab adds that:
[a] postmodern democracy... can argue
for inclusiveness without equality by simply
refusing to sanction any decisive criteria for
exclusion, since postmodernism is suspicious
of privileging any discourse. Such inclusionby-nonexclusion would not then have any
baseline conceptions that would problematize
difference and conflict.85
Not everyone has to be involved in a discourse. Everyone has the opportunity to
participate. No one should feel compelled to accept one discourse over the other.
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In a democracy there would be no shortage of people who would uncritically
adhere to alleged truth claims. As long as they are not forced to accept these
claims, their collective ignorance is a chosen evil. Of course any beliefs that run
counter to what Nietzsche’s free spirits hold have to be admitted too. Any foolish
beliefs are permissible because “postmodern openness would allow no criteria for
excluding any beliefs from political discourse, even if some citizens have very
closed convictions.”86 If we allow everyone to have their say, conservatives and
liberals will most likely exercise their right to speak, even if we do not wish to
hear them. A wealth of perspectives might seem like pure epistemic entropy, but
its alternative in the form of dogmatism and/or rigidity does not seem to be more
desirable. Many opinions as opposed to only one “truth” serve to enliven and
enrich a discourse.
In the next section, I would like to show how democracy and discourse
together can form a vital link in Nietzsche. When rules are set in place that ensure
inclusive participation, the agon is best sustained. I will draw on the works of
Jurgen Habermas and Seyla Benhabib to show how inextricably bound
democracy and discourse are. Neither Habermas nor Benhabib explicitly use
Nietzsche as their political compass, but their support of democratic discourse is
valuable to the discussion at hand.

IV
Habermas operates from a standpoint similar to one of Nietzsche’s
favorite nemeses - Kant. Habermas is not a particularist any more than Kant is,
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and he is definitely a rationalist. Habermas modifies the “Categorical Imperative”
by appending a process of intersubjective agreement. Contextualization of these
laws, or “norms” as Habermas calls them, is sidestepped, at least for the time
being. What is important about Habermas’s formulation is that there are no longer
any self-enclosed autonomous agents conversing only with themselves over
whether they can will their respective maxims into universal laws. Habermas is
never clear as to what norms participants test amongst each other are real or just
hypothetical. However, what is key for my purposes is to examine the idea of
equality in Habermas’s ideal speech situation.
An ideal speech situation entails many participants discussing and
debating ethical norms. The situation is ideal because everyone is given an equal
opportunity to speak and participate. I do not find his emphasis on attaining
consensus to be very useful, and neither would Nietzsche. In a real speech
situation, there is a wealth of viewpoints that would offer an interesting
point/counterpoint debate. However, the more views that are expressed, the less
likely consensus can be reached. A discourse does not have to be a failure if
consensus is not reached. Nietzsche could converse with members of the herd, but
I doubt that they would agree on much. Yet the idea that everyone can and should
participate in a discourse can never be discounted or ignored. This is a
participatory democracy that does not have to stubbornly cling to egalitarianism,
an egalitarianism in the sense of equality as sameness. This is why Hatab believes
that Nietzsche can be amenable to democracy, even if he (Nietzsche) denies it or
is unaware of it. Participatory democracy does not need to negate the “contest”.
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I can have a norm that I think I should prescribe for our behavior, and
someone else could claim that a norm which differs from mine or offers a better
prescription. One recommendation is that since neither of us will ever be able to
convince others that our respective prescriptions are valid, we ought to both
follow our separate plans of action without airing them in public. Nietzsche’s
sometimes banal comments regarding that “higher morality” which is still
“possible” might leads us to this conclusion.
This is not what Habermas advocates. Instead, since there is more than one
potential norm, the participants engage in rational argumentation with all of those
who would be affected by the norm and determine with the input from everyone
which is indeed the better norm. For Habermas, this is the procedure for
justifying moral norms and/or sustaining the ones we already have. For Kant, the
autonomous agent would will a maxim into a universal law that affected all moral
agents. The way Kant’s system is fashioned, all those affected, if they are rational
agents, would will the same maxim. For Habermas, anyone who could be affected
by the norm is not just invited, but urged to be a part of the discourse. Habermas
elects instead to have all those affected by the norm debate with each other over
norms, since any norm can be controversial or hard to accept. No one should be a
quietist and opt out of the discourse. No one should even want to do that. A norm
affects everyone. The unwillingness to engage in a discourse is indicative of a
person who is too cozy in the herd to question norms and values. Habermas calls
his theory “discourse ethics”, which, like Kant’s ethics, still entails universality.
This means the agreed upon norms are applicable to all people in a discourse
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community. In discourse ethics, anyone admitted into the discourse has to follow
the norm by virtue of the fact that everyone agrees to its promulgation.
“Everyone” does not mean the select few who chose this method over Kant or
Utilitarianism. From this theoretical standpoint, Habermas envisages all societies
engaged in a discourse with one another.
Discourse ethics, unlike Kant’s ethics, is dialogical and not monological.
Individuals in discourse ethics do not have to make the assumption that their
individually formulated maxims will automatically obligate others to obey the
laws that come out of their maxims. Rather, the participants rationally engage in a
discourse to justify norms, following established procedures. This can include a
norm whose validity has come into question. In a discourse of justification, the
norm in question can be sustained, or it can be discarded for a different norm.
Everyone has to agree to maintaining or dismissing the norms in question.
Argumentation is public, not private. Participants have to communicate with one
another in order to restore the consensus that has been sundered. Participants
engage in what Habermas refers to as “communicative action”.87
According to Habermas, interactions between participants are
communicative when the participants coordinate their plans of action
consensually, with the agreement reached at any point in the discourse evaluated
in terms of intersubjective recognition of validity claims.88 This means that the
moral life of each participant vastly affects how others live their lives. In other
words, our moral lives connect each of us. We have come to expect others to act
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in certain ways morally. Our lives are too entangled to separately pursue our
personal projects as if there were no one else around. Our self-interests have to be
secondary at best. Intersubjective agreement is starting to appear herd-like, but
the agreement is the conclusion of communicative action. The process of
communicative action need not be herd-like. Habermas lets the participants
themselves solve any moral dissent they may and will encounter. This will entail
some personal sacrifice. Despite his metaphors of battle and blood, even
Nietzsche perhaps would not want society to completely collapse into anarchy.
With anarchy and chaos, the higher men would go down along with the herd.
Even for Nietzsche I doubt anyone would or should pursue their self-interests
with abandon.
Nietzsche’s fear of leveling could surface with the mere mention of
“consensus” and “intersubjectivity”. Must we agree to certain norms for the sake
of consensus? What if I am the sole objector to a norm which I feel stifles me in
some way? Should I assent to the norm anyway so we will not have a hung jury?
Consenting to norms that I feel are unjustified perhaps can level me with the
others. Again, the process of discourse ethics I think is more valuable than its
ultimate goal. The moral lives of many participants would have to be altered in
order to obey the norm that has been agreed upon in what Habermas calls
“practical discourse”. It is here that communicative action takes place.89
The rule of argumentation that must be recognized at the start of any
discourse is the “principle of universalization” which is stated as follows:
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Every valid norm must satisfy the condition that the
consequences and the side effects its general observance
can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of the
interests of each could be freely accepted by all
affected (and be preferred to those of known alternative
possibilities).90
The principle of universalization belongs to the “justificatory discourse”. It is not
a discourse that determines the applicability of a norm. Can the norm actually
work in society? This is not a question Habermas seeks to answer. Justificatory
discourse is a discourse that merely “tests” the validity of a norm. This discourse
is similar to the application of the Categorical Imperative. No agent actually
issues universal laws. They merely test whether their personal maxim could be
willed into a universal law. The participants can later engage in a discourse of
application to see whether the norm to which they all consented can be applied in
practice.91 Arguing for or against the discourse of application is clearly outside of
the parameters of the immediate discussion. For now, the participants will
coordinate their plans of action under the norm to which they all consented
theoretically.
Rawls’s “original position” operates in a similar fashion. Theoretically,
certain principles and norms might work for everyone. In reality, they may not.
Consensus may be reached any time in the duration of the discourse. The
consensus is intersubjective not only because all who were affected gave their
consent, but also because the norm generated out of the discourse was the result
of the participants coordinating their diverse plans into one norm or another. Here
we have the primacy of the “Right” over the “Good”. We can pursue our plans
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once we have all agreed upon the norms which place restrictions on our activities.
We cannot do what is good for each of us until we have decided what is right for
all of us.
These constraints on personal behavior would certainly not be suitable for
Nietzsche. The agreed upon norms are the end of discourse. Those agreed-upon
norms are the norms to which we must adhere. Such adherence seems herd-like.
We do not have to reach the end in order to succeed. We can still have a contest
even while engaged in a discourse. The discourse does not have to end at all.
What is important here is that all validity claims must be recognized, for every
participant is entitled to speak. In the end, all those affected are given the
opportunity to make a claim, but to reach a consensus, some claims must be
jettisoned. Habermas insists that:
just as an individual can reflect on himself and his
life as a whole with the goal of clarifying who he is
and who he would like to be, so too the members of a
collectivity can engage in public deliberation in a spirit
of mutual trust, with the goal of coming to an understanding
concerning their shared form of life and their identity
solely through the unforced force of the better argument.92
If an agreement is reached, which according to Habermas is the aim of discourse
ethics, many of the participants will modify their plans of actions to cohere with
the agreed upon norms.
I do not think consensus is essential for discussion. The process of
communicative action can be just as important as the desired results. With so
many perspectives being admitted to the deliberation, consensus may be less
attainable. The discourse does not have to be a failure as a result. Nietzsche
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would be very unhappy to see his would-be higher men adjust their plans and
forgo transcending good and evil for the sake of agreement. I can sympathize
with Nietzsche regarding this. Our creativity might be stifled if certain norms
place strictures on us. We cannot go around creating our own personal values if
we take communicative action seriously. After all, if consensus is the ultimate
goal, we may have to give up on some personal values if we want to reach that
goal. If participants are uncoerced in their agreement, however, modifying their
plans of action does not have to be a devastating process.
Discourse ethics does not have to completely polarize Nietzscheans and
Habermasians. Habermas does make the important distinction between the
aforementioned communicative action and what he calls “strategic action”. The
latter involves a participant or group of participants seeking to influence others by
causing the discourse to proceed and end as they desire.93 They could compel
others to assent through duress, disinformation, or through any other
disingenuous way so as to justify a norm they wish to be agreed upon, even if it is
not the better norm. Such a consensus is contrived and therefore fraudulent. I
have stated earlier that Nietzsche is certainly no fan of fascism. Forcing others to
accept values does not support higher humanity in any way. Strategic action
violates the principle of universalization since the consequences and side effects
of the norm’s general observance were not anticipated by all, nor were the
interests of all affected satisfied. Supporters of strategic action do not wish to
engage in a contest equally or fairly. The agon is lost. Even in a democracy,
strategic action may run rampant. It is imperative for all participants to think each
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claim through thoroughly. If anything, the herd may effortlessly emerge from as a
culmination of strategic action. The participants would blindly and uncritically
accept norms that should be tossed.
Another reason why practical discourse commences is that the validity of
a norm has become controversial. At this point, one participant may want the
norm to be maintained while another wants it abandoned. Any agreement reached
through strategic action would certainly be devalued since only communicative
action is acceptable. A practical discourse is the means for a norm to be
legitimately justified according to Habermas. For a norm to have been justified
legitimately, the validity of the norm must extend beyond particular cultures. It
must also be based on a demonstration of universal and necessary presuppositions
of rational argumentation.94 From an ethical standpoint, to avoid any strategic
action from the outset, participants must presuppose:
1. Complete reversibility of perspectives from which
participants produce their arguments
2. Universality: validity claim must bind all concerned
3. Reciprocity of equal recognition of the claims of each
participant by all others.95
The first presupposition requires the participant to avoid testing a claim from a
strict “egological” perspective. This means when we test a norm, we do not ask
“What would I do?” Nietzsche might use that egological perspective, yet
Habermas forbids us to do so. Since I should be concerned with a norm that
affects many others, I should not ask what I should do when confronted with a
controversial norm. What I would do may not be what you would do. Each
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participant should adopt the perspective of the other participants as best they can.
I would ask myself how this norm could affect others in their respective positions.
The norms produced through communicative might be rather generic and broad.
The second presupposition further outlines the principle of
universalization. The agreed upon norm has to bind all concerned or it would not
be universal. Any norm, if freely accepted by all would have to be a universal
norm since all of those affected did agree to it. We must emphasize the phrase
“freely accepted by all”. Without that adverb, we would have strategic action.
The third presupposition is a vital underpinning of discourse ethics. To
avert strategic action and insure that every participant is given equal access to the
communicative process, every validity claim should be admitted into the
discourse. The claim can be quickly dismissed as long as everyone agrees to that.
Every participant is endowed with symmetrical rights for argumentation. These
rights are already implicit in the dialogical process. If there is communicative
action, then every participant at some point is recognized as having a stake in this
matter. Nietzscheans may not summarily wince with the third presupposition. No
contest is a good contest if fascists or bigots make the rules. If only a few people
and/or viewpoints are recognized, we have no communicative process; we have
no competition. Everyone should be given the chance to speak, to compete. No
one should be compelled to accept certain norms. As Nietzsche sees it, “there is
only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’”. (GM III:12) Shunning
multifarious perspectives for the sake of one generic perspective eliminates that
reciprocity that makes communicative action work. In the agon, some competitors
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simply will be better than others. While communicative action is not the same as
the agon, there are some similarities. Recognizing everyone as a potential
participant or competitor is essential for a discourse or contest to be staged at an
optimal level. Claims can be dismissed. Some participants and some competitors
may be smarter and more creative than others. There can be a spirit of
competition between these participants in communicative action. The agreed
upon norms would not issue from a traditional agon, but these agreed upon norms
need not be absolute and immutable. Norms can shift even for Habermas.
In order for these presuppositions of argumentation and the principle of
universalization to be observed with every practical discourse, the participants
must argue from what Habermas calls the “moral point of view”.96 Arguing from
the “moral point of view” is not unique to Habermas. In his book entitled The
Moral Point of View, Kurt Baier states that rules argued from this point of view
should be for the good of everyone alike. It would be to take the position of an
“independent, unbiased, impartial, objective, dispassionate, disinterested
observer.”97 Arguing from the moral point of view indeed buttresses Habermas
from Nietzsche’s perspectivism. The need for objectivity and impartiality
partakes in what Nietzsche calls the “family failing of philosophers” for their
positing man as an “aeterna veritas”. In doing so, these philosophers lack any
“historical sense” (HAH 2). Habermas is not positing an ideal observer like Baier.
But he still is placing a great deal of weight on objectivity and impartiality. Rich
contextual experiences may have no place in his speech situation. Judging the
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validity of norms impartially does require the complete participation and
consensus of everyone involved. That single, isolated observer passing judgment
from an Archimedean point would be unqualified in tending to the interests of
those affected by the norms.98 Yet Habermas’s rigorous focus on consensus
prevents any concern for personal relationships, responsibilities, and goals. We
may never reach a consensus if the particularities of our own experiences were to
be admitted to the discourse. Also, our own inclinations might possibly resort to
strategic action. The participants in this discourse are still anonymous. Habermas
is on the right path in the beginning, but he takes an impartialist detour too early.
Habermas’s impartialism still is not identical to Kant’s. Participants may
ask, “What norms should we prescribe for everyone?” My actions will affect the
interests of others, and their actions will affect my interests. We must reconcile
our differences in an impartial manner. With Kant, an autonomous moral agent is
expected to will a maxim into a universal law impartially and apart from any
inclination. The categorical imperative requires that a mode of action be good in
itself and make no references to ends. The law must be unconditional and
objectively necessary. The impartial adjudication of moral norms in discourse
ethics is not so stringent. Because the validity of any norm can become suspect, it
is neither an unconditional nor objectively necessary law. The norm of truth
telling can become controversial. The norm of promise-keeping might even
become controversial. I may be a person of a duplicitous nature who wants this
norm to be discarded for that says lying is permissible. Another participant may
strongly disagree. Instead of each of us silently testing whether we could will our
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maxims into universal laws, we and everyone else affected engage in a discourse
from the moral point of view. We reciprocally acknowledge the validity claims of
each other and adopt each other’s perspectives to ascertain how this norm would
affect us all. Ideally, I should come to realize that lying does not satisfy the
interests of all affected. Habermas points out:
everyone must be able to will that the maxims of our
action should become universal law. Only a maxim that
can be generalized from the perspective of all affected
counts as a norm that can command general assent and to
the extent is worthy of recognition or, in other words, is
morally binding. The questions ‘What should I do?’ is
answered morally with reference to what one ought to do.99
One participant may want X, another may want Y. In order to harmonize a
plurality of plans of action under a few norms, participants must detach
themselves from their egocentric perspectives so as not to favor certain claims
over others.100 A norm is the generalized interests of all participants; these
interests must transcend the boundaries of the participants’ social, cultural, and
historical context. Despite the fact some participants may have had to convert
their plans of action to freely give their consent, the norm to which they have
ostensibly agreed does embody their rational interests somehow. No set of values
can be held so strongly by the participant that it cannot be forsaken or revised for
the interests of all others who would be affected.
The generalized participant is a very thin conception since so much of her
character, her personal narrative of who she is and she wants to be is inadmissible
into the discourse. For example, one participant may respect another participant
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because the latter is a courageous or selfless person. But for Habermas, it does not
matter how virtuous the participant is in real life. The personal characteristics of
participants, whether remarkable or mediocre, cannot be part of the discursive
configuration. Admirable or despicable qualities do not enter into the
conversation. Habermas claims there are no “gradations” of persons in the
discourse, for any kind of acclaim or disapprobation that is attached to a
participant could possibly give them more leverage in argumentation.101
Habermas feels he can better avoid strategic action if no participant’s personal
characteristics come into play. Perhaps we would be more inclined to consent to a
norm if a participant fostering that norm were a handsome young athlete or an
action movie actor. For Habermas, particularity must be compromised so that the
discourse is not biased. We respect persons only as fellow participants who are
capable of acting freely in the discourse. We cannot respect someone more
because she helps feed the hungry or because he is a member of a royal family. A
person’s particular life may perhaps be factor in whether he gets more airtime for
his viewpoint. Active participants on Habermas’s formulation are still
homogenous in nature and in appearance. In this case, Habermas has not gone
much further than Kant. For the argument to proceed with as little cultural,
historical, social, and personal tainting, the participants must lose their
individuality so all interests can be taken into account. As long as a participant is
capable of being a member of some community, then they are admitted into the
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discourse.102 However, the communities in which the participants are actually
situated are not themselves factors in the discourse.
When participants engage in a discourse according to the principle of
universalization, they are using their collective moral imagination only to test the
norm’s validity, and not to apply a norm. At best participants can anticipate
certain favorable and unfavorable consequences and side effects that norm may
appear to generate if we were all to agree to it.103 The norms that come out of
justificatory discourse are not necessarily impracticable. The participants have all
agreed that these norms should dictate their lives. But, this is all a thought
experiment. This is an experiment which is promising at first, but empty in the
end.
This is an ideal speech situation which entails dialogical symmetry by
demanding reciprocity of all the participants. For Habermas to equalize the
situation, he has had to generalize all persons and subsume them into the category
of “participant”. Habermas has an inclusive checklist to make sure that everyone
has equal access to the discourse and that everyone has the right to speak in the
discourse. Participants are all dialogical equivalents so that every claim is at least
considered, even if it is an ignorant claim. Conservative talk radio hosts and
liberal news anchors could all participate. Participants are all placed into a
practical discourse since at some time during social interplay, the consensus they
once shared came asunder somehow. Consensus must be restored. The
participants may offer a wealth of norms, but they all must agree on something.
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In many cases, people in large societies would not be able to secure a
consensus unless some participants resorted to strategic action. The notion that all
participants will be able to harmonize their plans of action under a few norms to
which they all agreed is seemingly implausible. A norm will affect everyone, but
it is doubtful that all who are affected by it will accept it. Nietzsche’s free spirits
would ostensibly shudder at the thought of agreeing with everyone. Differing
values and the creation of new ones separate us from everyone else. We all have
certain courses of action that we would like to pursue. If consensus is the only
end we ought to have, then certain courses cannot be undertaken. The Dionysian
spirit would surely be trampled. If there are participants who steadfastly cling to
courses of action that embody their values, assuming they would be willing to
abandon these courses for the sake of consensus is mistaken. If someone always
follows uncontroversial norms, he probably never had his very own course of
action in the first place. For the purpose of impartiality, persons must pare their
identities down to nothing for the assurance that no participant will be favored
over others. Nietzsche’s aristocratic leanings tend to have him favor those who
are more accomplished and stand out from the crowd. That may not be such a bad
thing. Some of the more ordinary, untalented people seem to be in front of the
camera or behind the podium.
In no way am I suggesting that Habermas is a closeted Nietzschean. He is
nothing of the sort. But there are aspects of his communicative action that I do
find useful for Nietzsche. Nietzsche in practice is certainly not Nietzsche in
theory. At times we are left to surmise how Nietzsche’s ideas could be applied to
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our current sociopolitical climate. While consensus is not a Nietzschean project,
discourse can be. Habermas’s argument that the discourse have equal access and
complete reciprocity could enhance Nietzsche’s contest. Many are unable to
compete because they are not allowed to compete. Many of us are like miniature
Zarathustras. We are shunned and ridiculed because we are different or dare to
dissent. We may never get the chance to speak. There can be fifteen candidates
running for the same office, but only two have a genuine chance to win. Our
claims may never be given equal weight, but the capacity to participate is
essential. There can be no contest if only a select few can enter. This does not
mean that everyone will enter. This does not mean that upon entering, we can
easily pick out the victors. Habermas was on the right track, but Seyla Benhabib
concretizes communicative action. Through her we can see how an actual contest
could be staged.
Seyla Benhabib’s purpose for reformulating Habermas’s discourse ethics
is to retain the universalist spirit of discourse ethics while replacing the
disembodied subject with a more concrete, particularized subject who is engaged
in a dialogue with others. Benhabib often calls discourse ethics “communicative
ethics”.104 Benhabib takes out the disembodied, transcendental subject in order to
concretize the self; it is a self that is an active participant in the dialogue. The
understanding exhibited by the ahistorical participants is replaced with an
understanding of all actual participants engaged in the discourse.105 This means
that participants do not speak to one another from a timeless and impartial
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standpoint. They speak to one another as members of this particular community
and this particular culture. For Habermas, the participants do have to be anchored
in a particular culture. If they weren’t, their norms would make no sense. There
has to be some cultural reference. However, in the ideal speech situation, the
Habermasian participants exhibit a generic, bare self, much like the Kantian
subject. Benhabib’s subjects have contextual references from the beginning.
Participants, according to Benhabib, would not and should not disengage from
their gender, race, and religious affiliation for the sake of impartiality. Why
impose uniform selves on the dialogue? Benhabib concedes that such an
undertaking would prevent the dialogue from being morally neutral. Those who
would be participants would each have a far more pronounced vested interest in
airing their claims. Is this a bad thing? Should any dialogue or contest be neutral?
This is not a terrible concession. We as individual participants expect so much
from ourselves and others. We have these expectations because of the
relationships we have built. Participants can share a course of action they see fit
to bind others, but not everyone in the same way. One person’s rationale for
seeking a particular mode of life may differ from someone else’s. We can tailor
our lives to fit our needs and wants. Benhabib argues that public discourse must
be viewed as a collaborative effort among participants who share more than just
formal characteristics of rational agents. In a contest, a collaborative effort
implies that some of us might need to be on teams. Perhaps only someone like
Zarathustra plays by himself.
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Benhabib does not discard the universalism of Habermas’s discourse
ethics. The universalism can guarantee certain freedoms like equal access and
free speech. The universalistic presuppositions are the foundations of her theory.
Without these elements, participants in the discourse would be able to privilege
certain claims over others, possibly even preventing some participants from
speaking. With these universalistic presuppositions, perhaps Judeo-Christian
claims would be inevitably privileged in the discourse at all times. Even
Nietzsche would need to be recognized as a speaker in the discourse, even if his
claims were quickly forgotten or discarded. With recognition, one can be a heretic
and not risk burning at the stake. Benhabib’s model has these presuppositions:
1. Recognizing the right of all beings capable of speech
and action to be participants in the moral discourse.
2. Recognizing that each participant has the same symmetrical
rights to speak, offer new topics, and discuss these very
presuppositions.106
Benhabib calls the first presupposition that “principle of universal moral respect”,
and the second the “principle of egalitarian reciprocity”.107 Benhabib has slightly
reworded the presuppositions that Habermas has formulated. These are
presuppositions without which her theory could not be sustained lest she sanction
something like strategic action in the discourse. Nietzsche does “mistrust all
systematizers” since “the will to a system is a lack of integrity (TI 1,26).
Benhabib does offer a system, but she hers is not in the same tradition as Kant or
Hegel. Her system is constructed out of presuppositions. Without certain rules,
there would be no competition since the same potent, high-ranking, and hostile
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players would always win. Those aggressive players may not be free spirits but
ascetic priests.
Even Nietzsche would have to realize that in order for a contest to be
genuine, rules have to be in place to ensure fair competition and eliminate
cheaters. Even the agonistic Greeks had rules of fair play. We have to know how
and when we cross the finish line. We cannot have a discourse without attempting
to preclude privileged claims. Some people have always been allowed to speak
while others were muffled. Benhabib is not trying to rid discourse of its agonistic
tendencies. She is trying to prevent the silencing of others. She is always trying to
recognize difference among participants. Nietzsche himself had said that
difference engenders hatred (BGE 263). By recognizing different opinions, we
can battle each other in a discourse without some us being muzzled and
constrained.
Benhabib also emphasizes the reversibility of perspectives as Habermas
does, but her version of reversibility is not done from the “moral point of view”.
Her granting of a universal label to these two presuppositions is not tantamount to
the universalizability test in the Kantian sense. This is not that rigid of a system.
No universal laws are issued forth which bind all agents at all times. Universal
moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity are attributes that all participants are
required to display upon entering the discourse. Respecting others’ right to speak
need not strip away a person’s creativity and valor. These two presuppositions are
universally binding in the discourse, but what may be produced in the discourse
will not be universal moral rules. That is not the point of the discourse. This is
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where Benhabib veers sharply from Habermas. Consensus will not be attainable
in all discursive practices. Consensus should never be the ultimate goal. By
recognizing differences among participants, we reduce the likelihood of a
consensus. But the lack of consensus is not the bete noire of discourse that
Habermas thinks it is.
It is at this point that Benhabib believes Habermas to be mistaken in his
theory. He claims that the purpose of discourse is to reach a consensus on moral
norms. A norm is only justified when it is accepted by all who would be affected
by it. The participants engage in a discourse because consensus over a norm’s
validity has been lost. It is the task of the participants to restore that lost
consensus. For Habermas, the process of communicative action is just when all
participants adhere to the principle of universalization. The participants have
taken into account the consequences and side effects that a norm’s general
observance would have. It does not even matter which norm is justified. All that
matters is that the participants have fairly and equitably examined every claim
and then reach a consensus about that norm. There would not seem to be any
purpose for engaging in rational argumentation if the discourse did not reach a
consensus.
As Benhabib points out, however, consensus cannot be the criterion of
validity.108 Such an ambitious assignment would repeatedly end in
disappointment. It would be like having one hung jury after another. Participants
are not guaranteed a consensus simply by placing themselves in an ideal speech
situation. It would be possible that after such deep, public reflection over
108
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controversial norms, dissent would be better guaranteed than consensus.
Benhabib instead claims that it is the process and not the result of argumentation
that is of significance.109 It is the fact that there are participants in a discourse,
mutually recognizing and respecting each other from start to finish that matters.
Nietzsche maintains that our enemies made us better and stronger, especially if
they did not kill us (TI 1,8). What better way to confront our enemies than in a
discourse where we are on equal footing. Although a discourse is the means for
justifying claims to validity, if all of the participants adhere to the minimal
constraints imposed on their discourse, then the process has some merit. We are
not required to accept what others say. We have to let them say it though. For
Benhabib, the necessity of a discourse does not reside in the rational agreement of
all participants. If agreement were the goal, discourse would be a rather tedious
and fruitless labor. Rather, the emphasis is shifted from the need for consensus to
the need to simply keep the dialogue going. We cannot always agree on what is
right or wrong even if it is through a concerted effort. What is more significant to
Benhabib is how the participants can sustain a lasting dialogue between them.
What should be significant to Nietzsche is how competitors can sustain a lasting
contest between them. Nietzsche said in Homer’s Contest that an ultimate victory
was not desirable. A victory would be the worst thing to happen to competitors.
The continuation of the agon is what is important for Nietzsche just as the
continuation of the discourse is important for Benhabib.
Benhabib’s contribution to discourse ethics is not just downplaying the
importance of consensus in a discourse. This is part of her dramatic but necessary
109

Ibid., p. 38.

173

reassessment of the participants themselves. I agree that there is a need to recreate
the impartial and bland participant as a concrete and contextually sensitive
participant who engages in a meaningful dialogue with others. Each participant
has a storied existence which lies beneath the values they express. Personal
considerations should not be abandoned for the sake of impartiality.
Benhabib distinguishes between the “generalized other” of Habermas’s
discourse ethics and the “concrete other” of her version. The “generalized other”
view allows us only to see other participants as rational agents who deserve the
same rights that we would want ourselves to have. This also requires us to
abstract from our self-identity and individuality.110 All participants have to extract
from the personal and make it general and unrecognizable. To be a generalized
participant means to perfectly mirror all other participants, which means we must
lose all the self-defining attributes that make us unique. No contest is enjoyable or
even satisfying if we compete against anonymous “competitors”. We tend to exert
ourselves more and even take pleasure in competing against a famous and feared
future hall-of-famer whose face is not obscured by impartiality. In this way, I
look at a participant as a “concrete other”. I can still endorse the universalist
constraints of discourse, but I would acknowledge the other not as a formal copy
of myself and everyone else. I acknowledge the person as having her own history
and matrix of values that is a definite contrast with myself.111
It is through this process of recognizing the other as concrete and not
generalized that I can understand the needs, wants, and motivations of others, and
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they in turn comprehend the same about me. I can understand why someone
would want to beat me (or my team if I cannot do it alone) in a contest.
Participants revise and initiate subject matter in an ongoing dialogue by their
acquaintanceship with others, for they learn to adjust and adapt their relationships
with others. Habermas would have participants be accountable to others insofar as
they recognize each other’s validity claims and respect their right to participate.
He does not go much further than this. Habermas’s conception of a rational
participant is divested of any individuality so that it is virtually unrecognizable as
a human being. His depersonalized practical discourse would encounter many
practical difficulties. Benhabib’s retooling revives the discourse by taking a
contextual and very personal turn.
We can see how democracy can affirmatively affect discourse and the
many contests it would sponsor. I believe we can calm Nietzsche’s anxiety over
democracy in the next section. I will try to show how Nietzsche and democracy
as one can protect the many differences among citizens (and competitors).
Universality is needed in this account. The rules which Benhabib lays out must be
universally binding on all participants. The perspectives which are aired in a
discourse need not be universally true. The discourse is not staged to result in
objectively true norms binding on all participants. There are to be rules which
ensure the discourse will be free from coercion. An agonistic democracy will also
need rules to ensure each “contest” is fair. Rights must be conferred equally so
that political participation is available to all.
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V
Everyone has some kind of talent. Everyone can do something that many
others cannot do. Distributive justice might call for the equal allotment of
opportunities to cultivate talents, even if people are not equally talented. But do
we need this equality to function as long as differences are respected? While the
free spirits may be monumentally creative and competitive, many of them may
lack other skills. There are no genuine Renaissance men. Even the free spirits can
look foolish doing certain things. Nietzsche is fully aware of this. Citizens in a
liberal democracy are an eclectic group of people that do not share talents. It is a
group that has a fortunate distribution of talents so that every value is questioned,
every sonata is composed, and that every brake pad is replaced. Nietzsche points
out:
Everyone has his good days when he discovers his
higher self; and true humanity demands that everyone
be evaluated only in the light of this condition and
not in that of his working day unfreedom and
servitude (HAH 624).
Free spirits will need a rest too. Every day is not a veritable contest. We have our
brilliant days and then we have our lackluster days. Furthermore:
When we observe how some people know how
to manage their experiences - their insignificant,
everyday experiences - so that they become an
arable soil that bears fruit three times a year, while
others - and how many there are! - are driven through
surging waves of destiny, the most multifarious currents
of the times and the nations, and yet always remain on
top, bobbing like a cork: then we are in the end tempted
to divide mankind into a minority of those who know how
to make much of little, and a majority of those who know
how to make little of much… (HAH 627).
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While elitism is never the preferred alternative, in an agonistic democracy, it
emerges quite often. All competitors will have to feel they are best equipped to
win.
Since liberal democracy does not need to endorse or guarantee substantive
equality, there will be those people who make much of little and make little of
much. What is crucial in an agonistic democracy is that fair play is omnipresent
and that differences are not cast aside or discouraged. A beginner may have no
chance against a virtuoso, and the beginner should not be given a head start. Even
in an agonistic democracy, there is superiority and inferiority. There is no
essentialism in this ranking. This ranking is not static or permanent either. Age
and injuries can affect talent. A person’s socio-economic standing can affect
talent. Talent is there to be realized, but it can remain untapped or it can be
wasted and ignored. Hatab adds:
Artists, thinkers, leaders, athletes, laborers, and so
on across the social spectrum, all can have their excellences,
both within and between domains, and the recognition
of excellence will continually fluctuate within and between
domains…112
Racial and religious superiority cannot be countenanced. Racists and bigots fear
difference and punish those whom they see as violators. Racists and bigots also
think that certain talents are inherited, but the inheritors are usually a very small
and exclusive class. No democracy should tolerate such exclusivity. Democracy
can support difference and merit without excluding sectors of the population.
Nietzsche’s elitism is never inescapable, but it is never exclusionary either.
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A Nietzschean democracy with its postmodern elements could be much
like a meritocracy. Being rewarded for talent requires discovering and developing
talents. This involves a lot of luck. Having the money for private tennis lessons
will make it that much easier for a young player to develop. A girl who has to
drop out of school to help her mother pays the bills will probably not have the
luxury of worrying about her weak serve. In any case, no single talent is desirable
over all others. Aryan characteristics are hardly meritorious, so the state should
not reward blondes and punish brunettes. In a meritocracy, (ideally) better
students go to better colleges, the better actress wins the Academy Award, the
better candidate wins the election, and the better artists hang their works in the
best museums. Exceptions are made. Lazy children of alumni often get admitted
to the best schools. Excellence is not a singular notion, nor is it doled out to a
select few. People will be rendered excellent for a variety of reasons. There is
always a need for a great quarterback, educator, and mechanic.
Nietzsche himself thinks that differences would enhance culture instead of
tenaciously clinging to one locus of value or merit:
We usually endeavor to acquire a single
deportment of feeling, a single attitude
of mind towards all the events and situations
of life - that above all is what is being
philosophically minded. But for the enrichment
of knowledge it may be of more value not to
reduce oneself to uniformity in this way, but
to listen instead to the gentle voice of each of
life’s different situations; these will suggest
the attitude of mind appropriate to them. Through
thus ceasing to treat oneself as a single rigid
and unchanging individuum one takes an
intelligent interest in the life and being of many
others. (HAH 618).
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Competition would suffer without a wealth of differences between contestants. If
all contestants were exactly the same, had the same background, same values, and
same talents, the contest would end every time with an unsatisfying but expected
tie. No culture can truly thrive without difference. No free spirit would be
genuinely special if everyone indeed became one. Anyone can make the attempt,
but not everyone will succeed. Those who decide to follow Nietzsche and “live
dangerously” (GS 283) will do so in different ways. I may live dangerously
because I have chosen a career which is not especially lucrative. I may spend the
rest of my life rebuilding my credit and chasing a job in academia. Another might
live dangerously because he scales tall mountains or surfs on thirty feet waves as
a hobby. I cannot surf or climb, so such an avocation would do nothing more than
mortify me in public. I have had more success in education so I can better flourish
in that environment. I should have the choice and the opportunity to pursue such a
career without being forced to give a child to the Fuhrer or being forced to marry
at thirteen. I can pick my career, but I must also contend with others who have
chosen academia as their profession.
Any profession should be teeming with different perspectives. Minorities
and women are often encouraged to apply to many more jobs now for the
purposes of promoting difference. No one should be encouraged to assimilate or
integrate once she gets through the door. Difference may be compellingly erased
sometimes when a woman or a minority fears that she may have been hired as a
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result of affirmative action or as a rectification of a past wrong. Some admission
policies have become minority friendly to increase diversity on campus.
It does not appear to me that Nietzsche would be very supportive of an
affirmative action policy. He would probably feel that such a policy is another
leveling tendency of democracy. However, I do not think he would also support
the integration of race, gender, religion, and ethnicity so that we could harmonize
and homogenize. Nietzsche’s “good European” was not a glorified Frenchman or
Italian. It was the mixture of all the best elements of European and Jewish culture.
Some women do feel compelled to act in “masculine” ways on the job so they do
not appear overwrought, thereby softer and more feminine than their male
counterparts. People of other races sometimes try to act “white” to blend in.
People with thick accents often try to lose them to fit in. The only contest here is
one where women and minorities try to shed their personal identity the fastest.
This contest could not possibly celebrate differences if half of the contestants feel
the need to hide who they really are. Hiding one’s true self tells of a person not
only denying the culture from which she has emerged, but it also involves having
to reject the agonistic tendencies that reside in her. It does not matter which
“contest” a person chooses. She should not have to make a series of harsh
adjustments to be admitted. An agonistic democracy embraces a pluralism which
would be concomitant with the wide recognition of differences among people. A
person who denies or is shameful of her history is already starting to throw the
game for her opponents. Nietzsche could never run away from the fact that he
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was German. He certainly aspired to something he saw as greater, but he knew
his roots were firmly planted near Leipzig.
In a postmodern democracy, the recognition of difference does not mean
that everyone’s opinion has to be accepted. A postmodern democracy would
recognize the person’s right to say something, but not every perspective should be
seen as gospel. There is still a competition out there. I have a perspective for
which I will fight whenever I deem it necessary. If I can defend my perspective
with some clarity, I probably view my perspective as better than others. If I am to
adopt a postmodern orientation, I will not do myself any favors if I believe that
“truth” does underlie my perspective. The foundationalism that was seen in
Rationalist philosophers like Descartes would have a hard time fitting
comfortably within a postmodern democracy. No one is banned from adopting a
Cartesian perspective. Many might view this perspective as arcane, stuffy, or just
plain wrong. Refusing to admit such a perspective would be very undemocratic.
Refusing to espouse a foundationalist perspective is just one of many ways a
person can negotiate her way into the discourse. Every perspective at least should
be aired if someone is willing to adopt it. In this sense, it is necessary for
postmoderns to have to adhere to universal rules ensuring the recognition of
differences. A postmodern would need to ensure that difference is respected by
all. Rules that bind all participants are indispensable. A postmodern person's
willingness to recognize difference will inevitably lead to the airing of unpopular
and ignorant opinions. Cable news programs would have no audience if steadfast
conservative and liberal talking heads did not pontificate on a nightly basis.
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Quieting unpopular opinions will not enhance democracy’s agonistic tendencies.
We are engaged in a competition with anyone, not a select few. If we were to start
filtering out responses we deemed unacceptable, we would not be respecting the
agon. We dilute competition when we silence the few who make us grimace. If
anything, those who make us shudder and bristle make better contestants and/or
combatants. We might be more likely to bring our “A” game when faced with
despised opponents. One should also be willing to combat friends. In a contest,
friendship should not influence one’s desire for victory. Familial connections
should not be a factor either. Nietzsche himself says “if you want a friend, you
must be willing to wage war for him: and to wage war, you must be capable of
being an enemy” (Z I,14). Enemies enable us to become more creative and
exercise our agonistic tendencies. Nietzsche adds “a new creation…has more
need of enemies than friends: only in opposition does it feel itself necessary, only
in opposition does it become necessary…” (TI 5,3).
Ideally, a postmodern democracy will not collapse into a naïve relativism.
Hatab warns that differences should not be celebrated and honored to the point
where everything is permitted. A democracy should respect openness, but not
respect a “myopic tribalism”.113 Some people deserve to be reprimanded if not
condemned for their actions. Even a postmodern democracy has to restrict
cultural and moral isolationism. A racist opinion may offend those who do not
share it, but if bigoted policies such as ethnic cleansing and racial hygiene are
implemented, someone would have to intervene or at least raise awareness of it.
However, no one would be competing if they did not think their perspective was
113
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better. No one would defend their beliefs if they thought other perspectives were
more suitable. I have to believe that my perspective is better than others. I cannot
force someone else to acquiesce to my beliefs. I may truly think that my beliefs
are the “truth”. That is my perspective. Others are entitled to see me as misguided
or supercilious. I may decide to accept relativism as a guiding light and assume
everyone is “right”. Again, other people might think me naïve or spineless. The
consummate relativism, which in my opinion I do think many share, is quite
worrisome. We should never feel it necessary to accept the claims of everyone.
Some opinions are very uncritical and even nefarious. Tolerating the
sociobiological prejudices of Nazis as just another free opinion would send many
of us back to the cattle cars if enough people countenanced such a viewpoint. I
still tend to believe my perspective is better than many. I may have to work
harder to see to it that my aspirations are not interrupted by another Joseph
Mengele. If I am lucky, I will have many contestants on my side. No democracy
could ever tolerate or should tolerate such fascist designs. We may have to
tolerate fascist self- expressions.
Iris Marion Young has an interesting view of postmodern democracy. In
her book, Inclusion and Democracy, Young analyzes democracy’s relationship to
many key concepts such as difference, group representation, and marginalization.
What I want to discuss here is her views regarding the relationship between
democracy and justice. I have discussed free speech and recognition of
perspectives, but I have yet to delve deeply into how justice relates to democracy.
Young views justice as having an essential link to democracy, a link which
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fosters inclusion. Young beings her book by claiming that the “democratic
process is the best means for changing conditions of injustice and promoting
justice.”114 In democracy, inequalities still exist. Yet democracy is essential in
allowing citizens to come together and challenge these inequalities. The
democratic process enables people to be politically motivated to beginning grassroots campaigns, go to town hall meetings and discuss relevant issues, and protest
publicly in other ways. Privileges are often awarded to the richest and most
powerful despite the concerted efforts of those combating such privileges. Young
claims that a way to eradicate such privilege and influence is to “widen
democratic inclusion.”115 How is this done?
Young examines two models of democracy. She calls the first model the
“aggregate” model of democracy. According to Young, this model will view
democracy as a “process of aggregating the preferences of citizens in choosing
public officials and policies…[and the] goal of democratic decision-making is to
decide what leaders, rules, and policies will best correspond to the most widely
and strongly held preferences.”116 In other words, this brand of democracy entails
the generalized interests of those involved in deciding which politicians will
represent these interests. Not every interest can be taken into account, so some
personal interests have to be shelved for the greater good of everyone. As
citizens, we get a list of politicians from which to choose. We elect the politicians
we feel will best represent us. How do we determine which preferences are the
most strongly held? How are we going to ensure that everyone is represented? A
114

Iris Marion Young. Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: NY) p. 17.
Ibid., p. 17.
116
Ibid., p. 19.
115

184

poll can claim that seventy-five percent of those questioned do not favor capital
punishment. Does this mean that the majority of Americans do not support capital
punishment? Is the repugnance towards capital punishment more strongly held
than the support of it? If this poll were taken in the northeastern section of the
United States, the results may not be surprising since several states ban capital
punishment. Does one sampling of the population speak for all? In the same way
that 100 people polled do not speak for a country of 300 million, many politicians
claim that have the interests of all Americans accounted for when it is clear that
they do not. A pro-life president does not represent the interests of pro-choice
voters.
Perhaps the views which appear to be most strongly held are views held
by those who have the most power and influence. Are the incumbents empowered
by the loudest, richest, and strongest core group of voters? Is this a core group
which does not take into account marginalized groups and minorities? Young’s
concern is that a preference which happens to have the greatest number of
supporters will not adequately address many social problems which have lesser
visibility. Many voters may disregard a candidate whose platform revolves
around preserving the environment because welfare reform or defense spending
seem more important according to the majority of Americans. Many voters will
assume that interests with the greatest numerical support will best represent
everyone involved in the democratic process.117 If some voters feel that these
latter interests have no bearing on them, why should these voters be expected to
select a candidate who wishes to end welfare or increase spending on warplanes?
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The other model that Young examines is what she calls the “deliberative”
model of democracy. This model involves people who “offer proposals for how
best to solve problems or meet legitimate needs, and so on, and they present
arguments through which they aim to persuade others to accept their
proposals…[since] democratic process is primarily a discussion of problems,
conflicts, and claims of need or interest.”118 While many politicians might simply
tally up the number of supporters for any given issue, the aggregative model of
democracy is not the only option for enacting certain policies. Perhaps if there
were an inclusive dialogue, all issues would be addressed instead of a few.
Lesser-known interests and issues may not need safety in numbers to be aired if
this deliberative model is used.
Young claims that deliberative democracy works not by looking at how
many people share a given preference, but by people deciding en masse which
preferences should be sustained and supported.119 Which proposals could we all
support for the best reasons? According to Young, for us all to be able to decide
what is best for us, the deliberative model must be inclusive, equal, reasonable,
and public.120 For all of us to participate, we all have to be included into the
discussion. For the discussion to be equal, we all have to be granted the
opportunity to speak. The discussion is reasonable when everyone is given the
opportunity to explain their views, no matter how perverse or ignorant. No one
has to accept these peculiar views. Young expects reasonable people to have open
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minds regarding other views.121 Finally, the discussion has to be comprehensible
to all involved. In order for others to understand me and for me to understand
others, I must publicize my reasons for defending a certain view, and others must
do the same. Young defines a public as a “plurality of different individual and
collective experiences, histories, commitments, ideals, interests, and goals that
face one another to discuss collective problems under a common set of
procedures.”122 This means that we are not just accountable to ourselves, but also
to everyone else in the public.
What is key for Young is that the participants discuss and debate problems
without facing duress or without being silenced. Young views democracy as a
“process in which a large collective discusses problems…that they face together,
and try to arrive peaceably at a solutions in whose implementation everyone will
cooperate.”123 Justice is important for Young because it delineates steps that
participants need to follow in order for the discussion to be fair. Justice enlightens
us by telling us how things ought to be done. In this way, Young is much like
Habermas and Benhabib. All are concerned with outlining just procedures to
ensure that discourse is fair and the participants are uncoerced. Young does
believe that the participants should be committed to reaching an agreement.
Reaching consensus may enjoin some participants to give up some of their
preferences and interests if they are incompatible with justice.124 Maintaining a
just discourse is imperative. Contests are rife with discourse. No contest is fair if
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some participants are allowed to break the rules. There are rules proscribing some
forms of performance-enhancing drugs in amateur and professional sports. There
should be more rules eliminating certain kinds of campaign contributions. Rules
abound to ensure that we can compete fairly without a rival having an unfair
advantage. Justice can permeate a democracy, even one that is Nietzschean.
The refusal to privilege perspectives was also championed by JeanFrancois Lyotard. Lyotard supported the “little story” (petit recit) over the metanarrative or “grand story”.125 A Meta-narrative would be something along the
lines of “God” or “Spirit”. It is a grand story which purportedly defines and
constitutes a society and all of its people. Meta-narratives contain the “truth”. A
postmodern is typically incredulous to meta-narratives since they can be
exclusionary. Some may not feel that they are part of the meta-narrative’s
storyline. Some might wish to modify the character that the meta-narrative has
written for them. Lyotard claims that “most people have lost nostalgia for the lost
narrative…[but] it in no way follows that they are reduced to barbarity.”
Furthermore, “what saves them from it [barbarity] is their knowledge that
legitimation can only spring from their own linguistic practice and
communicational interaction.”126 A meta-narrative may render many perspectives
illegitimate. A meta-narrative may be nonsensical in reference to any given
person’s life. If I do not view life from a teleological perspective, then the
progress of “Spirit” will not mean a great a deal to me. I should have the freedom
of telling my own story which I see as legitimate.
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VI
It is possible that an agonistic environment that permits rampant
differences may be nothing more than the opening of Pandora’s box. It would be
undemocratic to limit who can speak. We are not exactly making a Faustian deal
if we accept the postmodern (if not Nietzschean) challenge to admit a healthy
share of perspectives that an agonistic democracy would surely encompass. If we
are generous with civil liberties, there will be many unpalatable opinions that we
have invited into the contest. No democracy can be sustained if we do not accept
that freedom provokes much discord and rancor. A culture would be very bland if
everyone thought the same way. Competing and winning against a hated rival
would sweeten the victory and the spirit of competition. Losing will not feel so
good, but it might revitalize the vanquished and give him the desire to try again.
It is important to underscore these consequences that come with an agonistic
democracy.
Nietzsche would have agreed with John Stuart Mill’s assessment of the
“tyranny of the majority” and its capacity to silence those who differ from it:
…[T]here needs to be protection against the tyranny
of prevailing opinion and feeling, against the tendency
of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties,
its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those
who dissent from them; to fetter the development and,
if possible, prevent the formation of any individuality
not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters
to fashion themselves upon the model of its own.127
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The dreaded herd stifled creativity and individual self-expression by
reproaching anyone who differed from it. The herd prevented potential free spirits
from transcending good and evil. Even though the herd is necessary for the
emergence of free spirits, the herd still harbors that “tyranny of the majority”.
Mill also feared the compulsion of the few to assent with the many. The majority
would never recognize other opinions lest these opinions and attitudes chip away
at the foundation of the society. Unless something or someone is proven to be
harmful to others, liberty should not be restricted.128 While a cursory reading of
Nietzsche might lead someone into thinking he is the patron saint of the Nazis,
had Nietzsche been living during the Third Reich, he never would have been
permitted to say what he said. For instance:
No, we do not love humanity; but on the
other hand we are not nearly ‘German’ enough,
in the sense in which the word ‘German’ is constantly
being used nowadays, to advocate nationalism and
race hatred and to be able to take pleasure in the
national scabies of the heart and blood poisoning
that now leads the nations of Europe to delimit and
barricade themselves against each other as if it were
a matter of quarantine (GS 377).
No Nazi would enjoy an unflattering portrait of the fatherland. A discourse
becomes hampered by the domination and exploitation of the majority or of the
powerful. We have to heed Mill’s warnings and be prepared for a potential
onslaught of tasteless, crass, and uncritical perspectives. Libel and slander are the
stuff out of which many careers are made. Sometimes libelers and slanderers can
be sued; it is difficult to silence them completely. We also have to respect the free
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speech of the neo-Nazis who march in public displaying their anti-Semitism and
racism. We would move closer and closer to the totalitarian society that these
neo-Nazis would like to represent if we did not let such bigots air their
grievances. Like a good Nietzschean, I can feel confident with my perspective
and claim that mine is simply better than a bigot’s view towards people of other
races and religions. I do not have to ignore prejudice and lapse into a shortsighted relativism. Nietzsche thinks his perspective is better than that of the
ascetic priests, and I can think my perspective far better than that of a Nazi
sympathizer.
I am very sympathetic to Hatab’s, Benhabib’s, Young’s, and Habermas’s
arguments. With their help, I have attempted to wed Nietzsche with democracy. I
cannot help but view Nietzsche and democracy as a pair of antagonistic allies
who love to hate each other, but are necessary together. Democracy and
Nietzsche form a crucial symbiotic relationship. Nietzsche needs democracy for
the agon to be fully realized. Democracy can guarantee that certain rules will be
in place so that the contest is a bona fide competition. Contests that are staged or
rigged not only show contempt for the rights of citizens who wish to engage in
competition, but these farcical contests also disrespect the competitive character
of the agon. Democracy needs Nietzsche so we can see how important it is to let
marginal, divisive, and even loathsome perspectives into the debate. Democracy
needs a critic like to Nietzsche to make citizens grateful for free speech, justice
rules, and other civil liberties.
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Conclusion

It was my intention in this dissertation to align Nietzsche with liberal
democracy. This has not been an easy task, but I believe that I have been
successful. While there are many facets of democracy, I chose the marriage of
Nietzsche and liberal democracy. Liberal democracy promotes individual freedom
of thought and expression. Nietzsche's criticism of those moderns who
persistently remain in the herd and never establish a voice of their own would fit
quite nicely in a liberal democracy. In a liberal democracy, individuals have the
right to transcend the "herd" and express their values and not values created for
them. In theory, a liberal democracy would protect freedom of speech and
expression. A liberal democracy need not presuppose a substantive equality. In a
liberal democracy, our freedoms are equally protected, but we are not considered
to be equal to each other regarding intelligence or talent.
Nietzsche's views of democracy were myopic. Had he not presumed that
liberal democracy has these alleged leveling proclivities, he might have been
more amenable to it. I cannot speak for Nietzsche. This dissertation is but a
corollary to Nietzsche's scholarship. I sought to answer a deceptively simple
question: Under what political conditions could Nietzsche's philosophy of culture
be best realized? The answer might have surprised some readers who viewed
Nietzsche as a Fascist, proto-Nazi, or an anarchist.
There are lingering questions which cannot be fully answered by my
account. What do we do if these rules which guarantee a fair and competitive
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discourse are ignored by incumbent lawmakers? Even if all perspectives can be
aired, how can we ensure that the general population will hear these marginal
perspectives? How can we prevent these marginal perspectives from languishing
on the periphery of mainstream politics? In a country of Democrats and
Republicans, how can third parties reach out and attract undecided voters if these
candidates are not even allowed to engage in a nationally televised debate with
their more visible opponents? What do we do if certain perspectives are indeed
privileged over others? Would those who disagree with these privileged
perspectives have to participate in a contest elsewhere? What recourse do we
have from these problems? Answers to these questions are not implausible.
Answers are simply difficult to generate. Not even a democratic or a higher
culture may have all the answers.
But all of this is certainly a start. The marriage between Nietzsche and
democracy shows promise. Together they may be able to create a culture of
public competition that reveals the many talents and capabilities of its
participants. My purpose was to see not only what kind of impact Nietzsche’s
philosophy of culture would have on politics, but also to ascertain how
Nietzsche’s “higher culture” could be best realized. Nietzsche’s sometimes
opaque “higher culture” is not some kind of bestiary as MacIntyre sees it to be or
some kind of unattainable and distant notion. Strangely enough, democracy is
quite conducive to the emergence of the free spirits. The herd is still milling
around, blissfully nestled into their human-all-too-human values. Free spirits
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should be aware that their emergence would not be possible without the herd and
their “life-denying” values. Nietzsche is aware of this:
What with all their might they [levelers] would like
to strive after is the universal green pasture
happiness of the herd, with security, safety, comfort
and an easier life for all…and suffering itself they take
for something that has to be abolished. We, who are the
opposite of this, and have opened our eyes and our conscience
to the question where and how the plant ‘man’ has hitherto
grown up most vigorously, we think that this has always happened
under the opposite conditions, that the perilousness of his situation
had first to become tremendous, his powers of invention and
dissimulation had, under protracted pressure and
constraint, to evolve into subtlety and daring, his
will to life had to be intensified into unconditional
will to power - we think that severity, force, slavery,
peril in the street and in the heart, concealment,
stoicism, the art of experiment and the devilry of every kind,
that everything evil, dreadful, tyrannical, beast of prey
and serpent in man serves to enhance the species ‘man’
just as much as does its opposite (BGE 44).
It is under trying, maddening, abysmal conditions that a free spirit can emerge
from the rest of society. Free spirits are under societal duress to keep their
creative instincts to themselves and coalesce with the rest of the herd. Free spirits
are too grandiose and daring for their human-all-too-human counterparts. All that
is “evil, dreadful, tyrannical” will build up the free spirits because these qualities
are out of the ordinary. Yet their antitheses, that which is good, agreeable, and
tolerant serve as human-all-too-human ciphers against which the free spirits judge
themselves.
Furthermore, free spirits do not seek to abolish suffering. Suffering and all
that is terrible is what makes them stronger. Every free spirit may have to bite the
head of off of that appalling black serpent in order to affirm her life (Z III:2).
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When all that is blackest and heaviest is affirmed with all that is joyous and
weightless, free spirits can cast off that which burdens the herd, the levelers. But
higher humanity will mean nothing without a climate which is conducive for its
emergence. Free spirits could not emerge without a democracy. Democracy
would welcome the difference of opinion. Democracy would welcome rancorous
debate, differing values, resonant and weak voices. No totalitarian state would
tolerate free spirits. Democracy would respect the agonistic perspectivism that
should underlie any discourse. Democracy and Nietzsche may at first blush form
a mesalliance that can never be sundered. Nietzsche may not have realized it, but
his higher culture would be more than amenable to democracy. His culture and
his “good European” could not exist without it.
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